Philosophy 20: Ethics
Pierce College
Department of History,
Philosophy, & Sociology
Lecture Notes for Singer's "All
Animals are Equal"
Singer: the elimination of
racial and sexual oppression does not equate to the elimination of all forms of
class oppression or discrimination.
"A liberation
movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or
reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality."
Once we have reinterpreted
the principle of equality, we can uncover "unjustifiable prejudice."
We need to learn how to
adopt alternative perspectives, both emotionally and intellectually:
"We need to consider
them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and
the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this
unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and
practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one groupÐusually the one
to which we ourselves belongÐat the expense of another."
Singer's Project:
"My aim is to
advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and
practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than
our ownÐor, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals."
Singer's Project
Re-Stated:
"In other words, I am
urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that
most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own
species."
Worth NotingÐNegative:
There are important
differences between humans and other animals, and these differences must give
rise to some differences in the rights that each have."
We can recognize that
humans and nonhuman animals may not have the same rights.
"Since a man cannot
have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one."
"Since a pig can't
vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote."
Equality:
"The extension of the
basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we
must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same
rights to both groups."
Basic Principle:
"The basic principle
of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and equal
consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and
different rights."
Facts
If one pins their argument
against those who are against equality on facts, then one must appeal to
science (the study of facts), but the sciences have not determined if
differences in ability stem from genetic or environmental factors.
Ideals over Facts
"Fortunately, there
is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of this
scientific investigation."
"[T]he
claim to equality does not depend on intelligence,
moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact."
"Equality is a moral
ideal, not a simple assertion of fact."
"There is no
logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability
between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we
give to satisfying their needs and interests."
Principle of Equality
"The principle of the
equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality
among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans."
Bentham: "'Each to
count for one and none for more than one.'"
Singer on Bentham:
"In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to
be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any
other being."
Sidgwick: "'The good
of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I
may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.'"
"It is an implication
of this principle of equality that our concern for others ought not to depend
on what they are like, or what abilities they possessÐalthough precisely what
this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of
those affected by what we do."
"It is on this basis
that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately
rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be
condemned."
"If possessing a
higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his
own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans?"
Suffering
In line with Bentham,
Singer considers the role of suffering.
It is the capacity to
suffer that "gives a being the right to equal consideration."
Having the capacity to
suffer and be happy "is not just another characteristic like the capacity
for language, or for higher mathematics."
Those capacities are
prerequisites for "having interests at all."
"It would be nonsense
to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road
by a schoolboy."
"A stone does not
have interests because it cannot suffer."
"Nothing that we can
do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare."
Animals have interests in
"not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is."
Suffering
"If a being suffers,
there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into
consideration."
It is for this reason,
Singer argues, that suffering is the only non-arbitrary way to mark out a
boundary of non-consideration:" This is why the limit [the ability to
suffer or be happy] ... is the only defensible boundary of concern for the
interests of others."
Racists and sexists
violate the principle of equality "by giving greater weight to the
interests of members of" their own groups.
"Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to
override the greater interests of members of other species."
Speciesists most frequently violate other species' equality
with their mouths.
Some speciesists
violate other species' equality by condoning experiments on those species.
Philosopher-speciesists violate other species' equality by not
questioning the basic assumption of our times, anthrocentrism.
(In the interest of time
we'll focus on the third violation.)
Philosophers and the Ignorance
of Non-Human Animal Interests
Singer asserts that
philosophy "ought to question the basic assumptions of the age" so
that what is taken for granted can be discovered as just that.
But philosophers are the
products of their culture, and they too can be blind to their own
presuppositions.
"[P]hilosophy as practiced in the universities today does not
challenge anyone's preconceptions about our relations with other species."
Academic Philosophers
Singer focuses in on the
failure of academic philosophy to uncover its own unwarranted speciesism within
its focus on equality.
Philosophers try and
invent ways to show that humans are morally distinct from nonhuman
animals.
"They resort to
high-sounding phrases like 'the intrinsic dignity of the human individual;'
they talk of the 'intrinsic worth of all men' as if men (humans?) had some
worth that other beings did not, or they say that humans, and only humans, are
'ends in themselves,' while 'everything other than a person can only have value
for a person.'"
"[W]hen
one thinks only of humans, it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of
the dignity of all human beings."
"In so doing, we
implicitly condemn slavery, racism, and other violations of human rights."
"We admit that we
ourselves are in some fundamental sense on a par with the poorest, most
ignorant members of our own species."
But the elevation of our
entire species as equal lowers the "relative status of all other
species."
"The truth is that
the appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appears to solve the
egalitarian's problems only as long as it goes unchallenged."
Singer's Gonna Sing:
But why should it be that
all humans including "mental defectives, psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and
the restÐhave some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or
chimpanzee can ever achieve?"
When we ask that question,
Singer argues that we see that answering it is as difficult as answering the
original question:
What is the "relevant
fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals"?
Singer argues that these
two questions boil down to one: if there is some intrinsic human dignity, then
"some relevant capacities or characteristics that all and only humans
possess" would need to be identified and argued for.
Consider the existence of
humans "who quite clearly are below the level of awareness,
self-consciousness, intelligence, and sentience, of many non-humans."
Their existence challenges
"those who still think it may be possible to find some relevant
characteristic that distinguishes all humans from all members of other species ... ."
Singer has in mind
"humans with [non-self inflicted] severe and
irreparable brain damage," amongst other types of humans.
First off, the
philosophers that seek to in part explain human equality by excluding nonhuman
animals "rarely" lump such brain-damaged humans "in with the
other [nonhuman] animals."
If such humans were lumped
in with other animals, that would "entail that we have the right to
perform painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that we had the right to rear and
kill these humans for food."
Benn is one of the
philosophers that seek to in part explain human equality by excluding nonhuman
animals, but Benn does not avoid considering the problem brain-damaged humans
present.
Benn's notion of equality
admittedly has "only [to do with the] 'equal consideration of human
interests.'"
Benn: "' . . . not to
possess human shape is a disqualifying condition. However faithful or
intelligent a dog may be, it would be a monstrous sentimentality to attribute
to him interests that could be weighed in an equal balance with those of human
beings . . . if, for instance, one had to decide between feeding a hungry baby
or a hungry dog, anyone who chose the dog would generally be reckoned morally
defective, unable to recognize a fundamental inequality of claims.'"
Benn: "'This is what
distinguishes our attitude to animals from our attitude to imbeciles. It would
be odd to say that we ought to respect equally the dignity or personality of
the imbecile and of the rational man . . . but there is nothing odd about saying
that we should respect their interests equally, that is, that we should give to
the interests of each the same serious consideration as claims to
considerations necessary for some standard of well-being that we can recognize
and endorse.'"
Singer: "Benn's
statement of the basis of the consideration we should have for imbeciles seems
to me correct, but why should there be any fundamental inequality of claims
between a dog and a human imbecile?"
"Benn sees that if
equal consideration depended on rationality, no reason could be given against
using imbeciles for research purposes, as we now use dogs and guinea
pigs."
Benn: "The answer he
gives is this: ' . . . we respect the interests of men and give them priority
over dogs not insofar as they are rational, but because rationality is the
human norm. We say it is unfair to exploit the deficiencies of the imbecile who
falls short of the norm, just as it would be unfair, and not just ordinarily
dishonest, to steal from a blind man."
Benn: "'If we do not
think in this way about dogs, it is because we do not see the irrationality of
the dog as a deficiency or a handicap, but as normal for the species.'"
Benn: "'The
characteristics, therefore, that distinguish the normal man from the normal dog
make it intelligible for us to talk of other men having interests and
capacities, and therefore claims, of precisely the same kind as we make on our
own behalf.'"
Benn: "'But although
these characteristics may provide the point of the distinction between men and
other species, they are not in fact the qualifying conditions for membership,
to the distinguishing criteria of the class of morally considerable persons;
and this is precisely because a man does not become a member of a different
species, with its own standards of normality, by reason of not possessing these
characteristics.'"
Singer argues that the
problem can be seen in that last sentence.
Benn: " ... a man does not become a
member of a different species, with its own standards of normality, by reason
of not possessing [those] characteristics."
Singer's interpretation of
Benn: "An imbecile ... may
have no characteristics superior to those of a dog; nevertheless
this does not make the imbecile a member of 'a different species' as the dog
is. Therefore it would be 'unfair' to use the imbecile
for medical research as we use the dog."
Singer points out that
neither the brain damaged person nor other nonhuman animals are
"responsible for their mental level."
"If it is unfair to
take advantage of an isolated defect, why is it fair to take advantage of a
more general limitation?"
Singer argues that Benn's
argument is actually just an expression of interests in one's own species
merely because they are of one's own species.
To those not yet convinced
Singer proposes the following substitution exercise.
Assume: "it has been
proven that there is a difference in the average [I.Q.] for two different
races, say whites and blacks."
Substitute:
"'white'" for
"'men'"
"'black" for
"'dog'"
"'high I.Q.'"
for "'rationality'"
"'imbeciles'"
for "'dumb whites'"
"'species'" for
"'race'"
"It has become a
defense of a rigid, no-exceptions division between whites and blacks, based on l.Q. scores, not withstanding an
admitted overlap between whites and blacks in this respect."
But that is outrageous,
according to Singer.
"If the original did
not, at first reading strike us as being as outrageous as the revised version
does, this is largely because although we are not racists ourselves, most of us
are speciesists."