Philosophy
2: Society and Values
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy,
& Sociology
Lecture
Notes for Mill's On Liberty
A
Moral Foundation
"I regard utility as the ultimate
appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."
Principle
of Harm
"That principle, that the sole
end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. That the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
Mill's
Liberalism
The individual has a certain priority
over the community.
"In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign."
Liberty's
Region
Mill lists out the domain of liberty
prescribed by the Principle of Harm:
1) the private life of consciousness,
2) "the liberty of thought and
feeling,"
3) the absolute freedom to hold
opinions, have sentiments "on all subjects,"
4) "the liberty of expressing and
publishing opinions,
5) "the liberty of tastes and
pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character,"
6) the liberty of "doing what we
like," and
7) the liberty to assemble freely.
Those liberties can be pursued by us "so
long as what we do does not harm [others], even though they should think our
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong."
Liberty's
Region / Opinion in Focus
1) "mental well-being of
mankind" demands a liberty of opinion;
2) it would take an infallible opinion
to silence another, but the assumption of infallible opinion is highly suspect;
3) it is only through the clash of
opinions that good opinions can be tempered by bad opinions, for even bad
opinions can bear "a portion of truth;"
4) opinions which are entirely wrong
can prevent the dogmatic assumption of true opinions; and
5) opinions not challenged by other
opinions lose their meanings.
What
Freedom Means to Mill
Any society that respects those
liberties is free:
"The only freedom which deserves
the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain
it."
Exceptions
There is one significant exception to
that absolute right of self-sovereignty conferred on citizens by the Principle
of Harm:
"Those who are still in a state
to require being taken care of by others must be protected against their own
actions as well as against external injury."
At least three types of people, Mill
argues, require that protection:
a) children,
b) certain kinds of the elderly, and
c) races that of "considered as
in [their] nonage."
Whence
the Exceptions
According to Mill, those three groups
lack "the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction
or persuasion," and as a result members of those groups can be compelled
"as a means to their own good."
Should the members of those groups
become capable of guiding their own improvements, they then gain the right of
self-sovereignty.
Before they gain those capacities,
however, they are rightfully constrained and cannot be said to be living in
freedom.
Others'
Direct Interests / Taxes
The harm principle implies a fair
amount of societal intervention and compulsion, in order to preserve individuals'
rights of self-sovereignty.
Thus, the self-sovereign interests of
the multitude of men "in the largest sense," permit the suppression
of behaviors that might harm others, and the compulsion of behaviors where
those behaviors are needed to prevent the harm of others.
Negatively, "If any one does an
act harmful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him," by
law or by general "disapprobation."
Positively, a citizen "may
rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing" things that are
"obviously a man's duty to do," including
a) "to bear his fair share in the common
defense,
b) "to give evidence in a court of justice, or
c) "[to bear his fair share] in any other joint work necessary to
the interests of the society ... "
Whence
the Obligation to Obey the Laws Regarding Direct Interests
These direct interests that the state
has in intervening upon, and compelling, any individual's actions gives rise to
an obligation to,
a) (negatively) "not injuring the
interests of one another," and
b) (positively) to bear "his
share ... of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or
its members from injury and molestation."
Why? you ask? Whence this obligation to obey the laws which
dictate a) and b)?
"Though society is not founded on
a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in
order to deduce social obligations from it, every one
who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the
fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest."
The
Law's Limits
But, Mill concedes, there are forms of
harm that ought not be covered by either of those negative or positive
laws. They amount to offenses, but not
to real harm:
"The acts of an individual may be
hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without
going the length of violating any of their constituted rights."
"The offender may then be justly
punished by opinion, though not by law."
The acts of such an individual may
permit us to offer our help:
"Considerations to aid his
judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even
obtruded on him, by others; but," Mill argues, "he, himself is the
final judge. All errors which he is
likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of
allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good."
Other's
Indirect Interests / Extra-Judiciary Control
Mill does admit that opinions can
warrant a kind of social punishment, though not a legal one.
Social punishment is warranted because
of society's indirect interest in what goes on in the mind and house of the
individual when those occurrences can lead to harm in others.
Society thus has indirect interests in
whether or not an individual has moral vices ranging from "irascibility on
insufficient cause" to "the pride which derives gratification form
the abasement of others."
Here is his moralization:
"There is a degree of folly, and
a degree of what may be called ... lowness or depravation of taste, which,
though it cannot justify doing [legal] harm to the person who manifests it,
renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme
cases, even of contempt ... . Though doing no [legal] wrong to anyone, a
person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or
as a being of an inferior order ... ."
Social
Punishment
Mill argues that this notion of social
punishment can be severe:
the contemptibly depraved "may
suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others," like being passed
over for promotion, being boycotted, being shunned in the streets, etc.
Exceptions
"A person who shows rashness,
obstinacy, self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot
restrain himself from hurtful indulgences—who pursues animal pleasures at the
expense of those of feeling and intellect—must expect to be lowered in the
opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable
sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited
their favour by special excellence in his social
relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not
affected by his demerits towards himself."