Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, and Sociology

Edith Stein	On the Problem of Empathy	Translated by Waltraut Stein; published by ICS Publications.
Forward	"the question of empathy as the perceiving [Erfahrung] of foreign subjects and their experiences [Erleben]."
Chapter Two	"The Essence of Acts of Empathy"
Givenness	How are acts of empathy given to us? A phenomenological answer is called for. The phenomenological reduction is first needed.	"All controversy over empathy is based on the implied assumption that foreign subjects and their experiences are given to us. Thinkers can deal with the circumstances of the occurrence, the effects, and the legitimacy of this givenness. But the most immediate undertaking is to consider the phenomenon of givenness in and by itself and to investigate its essence. We shall do this in the setting of the 'phenomenological reduction.'"
Abeyance	So, we put in abeyance the actual existence of things: the actual existence of things will not play a premise role in our thinking.	"The goal of phenomenology is to clarify and thereby to find the ultimate basis of all knowledge. To reach this goal it considers nothing that is in any way 'doubtful,' nothing that can be eliminated. ... "
	So, not the actual existence of ourselves as psycho-physical beings, not the actual existence of other psycho-physical beings, and not the world "out there."	"Is it based on natural experience then? By no means, for even this as well as its continuation, research in natural science, is subject to diverse interpretations (as in materialistic or idealistic philosophy) and thus stands in need of clarification. Therefore the entire surrounding world, the physical as well as the psycho-physical, the bodies as well as the souls of men and animals (including the psycho-physical person of the investigator himself) is subject to the exclusion or reduction."
Retained	What's left over after this suspension? "[M]y experience of the thing (the perception, memory, or other kind of comprehension)," "together with its correlate, the full 'phenomenon of the thing' (the object given as the same in series of diverse perceptions or memories)." "Thus there remains the whole 'phenomenon of the world' when its positing has been suspended." "And these 'phenomena' are the object of phenomenology."	"what I cannot exclude, what is not subject to doubt, is my experience of the thing (the perception, memory, or other kind of comprehension) together with its correlate, the full 'phenomenon of the thing' (the object given as the same in series of diverse perceptions or memories). This phenomenon retains its entire character and can be made into an object of consideration."
Am "I" suspended?	Have we gone too far? My "empirical 'I,'" with its particular history any with my various, peculiar and unique idiosyncrasies, is suspended, but "'I,' the experiencing subject who considers the world and my own person as phenomenon, 'I' am in experience and only in it, am just as indubitable and impossible to cancel as experience itself."	"It is not indubitable that I exist, this empirical 'I' of this name and station, given such and such attributes. My whole past could be dreamed or be a deceptive recollection. Therefore, it is subject to the exclusion, only remaining an object of consideration as a phenomenon. But 'I,' the experiencing subject who considers the world and my own person as phenomenon, 'I' am in experience and only in it, am just as indubitable and impossible to cancel as experience itself."
Description of Empathy in Comparison with Other Acts	"A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain." "What kind of awareness is this?"	"A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain. What kind of awareness is this? I am not concerned here with going into the basis on which I infer the pain. Perhaps his face is pale or disturbed, his voice toneless and strained. Perhaps he also expresses his pain in words. Naturally, these things can all be investigated, but these are not my concern here. I would like to know, not how I arrive at this awareness, but what it itself is."
Outer Perception?	"I have no outer perception of the pain." Objects of outer perception are spatio-temporal beings concretely embodied. Objects of outer perception come to me with "embodied givenness."	"Needless to say, I have no outer perception of the pain. Outer perception is a term for acts in which spatio-temporal concrete being and occurring come to me in embodied givenness."
Embodied Givenness	Having "embodied givenness" means having "the quality of being there itself right now." The facing side of this cup has embodied givenness. The facing side of this cup is "primordially there." The non-facing side of this cup is not. The non-facing side of this cup is "co-perceived." The non-facing side of this cup is "averted."	"This being has the quality of being there itself right now; it turns this or that side to me and the side turned to me is embodied in a specific sense. It is primordially there in comparison with sides co-perceived but averted."

Pain	Pain is not like a cup. Pain does not have a primordial side that can have embodied givenness. While the cup has non-primordially side that are averted, the non-primordially given sides can be primordially given.	"The pain is not a thing and is not given to me as a thing, even when I am aware of it 'in' the pained countenance. I perceive this countenance outwardly and the pain is given 'at one' with it."
A Limited Parallel Between Outer Perception & Empathy	But just as we can gain clarity about the cup by turning it about. We can gain some clarity about the pain by investigating it. But, "in principle, I can never get an 'orientation' where the pain itself is primordially given."	"There is a close, yet very loose, parallel between empathic acts and the averted sides of what is seen, because in progressive perceptions I can always bring new sides of the thing to primordial givenness. Each side can, in principle, assume this primordial givenness I select. I can consider the expression of pain, more accurately, the change of face I empathically grasp as an experience of pain, from as many sides as I desire. Yet, in principle, I can never get an 'orientation' where the pain itself is primordially given."
Empathy & Primordiality	While objects of both outer perception and empathy have objects "present here and now." Empathy lacks the primordiality possible in outer perception.	"Thus empathy does not have the character of outer perception, though it does have something in common with outer perception: In both cases the object itself is present here and now. We have come to recognize outer perception as an act given primordially. But, though empathy is not outer perception, this is not to say that it does not have this 'primordiality.'"
Primordiality "Within"	But pain can be experienced primordially, if it is our own. "[O]ur own experiences as they are given in reflection have the character of primordiality."	"There are things other than the outer world given to us primordially; for instance, there is ideation which is intuitive comprehension of essential states. Insight into a geometric axiom is primordially given as well as valuing. Finally and above all, our own experiences as they are given in reflection have the character of primordiality."
	But not all of our pain is experience primordially. Remembered pain is not primordially present.	"But not all experiences are primordially given nor primordial in their content. Memory, expectation, and fantasy do not have their object bodily present before them. They only represent it, and this character of representation is an immanent, essential moment of these acts, not a sign from their objects."
	"It is possible for every experience to be primordially given, i.e., it is possible for the reflecting glance of the 'I' in the experience to be there bodily itself. Furthermore, it is possible for our own experiences to be given non-primordially in memory, expectation, or fantasy."	"Finally, there is the question of givenness of our own experiences themselves."

Is Empathy Analogous to Memory	"The memory of joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non-primordial." "This act has the total character of joy which I could study, but the joy is not primordially and bodily there, rather as having once been alive (and this 'once,' the time of the past experience, can be definite or indefinite)."	"There is a well-known analogy between acts of empathy and acts in which our own experiences are given non-primordially. The memory of joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non-primordial. This act has the total character of joy which I could study, but the joy is not primordially and bodily there, rather as having once been alive (and this 'once,' the time of the past experience, can be definite or indefinite). The present non-primordiality points back to the past primordiality. This past has the character of a former 'now.' Accordingly, memory posits, and what is remembered has being."
I Now ≠ I Then	In memory, the I remembering faces the I remembered. I remembering is primordially given. I remembered is non-primordially given.	"Furthermore, there are two possibilities: The 'I' as the subject of the act of remembering, in this act of representation, can look back at the past joy. Then the past joy is the intentional object of the 'I,' its subject being with and in the 'I' of the past. Thus the present 'I' and the past 'I' face each other as subject and object. They do not coincide, though there is consciousness of sameness. But his is not a positive identification and, moreover, the distinction between the primordially remembering 'I' and the 'I' non-primordially remembered persists."
		"the memory always remains a representation with a non-primordial subject which is in contrast with the subject doing the remembering."
Self-Surrogate	N.B. "[I]t is possible for me to represent a past situation to myself and be unable to remember my inner behavior in this situation. As I transfer myself back into this situation, a surrogate for the missing memory comes into focus." You've asked yourself before, haven't you, "What was I thinking?"	"At the end of the process there is a new objectification. I now unite the past experience, which first arose before me as a whole which I then took apart while projecting myself into it, in an 'apperceptive grip.' Divers forms of memory can have a variety of gaps. Thus it is possible for me to represent a past situation to myself and be unable to remember my inner behavior in this situation. As I transfer myself back into this situation, a surrogate for the missing memory comes into focus. This image of the past behavior is not, however, a representation of what is past. Rather, it is the requisite completion of the memory image to get the meaning of the whole. It can have the character of doubt, conjecture, or possibility, but never the character of being."
Empathy	Similar to memory, in empathy we see "an act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content." Empathic act: primordially present Empathized content: non-primordially present	"So now to empathy itself. Here, too, we are dealing with an act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content. And this content is an experience which, again, can be had in different ways such as in memory, expectation, or in fantasy."
Object / Content / Subject / Understanding	E.G.: The empathic object is another's sadness. The empathic content is that about which the other is sad. The empathic subject: "I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am I at the subject of the content in the original subjects' place" The empathic understanding of the content is something even further.	"When it arises before me all at once, it faces me as an object (such as the sadness I 'read in another's face'). But when I inquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself), the content, having pulled me into it is no longer really an object. I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am I at the subject of the content in the original subjects' place. And only after successfully executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object."
Levels	"These are (1) the emergence of experience, (2) the fulfilling expectation, and (3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience."	"Thus in all the cases of the representation of experiences considered, there are three levels or modalities of accomplishment even if in a concrete case people do not always go through all levels but are often satisfied with one of the lower ones. These are (1) the emergence of experience, (2) the fulfilling expectation, and (3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience. One the first and the third levels, the representation exhibits the non-primordial parallel to perception, and on the second level it exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the having of the experience."
Alterity	"The subject of the empathized experience, however, is not the subject of the empathizing, but another." "These two subjects are separate and not joined together, as previously [in memory], by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience."	"The subject of the empathized experience, however, is not the subject of the empathizing, but another. And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast with the memory, expectation, or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two subjects are separate and not joined together, as previously, by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience."
Non-Primordiality as Empathic Subject	"And while I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial joy."	"And while I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial joy. It does not issue live from my 'I.' Neither does it have the character of once having lived like remembered joy. But still much less is it merely fantasied without actual life."
Other's Primordiality	"This other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial."	"This other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience."
Empathy So Far	"Empathy, which we examined and sought to describe, is the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of the experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced." "This is how human being comprehend the psychic life of their fellows."	"Thus empathy is a kind of act of perceiving [eine Art erfahrender Akte] sui generis. We have set ourselves the task of expounding it in its peculiarity before tackling any other question (of whether such experience is valid or how it occurs). And we have conducted this investigation in purest generality. Empathy, which we examined and sought to describe, is the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of the experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced. We only discussed the pure 'I,' the subject of experience, on the subject's as well as on the object's side. Nothing else was drawn into the investigation."

Chapter III	"The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual" "Now let us turn to the constitution of the individual and make clear, in the first place, what an individual is."	"We have final clarity and no questions remain open when we have achieved what we call progress–the constitution of transcendent objects in immanently given, pure consciousness. This is the goal of phenomenology."
Where We're Headed	"It is a unified object inseparably joining together the conscious unity of an 'I' and a physical body in such a way that each of them takes on a new character."
Individual Will Include the Living Body	"The living body in contrast to the physical body is characterized by having: "fields of sensation, "being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, "moving voluntarily and "being constructed of moving organs, "being the field of expression of the experiences of its 'I' and the instrument of the 'I's' will."
Mine	Individuality is here at the beginning of our investigation, "'itself' and no other." That which is mine and non-other's.	"First of all, it means only that it is 'itself' and no other. This 'selfness' is experienced and is the basis of all that is 'mine.'"
Against the Relief of the Other	The other serves as "relief" against which that which is mine emerges.	"Naturally [lower-case 'n' naturlich], it is first brought into relief in contrast with another when another is given."
Individual v. Other	At this stage, both individual and other are qualityless. To each, an 'other.'	"This other is at first not qualitatively distinguished from it, since both are qualityless, but only distinguished as simply an 'other.'"
	Your otherness is given to me unlike the way my I is given to me. Your otherness is given to me as "you." You experience your you as an "I," as I do my own I.	"This otherness is apparent in the type of givenness; it is other than 'I' because it is given to me in another way than 'I.' Therefore it is 'you.' But, since it experiences itself as I experience myself, the 'you' is another 'I.'"
Selfness	Our own individual "selfness is brought into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other."	"Thus the 'I' does not become individualized because it faces it, but its individuality, or as we would rather say (because we must reserve the term 'individuality' for something else), its selfness is brought into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other."
Section 2	"The Stream of Consciousness"
I am a Unity of a Stream	Here, the "I" has a quality, being the unity of a stream of consciousness. Here, the "I" is the subject of actual experience.	"We can take the 'I' in a second sense as the unity of a stream of consciousness. We begin with the 'I' as the subject of an actual experience."
My Figure/Ground	But experiences emerge against a background of other experiences. The "I" of the stream shifts.	"However, when we reflect on this experience, we find that it is not isolated, but set against a background of a stream of such experiences more or less clearly and distinctly given. The 'I' of this experience was not always in it but shifted over or was drawn into it from another experience, and so on."
Non-Representational & Representational	In the stream, "I's" are experienced. Some "I's" in the stream are only accessible representationally.	"Going over these experiences, we continually come upon experiences in which the present 'I' has once lived." "This is even true when we can no longer directly grasp the experience, finding it necessary to view it through remembering representation."
Other Streams	All of the stream's experiences are affiliated with the pure "I" of the living now, of the present. Other's streams "face" mine. "[T]he stream of the 'I' faces those of the 'you' and the 'he'" and the she and others.	"Precisely this affiliation of all the stream's experiences with the present, living, pure 'I' constitutes its inviolable unity." "Now 'other' streams of consciousness face this 'same' stream; the stream of the 'I' faces those of the 'you' and the 'he.'"
Individuation	Streams are otherwise than identical; "each one has its peculiar experiential content."	"Their selfness and otherness are based on those of their subject. However, they are not only 'others,' but also 'varied' because each one has its peculiar experiential content."
	Each experience of a stream is unique. Each experience of a stream has a unique position in that stream. Positions within a stream provide experiential context. This context ≠ belonging to an "I."	"Since every single experience of a stream is particularly characterized by its position in the total experiential context, it is also characterized apart form belonging to an 'I.'"
	"Thus it is also qualitative as the experience of this and no other 'I,' and streams of consciousness are qualitatively distinguished by virtue of their experiential content."	"But even this qualitative distinction does not yet take us to what is usually understood by an individual 'I' or an individual."

Tending	Acts emerging from tendencies ... ≠ Acts that emerge from some causal succession.	"Tending also has a similar structure, and action progressing from a tendency does not appear as a causal succession, either."
Volition	In tending, the "I" is "drawn into action" but expresses no creativity. Creative acts evince "a volitional action."	"The difference is that in tending the 'I' is drawn into action, does not step into it freely, and no creative strength is lived out in it." "Every creative act in the true sense is a volitional action. "Willing and tending both have the capacity to make use of psycho-physical causality, but it can only be said that the willing 'I' is the master of the living body."
Section 5	"Transition to the Foreign Individual"
So Far	"It is a unified object inseparably joining together the conscious unity of an 'I' and a physical body in such a way that each of them takes on a new character."	"We have at least outlined an account of what is meant by an individual 'I' or by individuals."
You Can't Forget the Body!	"The living body in contrast to the physical body is characterized by having fields of sensation, being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of moving organs, being the field of expression of the experiences of its 'I' and the instrument of the 'I's' will."
Section 5(a)	"The Fields of Sensation of the Foreign Living Body"	"Let us begin by considering what permits the foreign living body to be comprehended as a living body, what distinguishes it from other physical bodies."
Experiencing Our Own Sphere of Ownness	How are "raw" fields of sensation given to us? Our own field of sensations are given to us primordially in the experience of our bodies. And when we perceive our physical-body, our own field of sensations is "co-given." "Moreover, they are 'co-given' in the outer perception of our physical body in that very peculiar way where what is not perceived can be there itself together with what is perceived."	"First we ask how fields of sensation are given to us." "As we saw, we have a primordial givenness in 'bodily perception' of our own fields of sensation."
The Other's Sphere	We perceive the other's field of sensations via a perception of their physical-body. The other's body can be primordially experienced, and their field of sensations can be experienced as non-primordially "co-given." The two are "co-given."	"The other's fields of sensation are there for me in the same way. Thus the foreign living body is 'seen' as a living body."
Con-Primordiality	The entire individual is experienced, with some parts given primordially, and some non-primordially. The other is experienced "con-primordially."	"This kind of givenness, that we want to call 'con-primordiality,' confronts us in the perception of the thing. The averted and interior sides of a spatial thing are go-given with its seen sides."
Primordially Other	"In short the whole thing is 'seen.' But, as we have already said, this givenness of the one side implies tendencies to advance to new givennesses." "If we do this, then in a pregnant sense we primordially perceive the formerly averted sides that were given con-primordially."
Alterity	What's going on here? As we'll see, Stein is not claiming that we can primordially experience someone else's field of sensations.
		"Such fulfillment of what is intended or anticipated is also possible in 'co-seeing' of our own fields of sensation, only not in progressive outer perception, but in the transition from outer to bodily perception."
Representation	The other's field of sensations remains theirs. I can have experiences of their field of sensations, though not primordial experiences of them. "Empathic representation is the only fulfillment possible here."	"The co-seeing of foreign fields of sensation also implies tendencies, but their primordial fulfillment is in principle excluded here. I can neither bring them to primordial givenness to myself in progressive outer perception nor in the transition to bodily perception."
		"Besides by empathic presentation and con-primordiality, I can also bring these fields of sensation to givenness by making them intuitive for me, not in the character of perception, but only representationally."
The Hand	Can I get a hand please? It is not there like this cup is. I can see how the table would feel. I can even see how that hand is oriented to the edge of the table. I can situation myself in the position of that hand (non-primordially).	"The hand resting on the table does not lie there like the book beside it. It 'presses' against the table more or less strongly; it lies there limpid or stretched; and I 'see' these sensations of pressure and tension in a con-primordial way. If I follow out the tendencies to fulfillment in this 'co-comprehension,' my hand is moved (not in reality, but 'as if') to the place of the foreign one. It is moved into it and occupies its position and attitude, now feeling its sensations, through not primordially and not as being its own."
	Via empathy, we can feel the table "with" each other. I'm not confused as to who's hand is who's. "[T]he empathized sensations are continually brought into relief as foreign in contrast with our own sensations."	"Rather, my own hand feels the foreign hand's sensations 'with,' precisely through the empathy whose nature we earlier differentiated form our own experience and every other kind of representation. During this projection, the foreign hand is continually perceived as belonging to the foreign physical body so that the empathized sensations are continually brought into relief as foreign in contrast with our own sensations. This is so even when I am not turned toward this contrast in the manner of awareness."
Section 5(b)	And all of the above is possible with different hands as our own hands are not given to us as "inalterably fixed." Sure there are limits, but they are broad limits.	"Were the size of my hand, such as its length, width, span, etc. given to me as inalterably fixed, the attempt at empathy with any hand having different properties would have to fail because of the contrast between them." "But actually empathy is also quite successful with men's and children's hands which are very different from mine, for my physical body and its members are not given as a fixed type but as an accidental realization of a type that is variable within definite limits."
Section 5(d)	The other's zero-point of orientation
	Living-bodies have fields of sensations ... & Living-bodies have unique zero-points of orientation.	"We come to the second constituent of the living body: its position at the zero point of orientation."
Physical Bodies	The other's physical-body is given in space like other physical bodies.	"The living body cannot be separated from the givenness of the spatial outer world. The other's physical body as a mere physical body is spatial like other things and is given at a certain location, at a certain distance from me as the center of spatial orientation, and in certain spatial relationships to the rest of the spatial world."
New Zero-Point	When a physical-body is experienced as having a field of sensations, as having a living-body, the experience of my spatial world changes as there is a new zero-point of orientation. (Cf. Sartre's drain.)	"When I now interpret it as a sensing living body and empathically project myself into it, I obtain a new image of the spatial world and a new zero point of orientation." "It is not that I shift my zero point to this place, for I train my 'primordial' zero point and my 'primordial' orientation while I am empathically, non-primordially obtaining the other one."
Con-Primordial	Here too, the other's zero-point is "con-primordially" given. The other's physical-body is experienced as being "given primordially to the other 'I,' even though non-primordially to me."	"[T]his orientation, as well as the empathized sensations, is con-primordial, because the living body to which it refers is perceived as a physical body at the same time and because it is given primordially to the other 'I,' even though non-primordially to me."
Nearly Full	We've come a long way. The other now has not just a field of sensations, but also as having its own "here."	"This orientation takes us a long way in constituting the foreign individual, for by means of it the 'I' of the sensing, living body empathizes the whole fullness of outer perception in which the spatial world is essentially constituted." "A sensing subject has become one which carries out acts." "And so all designations resulting form the immanent essential examination of perceptual consciousness apply to it."
		"This also makes statements about the essentially possible various modalities of the accomplishment of acts and about the actuality and non-actuality of perceptual acts and of what is perceived applicable to this subject."
		"In principle, the outwardly perceiving 'I' can perceive in the manner of the 'cogito,' i.e., in the mode of specific 'being directed' toward an object; and, simultaneously given, is the possibility of reflection on that accomplished act."
		"Naturally, empathy with a perceiving consciousness in general does not prescribe the form of accomplishment actually present; for this we need specific criteria according to the case. However, the essential possibilities present in particular cases are determined a priori."
Section 5(e)	As a result of such an other, we can enrich our own world, even if only with regards to spatial objects at this point; "Here emerges the possibility of enriching our own world image through another's, the significance of empathy for experiencing the real outer world."
Section 5(f)	Founding the world
One Amongst Others	My zero-point is merely one point amongst other points.	"From the viewpoint of the zero point of orientation gained in empathy, I must no longer consider my own point as the zero point, but as a spatial point among many."
Similar Bodies	We share in having our kind of bodies and unique experience of one's own experiences.	"By this means, and only by this means, I learn to see my living body as a physical body like others. At the same time, only in primordial experience is it given to me as a living body."
Similarly Special Bodies	My body retains a specialness to it as I cannot have the living, primordial perspectives on it that you can have.	"Moreover, it is given to me as an incomplete physical body in outer perception and as different from all others." "In 'reiterated empathy' I again interpret this physical body as a living body, and so it is that I first am given to myself as a psycho-physical individual in the full sense."
Section 5(g)	Building the world
Experience of the World	The world experienced: "The world I glimpse empathically is an existing world, posited as having like the world primordially perceived." "The perceived world and the world given empathically are the same world differently seen."
		"But it is not only the same one seen from different sides as when I perceive primordially and, traversing continuous varieties of appearances, go from one standpoint motivates the later one, each following one severs the preceding one."
		"Of course, I also accomplish the transition from my standpoint to the other's in the same manner, but the new standpoint does not step into the old one's place."
	Ours are different perspectives onto the same world; "The same world is not merely presented now in one way and then in another, but in both ways at the same time."	"I retain them both at the same time. The same world is not merely presented now in one way and then in another, but in both ways at the same time."
Unique Perspectives	And yet our perspectives can be unique. However the unique the perspectives are, they are nevertheless perspectives onto the same world.	"And not only is it differently presented depending on the momentary standpoint, but also depending on the nature of the observer." "This makes the appearances of the world dependent on individual consciousness, but the appearing world–which is the same, however and to whomever it appears–is made independent of consciousness."
Curious	"Were I imprisoned within the boundaries of my individuality, I could not go beyond 'the world as it appears to me.'"
Gaining The World	"At least it would be conceivable that the possibility of its independent existence, that could still be given as a possibility, would always be undemonstrable. But this possibility is demonstrated as soon as I cross these boundaries by the help of empathy and obtain the same world's second and third appearance which are independent of my perception."
Empathy as the Condition of the Possible Knowledge of of an Existing Outer World	"Thus empathy as the basis of intersubjective experience becomes the condition of the possible knowledge of the existing outer world, as Husserl and Royce present it."
Empathy and Objective Language	Empathy makes understanding linguistic noises possible.	"[I]f there were no possibility of empathy, of transferring the self into the other's orientation, their statements about their phenomenal world would always have to remain unintelligible, at least in the sense of a complete fulfilling understanding in contrast with the mere empty understanding of words."
Language Filling In Gaps	Language can help us refine our knowledge of the world. "Statements can fill the breach and supplement where empathy fails." "Possibly they may even serve as points of departure for further empathy." "But in principle they cannot substitute for empathy." "Rather, their production assumes that of empathy."
Section 5(h)	"The Foreign Living Body a the Bearer of Voluntary Movement"
Individual's Voluntary Movement	"An individual's movements are not given to us as merely mechanical movements."	"We have become acquainted with the foreign living body as the bearer of fields of sensation and as a center of orientation of the spatial world." "Now we find that voluntary movement is another constituent of it. An individual's movements are not given to us as merely mechanical movements."
My Voluntary & Non-Voluntary Movement	"If I grasp and raise one hand with the other, the former's movement is given to me as mechanical in the same sense as a physical body I lift." One hand voluntarily moving: "'I move'" Hand moved not voluntarily (in the relevant sense): w/out "'I move'"	"Of course, there are also cases of this kind just as in our own movements." "The simultaneous sensations constitute the consciousness of a positional change of my living body, but not of the experience 'I move.'"
Your Non-Voluntary Movement	Isadora Duncan (who writes of empathizing with an orchestra) is in the passenger seat of a Bugatti. Non-voluntary movement as moving object w/in moving object	"Movements analogous to our own are found in foreign movements." "If I see someone ride past in a car, in principle his movement appears no differently to me than the 'static' parts of the car." "It is mechanical associated movement and is not empathized, but outwardly perceived."
Empathizing w/ Non-Voluntary Movement	This too can be empathized when I adopt her orientation.	"Of course, I must keep his interpretation of this movement completely separate. I represent this to myself empathically when I transfer myself into his orientation."
Empathizing w/ Voluntary Movement	But, Isadora waves at us. "The case is entirely different if, for example, he raises himself up in the car. I 'see' a movement of the type of my spontaneous movement." "As I participate in the movement empathically ... I follow out the 'co-perceived' spontaneous movement's tendency to fulfillment."	"I interpret it as his spontaneous movement."
Your Voluntary Movement	Isadora's wave is not experienced as the product of some external puppet-master's.	"Finally, I objectify it so that the movement faces me as the other individual's movement."
On the Condition of Lived Body	"In order to empathize alive movement in this physical body, we must already have interpreted it as a living body."	"We would never interpret the spontaneous movement of a physical body as alive, even should we perhaps illustrate its difference form imparted or associated movement to ourselves by a quasi-empathy."
Individuals Move Voluntarily	"And voluntary mobility is closely link with the other constituents of the individual."	"This is how the foreign living body with its organs is given to me as able to move."
W/out Voluntary Movement, No Individual	"[V]oluntary movement is a part of the structure of the individual and is entirely nonsuspendable."
Elsewhere in Chapter III	(Filling in some gaps.)
Background Experiences	"Part of the nature of consciousness is that the cogito, the act in which the 'I' lives, is surrounded by a marginal zone of background experiences in each moment of existence."
Previously Initiated, yet Abiding, Intention-in-Actions	Earlier initiated volitions linger: "it is not something past which affects the present, but something that reaches into the present."	"They [those background experiences] are still primordially present, even if not actually, and therefore have efficacy." "The unfulfilled volition is not dead, but continues to live in the background of consciousness until its time comes and it can be realized. Then its effect begins." "Thus it is not something past which affects the present, but something that reaches into the present."
Likewise w/ the Future	"Future events which 'throw their shadows in advance' are no different. Scheler gives an example of James who, under the influence of an unpleasant logic course he had to teach afternoons, undertook many unnecessary activities the entire day before simply so that he would find no time for the burdensome preparation. Yet he did not 'think about it.' ... Rather, it remains 'in the background' and influences our entire conduct."
Background's Scope	"Experiences of early childhood can also endure into my present, even though pushed into the background by the profusion of later events. This can clearly be seen in dispositions towards other persons." "I do not 'forget' my friends when I am not thinking about them. They then belong to the unnoticed present horizon of my world."	"And of what finally concerns the efficacy of the whole life on every moment of its existence we must say: Everything living in the present can have an effect, irrespective of how far the initiation of the affecting experience is from 'now.'"
Reflections on the (Empirical) Self	We assume the position of the other when reflecting on ourselves (recall memory analogy).	"To consider ourselves in inner perception, i.e., to consider our psychic 'I' and its attributes, means to see ourselves as we see another and as he sees us."
Getting the (Empirical) Self Wrong	Just as we can ask ourselves "What was I thinking?" we can get ourselves wrong.	"And, in principle, it is possible for all the interpretations of myself with which I become acquainted to be wrong."
The Other's Reflection	Sometimes the other's reflection on our self can be more accurate.	"It is possible for another to 'judge me more accurately' than I judge myself and give me clarity about myself."
"Come Together ... Right Now, ... Over Me"	"This is how empathy and inner perception work hand in hand to give me myself to myself."