Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, and Sociology

Peter Singer's 1972 "Famine, Affluence, and Morality"

Peter Singer	"Famine, Affluence, and Morality"	Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229_243 [revised edition]
9 Million Refugees & Human Powers	"Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions." "The decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering."	"As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical care. The suffering and death that are occurring there now are not inevitable, not unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions. The decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering."
Few Step Up	Most individuals who could make even a modest difference do not.	"At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any significant way."
	Most governments that could make a modest different don't.	"At the government level, no government has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive for more than a few days."
Comparisons	"For comparative purposes, Britain's share of the nonrecoverable development costs of the Anglo_French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,000. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as highly as it values the lives of the nine million refugees."
Money Needed	"The estimated cost of keeping the refugees alive for one year is £464,000,000." "The World Bank has said that India needs a minimum of £300,000,000 in assistance from other countries before the end of the year."
Bengal and Abroad	Such is the situation in Bengal in 1971, and in other parts of the world at different times.	"There are also many parts of the world in which people die from malnutrition and lack of food independent of any special emergency. I take Bengal as my example only because it is the present concern, and because the size of the problem has ensured that it has been given adequate publicity. Neither individuals nor governments can claim to be unaware of what is happening there."
Singer's Thesis	"I shall argue that the way people in relatively affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal cannot be justified; indeed, the whole way we look at moral issues–our moral conceptual scheme–needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society."
Death Assumption	Singer begins by expressing an assumption (that which he won't be arguing for but that upon which his argument depends): "suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad."	"I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this, although one may reach the same view by different routes. I shall not argue for this view. People can hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and perhaps from some of them it would not follow that death by starvation is in itself bad. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to refute such positions, and so for brevity I will henceforth take this assumption as accepted. Those who disagree need read no further."
Prevention Principle	Singer's next "point:" "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."
Comparable Importance	"By 'without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance' I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent."
In Other Words	The prevention principle "requires us only to prevent what is bad, and to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably important."
The Famous Kid/Shoes Example	"[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out." "This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing."
No Distance Condition	Notice that the principle does not have qualification about proximity. "It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away."	"The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed. For the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away."
What Physical Distance Means	"The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away." "we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us" if we want to "accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, [or] equality ... ."	"I do not think I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take proximity and distance into account. The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away. If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are far away from him)."
Close Proximity Means	When things are physically closer they are usually easier to assess and change, we are inclined to think. In the ages before "instant communication and swift transportation" one could reasonably limit their moral concern to those near to them. But now, from "the moral point of view, the development of the world into a 'global village' has made an important, though still unrecognized, difference to our moral situation." Now, relief organizations "can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block."	"Admittedly, it is possible that we are in a better position to judge what needs to be done to help a person near to us than one far away, and perhaps also to provide the assistance we judge to be necessary. If this were the case, it would be a reason for helping those near to us first. This may once have been a justification for being more concerned with the poor in one's town than with famine victims in India. Unfortunately for those who like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation. From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a 'global village' has made an important, though still unrecognized, difference to our moral situation. Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine_prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block. There would seem, therefore, to be no possible justification for discriminating on geographical grounds."
No Moral Agent Individuation Condition	"Secondly, the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position."
Merely One Amongst Millions Makes No Difference	"There may be a greater need to defend the second implication of my principle–that the fact that there are millions of other people in the same position, in respect to the Bengali refugees, as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a situation in which I am the only person who can prevent something very bad from occurring."
Other Bystanders Don't Justify Standing By	"Again, of course, I admit that there is a psychological difference between the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, who have also done nothing." "Yet this can make no real difference to our moral obligations." "Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?" "One has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation." "It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils–poverty, overpopulation, pollution–are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved."
Vast Numbers' Plausibility	We can be tempted, given the sheer number of those who can help, that we are only obliged to give a minimum. If everyone who could give up five dollars without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant then all Bengali relief needs would be met. Thus I should not give anything more than anyone else "in the same circumstances as I am," and thus I have no obligation to give more than five dollars.	"The view that numbers do make a difference can be made plausible if stated in this way: if everyone in circumstances like mine gave £5 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no obligation to give more than £5."
Actual Conclusion	Singer argues that the soundness of the argument depends on whether or not we recognize this as the argument's actual conclusion: "if everyone in circumstances like mine were to give [five dollars], I would have no obligation to give more than [five dollars]."
Problem Persists	"It is more or less certain that not everyone in circumstances like mine will give [five dollars]." "So there will not be enough to provide the needed food, shelter, and medical care." "Therefore by giving more than [five dollars] I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just [five dollars]."
Absurd [?] Consequence	Since others won't help, and I recognize my duty to help and that others won't help, does that mean that I "ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more [I] would begin to cause serious suffering [to myself and my] dependents–perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause [myself and my] dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal"?	"It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substantial amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents _ perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal."
	That's not an absurd consequence, but it is not that pretty. It becomes absurd when (all) others do the same.
Paradoxical Consequence	"If everyone does this, however, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary." "Thus, if everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not be as good as it would be if everyone did a little less than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they ought to do."
Underlying Assumptions	The paradox comes about only if there are two assumptions: funds are sent simultaneously and funds are sent unexpectedly.	"The paradox here arises only if we assume that the actions in question–sending money to the relief funds–are performed more or less simultaneously, and are also unexpected."
	"[T]he fact that others have given, or may be expected to give, is a relevant circumstance."
Different Circumstances Matter	This doesn't diminish from the principle that holds that "people in the same circumstances have the same obligations." Rather, "those giving after it has become known that many others are giving and those giving before are not in the same circumstances."
Paradox Dissolved	"The result of everyone doing what he really ought to do cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do, although the result of everyone doing what he reasonably believes he ought to do could be."
Established	At this point, Singer takes it that he has established his principle: "[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it."
Segue	Singer moves to consider the traditional distinction between what we have a duty to do as opposed to what we can be praised for do (where there is not corresponding duty), and how it fairs in the face of Singer's principle.
Duty and Charity	"The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it."
Our Current Attitude Towards Charity	"The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned."
Wrong	But Singer thinks this is wrong, in light of his principle. "When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look 'well_dressed' we are not providing for any important need." "We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to famine relief." "By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving."
	According to Singer, "the present way of drawing the distinction [between duty and charity], which makes it an act of charity for a man living at the level of affluence which most people in the 'developed nations' enjoy to give money to save someone else from starvation, cannot be supported."
Radical Objections	Because adopting Singer's principle would cause radical changes, there would objections to it. He seeks to meet those objections in advance.
Objection / Too Drastic	We don't condemn people for not being charitable, and doing so would be "too drastic a revision."	"[I]t is too drastic a revision of our moral scheme."
Objection / Too Drastic / Singer's Reply	" ... I did not set out to present a morally neutral description of the way people make moral judgments, the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion."
Objection / Too Drastic / Consideration of the Spirit of the Objection	We've traditionally separated duty from charity, according to (Singer's characterization of) Urmson for the following reason: "the imperatives of duty, which tell us what we must do, as distinct from what it would be good to do but not wrong not to do, function so as to prohibit behavior that is intolerable if men are to live together in society." "This may explain the origin and continued existence of the present division between acts of duty and acts of charity." "From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent violations of norms against killing, stealing, and so on. It is quite inessential, however, to help people outside one's own society."	"It might, nevertheless, be interesting to consider why our society, and most other societies, do judge differently from the way I have suggested they should."
Objection / Too Drastic / Consideration of the Spirit of the Objection / Singer's Evaluation	While that may explain why we have distinguished between duty and charity, that does not justify the distinction.
Objection / Too Drastic / Lazy People Aspect	Some have argued that "we need to have a basic moral code which is not too far beyond the capacities of the ordinary man, for otherwise there will be a general breakdown of compliance with the moral code."	"It has been argued by some writers, among them Sidgwick and Urmson, that we need to have a basic moral code which is not too far beyond the capacities of the ordinary man, for otherwise there will be a general breakdown of compliance with the moral code."
	"[I]f we tell people that they ought to refrain from murder and give everything they do not really need to famine relief, they will do neither, whereas if we tell them that they ought to refrain from murder and that it is good to give to famine relief but not wrong not to do so, they will at least refrain from murder."
Objection / Too Drastic / Lazy People Aspect / Singer's Evaluation	Singer argues that this line of thinking "takes insufficient account of the effect that moral standards can have on the decisions we make."
	"In any case, the possibility that by spreading the idea that we ought to be doing very much more than we are to relieve famine we shall bring about a general breakdown of moral behavior seems remote."
Objection / No Vacations	"It follows from some forms of utilitarian theory that we all ought, morally, to be working full time to increase the balance of happiness over misery."	"The second objection to my attack on the present distinction between duty and charity is one which has from time to time been made against utilitarianism. It follows from some forms of utilitarian theory that we all ought, morally, to be working full time to increase the balance of happiness over misery."
Objection / No Vacations / Singer's Initial Reply	"The position I have taken here would not lead to this conclusion in all circumstances, for if there were no bad occurrences that we could prevent without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, my argument would have no application."
Objection / No Vacations / Singer's Some Vacations	But for as long as we are required to work full time to reduce misery, we should recognize that "if we wear ourselves out through overwork, we shall be less effective than we would otherwise have been."
Objection / No Vacations / Underlying Issue	That we are self-interested to the degree that we would not want to work so much for others is not a justification for not working for others.	"Since most people are self_interested to some degree, very few of us are likely to do everything that we ought to do. It would, however, hardly be honest to take this as evidence that it is not the case that we ought to do it."
Segue	Done with the two main objections Singer moves to consider practical points (after having briefly appealed to Aquinas for support). The practical points have to do with whether or not giving money is the best means to the end.
Practical Point / Against Private Giving	Some argue that giving is good, but should be done by governments, not individuals. "Giving privately, it is said, allows the government and the noncontributing members of society to escape their responsibilities."	"It is sometimes said that overseas aid should be a government responsibility, and that therefore one ought not to give to privately run charities."
Practical Point / Against Private Giving / Singer's Reply	Singer thinks it is plausible to suppose that "if no one gives voluntarily, a government will assume that its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would not wish to be forced into giving aid."
Practical Point / Population Control	Without controlling population growth, it is argued, famine relief funding "merely postpones starvation."	"Another, more serious reason for not giving to famine relief funds is that until there is effective population control, relieving famine merely postpones starvation."
Practical Point / Population Control / Point of Order	"[T]he earth cannot support indefinitely a population rising at the present rate." "This certainly poses a problem for anyone who thinks it important to prevent famine."
Practical Point / Population Control / Singer's Evaluation	"[O]ne could accept the argument without drawing the conclusion that it absolves one from any obligation to do anything to prevent famine." "The conclusion that should be drawn is that the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is population control."
Practical Point / Population Control / Singer's Solution	"It would then follow from the position reached earlier that one ought to be doing all one can to promote population control (unless one held that all forms of population control were wrong in themselves, or would have significantly bad consequences)." "Since there are organizations working specifically for population control, one would then support them rather than more orthodox methods of preventing famine."
Practical Point / How Much?!?	Just how much should be given?
Practical Point / How Much?!? / Too Much?	Enough to "reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances" of those who starve?	"One possibility, which has already been mentioned, is that we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility–that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift. This would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee."
Practical Point / How Much?!? / Singer's Estimation	Is Singer committed to that conclusion? Singer considered a stronger and a weaker version of his "principle of preventing bad consequences." "The strong version, which required us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, does seem to require reducing ourselves to the level of marginal utility."
	"I should also say that the strong version seems to me to be the correct one."
Practical Point / How Much?!? / Singer's Alternative "Moderate" Reply	"I proposed the more moderate version–that we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something morally significant–only in order to show that, even on this surely undeniable principle, a great change in our way of life is required." "On the more moderate principle, it may not follow that we ought to reduce ourselves to the level of marginal utility, for one might hold that to reduce oneself and one's family to this level is to cause something significantly bad to happen."
Practical Point / How Much?!? / Singer on the Consumer Society	"Even if we accepted the principle only in its moderate form, however, it should be clear that we would have to give away enough to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as it is on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely."
	But don't worry too much as our consumer society is untenable (as it is) for other reasons. "The value and necessity of economic growth are now being questioned not only by conservationists, but by economists as well." "There is no doubt, too, that the consumer society has had a distorting effect on the goals and purposes of its members."
Practical Point / How Much?!? / Singer on Merely Slowing Consumer Society	But don't get too upset, for it might be the case that we shouldn't slow our consumer society down too much: "[L]ooking at the matter purely from the point of view of overseas aid, there must be a limit to the extent to which we should deliberately slow down our economy; for it might be the case that if we gave away, say, 40 percent of our Gross National Product, we would slow down the economy so much that in absolute terms we would be giving less than if we gave 25 percent of the much larger GNP that we would have if we limited our contribution to this smaller percentage."