Reading Notes by
Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History,
Philosophy, and Sociology
Peter
Singer's 1974 "All Animals are Equal"
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Singer |
"All
Animals are Equal" |
Philosophical Exchange 1: 103-16. |
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The Racially Oppressed |
In
the 1960's "Black Liberation" movements began to achieve
success. An
oppressed group made at least semi-successful steps towards forcing an end to
oppression. Other
oppressed groups took note. |
"In
recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously for
equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation movement, which
demands an end to the prejudice and discrimination that has made blacks
second-class citizens. The immediate appeal of the black liberation movement
and its initial, if limited, success made it a model for other oppressed
groups to follow." |
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The Sexually Oppressed |
"When
a majority groupÐwomenÐbegan their campaign, some thought we had come to the
end of the road." |
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The Last form of
Pervasive Discrimination (?) |
"Discrimination
on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last universally accepted form
of discrimination, practiced without secrecy or pretense even in those
liberal circles that have long prided themselves on their freedom from
prejudice against racial minorities." |
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Singer |
But
Singer objects: the elimination of racial and sexual oppression does not
equate to the elimination of all forms of class oppression or
discrimination. |
"One
should always be wary of talking of 'the last remaining form of
discrimination.'" |
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Human Oppressors |
Humans
sometimes oppress without really recognizing it; it can be very difficult to
"be aware of latent prejudice in our attitudes to particular groups
until this prejudice is forcefully pointed out." |
"If
we have learnt anything from the liberation movements, we should have learnt
how difficult it is to be aware of latent prejudice in our attitudes to
particular groups until this prejudice is forcefully pointed out." |
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Reinterpretation of the Principle
of Equality |
"A
liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an
extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality." |
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Result |
Once
we have reinterpreted the principle of equality, we can uncover
"unjustifiable prejudice." |
"Practices
that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as
the result of an unjustifiable prejudice." |
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Pro-Oppression or
Anti-Oppression |
"If
we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared
to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes." |
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Sympathy & Empathy |
We
need to learn how to adopt alternative perspectives, both emotionally and
intellectually: "We
need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by
our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can
make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our
attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one
groupÐusually the one to which we ourselves belongÐat the expense of another." |
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Singer's Professed Aim |
"My
aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our
attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of
species other than our ownÐor, as we popularly though misleadingly call them,
animals." |
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Singer's Professed Aim
Restated |
"In
other words, I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle
of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of
our own species." |
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Historical Resonance
with Taylor's Parody / Slippery Slope |
Against
a previous attempt to minimize sexual oppression (carried out by
Wollstonecraft), Taylor argues that the arguments in favor of ending sexual
oppression can be extended to ending animal oppressionÐin an attempt to
dismiss both. |
"[I]n
the past the idea of 'The Rights of Animals' really has been used to parody
the case for women's rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a forerunner of later
feminists, published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792,
her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an
anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes.
The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge
philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecraft's reasonings by showing that they
could be carried one stage further." |
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Taylor's Reasoning |
"If
sound when applied to women, why should the arguments not be applied to dogs,
cats, and horses? They seemed to hold equally well for these 'brutes'; yet to
hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by
which this conclusion had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when
applied to brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to women, since the
very same arguments had been used in each case." |
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Possible Reply to that
Slippery Slope |
Extending
the right to vote to women does not entail extending the right to vote to
immature humans or nonhuman animals since immature humans and nonhuman
animals don't have the needed rational capacities. Nonhuman
animals are significantly different in a number of aspects, and so
"should not have equal rights." |
"One
way in which we might reply to this argument is by saying that the case for
equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to nonhuman
animals. Women have a right to vote, for instance, because they are just as
capable of making rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, are
incapable of understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have
the right to vote. There are many other obvious ways in which men and women
resemble each other closely, while humans and other animals differ greatly.
So, it might be said, men and women are similar beings and should have equal
rights, while humans and nonhumans are different and should not have equal
rights." |
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Singer's Evaluation of
that Possible Reply |
"The
thought behind this reply to Taylor's analogy is correct up to a point, but
it does not go far enough. There are important differences between humans and
other animals, and these differences must give rise to some differences in
the rights that each have." |
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Not Having the Same
Rights Not Having Any Rights |
We
can recognize that humans and nonhuman animals may not have the same rights. But
recognizing that does not mean that nonhuman animals don't have any rights. |
"Recognizing
this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to the case for extending the basic
principle of equality to nonhuman animals. The differences that exist between
men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women's Liberation
are aware that these differences may give rise to different rights. Many
feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request. It does
not follow that since these same people are campaigning for equality between
men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too." |
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Men & Pigs |
"Since
a man cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have
one." "Since
a pig can't vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote." |
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Equality Doesn't Mean ... |
"The
extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does
not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant
exactly the same rights to both groups." |
"The
extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does
not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant
exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend
on the nature of the members of the two groups." |
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Equality of
Consideration |
"The
basic principle of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and
equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and
different rights." |
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Singer's Reply to the
Taylor Parody/Slippery Slope |
Singer
argues that we will discover that we can see our basic equality with animals
if we philosophically examine why we are opposed to the oppression of races
or sexes. When
we discover why we are opposed to the oppression of races or sexes, we'll see
that we cannot consistently endorse the oppression of animals. |
"So
there is a different way of replying to Taylor's attempt to parody
Wollstonecraft's arguments, a way which does not deny the differences between
humans and nonhumans, but goes more deeply into the question of equality and
concludes by finding nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle of
equality applies to so-called 'brutes.' I believe that we reach this
conclusion if we examine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination
on grounds of race or sex ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be
on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other
groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans." |
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Examination of Equality |
What
does it mean to assert equality? |
"When
we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal,
what is it that we are asserting?" |
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Factual Inequality |
Non-egalitarians
often point out that factually humans are not all equal. Humans
differ in size, shape, and abilities both physical and intellectual. Thus,
"if the demand for equality [is] based on the actual equality of all
human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality." |
"Those
who wish to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed
out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans
are equal. Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in
different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral capacities,
differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and
sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate
effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In
short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all
human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. It would be an
unjustifiable demand." |
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Factual Equality |
One
can nevertheless assert equality by finding factual equivalences (like having
a human body). |
"Still,
one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human beings
is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes." |
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Relevant, Common
Equality Despite Irrelevant Differences |
"Although
humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences
between the races and sexes as such." "From
the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything
else about that person." |
"Although
humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences
between the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is
black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it
may be said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims
that whites are superior to blacks, but this is falseÑalthough there are
differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in
all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The
opponent of sexism would say the same: a person's sex is no guide to his or
her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the
basis of sex." |
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Reason #1 Against Basing
Opposition to Racism or Sexism on Any Kind of Factual Equality |
Basing
opposition to racism or sexism on factual equalities can force one to accept
"a most inegalitarian society." |
"This
is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is
not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would
choose, because taking this line could, in some circumstances, force one to
accept a most inegalitarian society." |
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Relevant
Differences? |
The
"opponent of equality" could grant that race or sex does not track
a relevant difference and still argue for preferential treatment according to
some other difference. |
"The
fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes, is a valid
reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South Africa,
in which all whites are superior in status to all blacks." |
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I.Q. |
A
"more sophisticated opponent of equality" could argue that we
should prefer the interests of "those with I.Q. ratings above
100." |
"The
existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex,
however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated
opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of those with
I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to the interests of those with I.Q.s
below 100." |
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Singer: |
"Would
a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based
on race or sex? I think not." |
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The First Problem with
Appeals to Factual Equality |
"But
if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the
different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and
sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism." |
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Reason #2 Against Basing
Opposition to Racism or Sexism on Any Kind of Factual Equality |
"[W]e
can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities really are
distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among human beings." |
"There
is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition to
racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind
which asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly
between the different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that
these abilities and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard
to race or sex, among human beings." |
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Factual Inequality
Exists |
"So
far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be certain measurable
differences between both races and sexes." |
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On Average |
"These
differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages
are taken." |
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Whence the Differences |
Do
these differences stem from genetic differences, or do they stem from
environmental differences? We
don't know, yet at least. |
"More
important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really
due to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and
how much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and
continuing discrimination." |
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Those
opposed to discrimination tend to hope that the differences stem from
environmental factors, as those can be changed "a lot easier" ...
but this is a "dangerous" position. |
"Perhaps
all of the important differences will eventually prove to be environmental
rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope
that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimination a
lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to rest the case against
racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are
environmental in origin." |
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If
differences in relevant abilities are connected to race, then "racism
would in some way be defensible."
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"The
opponent of, say, racism who takes this line will be unable to avoid
conceding that if differences in ability did after all prove to have some
genetic connection with race, racism would in some way be defensible." |
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Scientific
Finger-Crossing |
"It
would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole case on a
dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue
which is still a long way from being settled." |
"While
attempts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities between
races and sexes are primarily genetic in origin have certainly not been
conclusive, the same must be said of attempts to prove that these differences
are largely the result of environment." |
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Factual Equality and
Science |
If
one pins their argument against those who are against equality on facts, then
one must appeal to science (the study of facts), but the sciences have not determined
if differences in ability stem from genetic or environmental factors. |
"At
this stage of the investigation we cannot be certain which view is correct,
however much we may hope it is the latter." |
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Singer on the
Significance of the Facts |
"Fortunately,
there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of
this scientific investigation." |
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On the Relevance of
Facts for Claims of Equality |
"[T]he
claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical
strength, or similar matters of fact." |
"The
appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of
genetically-based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to
stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever
evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make it quite clear
that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity,
physical strength, or similar matters of fact." |
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A Moral Ideal |
"Equality
is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact." |
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"There
is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in
ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of
consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests." |
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Singer: Principle of Equality is
a Prescription |
"The
principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged
actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat
humans." |
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Bentham's Version of the Principle
of Equality |
Bentham:
"'Each to count for one and none for more than one.'" Singer
on Bentham: "In other words, the interests of every being affected by an
action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests
of any other being." |
"Jeremy
Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his
utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: 'Each to count for one and none
for more than one.'" |
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Sidgwick's Version of
the Principle of Equality |
Sidgwick:
"'The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the
point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any
other.'" |
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Principle of Equality |
"It
is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others
ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possessÐalthough
precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the
characteristics of those affected by what we do." |
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This Principle of
Equality Supports the Opposition Against Racism and SexismÐand Speciesism |
"It
is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism
must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism
is also to be condemned." |
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From Human Equality to
Animal Equality |
"If
possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use
another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans?" |
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Suffering / The Source of Equality
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In
line with Bentham, Singer considers the role of suffering. It
is the capacity to suffer that "gives a being the right to equal
consideration." |
"Bentham
points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a
being the right to equal consideration." |
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Suffering and Happiness,
Negatively |
Having
the capacity to suffer and be happy "is not just another characteristic
like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics." |
"The
capacity for sufferingÐor more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or
happinessÐis not just another characteristic like the capacity for language,
or for higher mathematics." |
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Suffering and Happiness,
Positively |
Those
capacities are prerequisites for "having interests at all." |
"The
capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having
interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of
interests in any meaningful way." |
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The Non-Suffering |
"It
would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be
kicked along the road by a schoolboy." "A
stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer." "Nothing
that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare." |
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Animals |
Animals
have interests in "not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is."
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"A
mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented,
because it will suffer if it is." |
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If You Can Suffer, Your
Interests Must Be Considered |
"If
a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take
that suffering into consideration." |
"No
matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that
its suffering be counted equally with the like sufferingÐin so far as rough
comparisons can be madeÐof any other being. If a being is not capable of
suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be
taken into account." |
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Non-Arbitrary |
It
is for this reason, Singer argues, that suffering is the only non-arbitrary
way to mark out a boundary of non-consideration:" This is why the limit [the
ability to suffer or be happy] ... is the only defensible boundary of concern
for the interests of others." |
"This
is why the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not
strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience
enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the
interests of others. To mark this boundary by some characteristic like
intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not
choose some other characteristic, like skin color?" |
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Racist/Sexist Analogy |
Racists
and sexists violate the principle of equality "by giving greater weight
to the interests of members of" their own groups. "Similarly
the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the
greater interests of members of other species." |
"The
racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the
interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their
interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the
speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater
interests of members of other species." |
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How the Speciesists Violate
the Principle of Equality |
Speciesists
most frequently violate other species' equality with their mouths. Some
speciesists violate other species' equality by condoning experiments on those
species. Philosopher-speciesists
violate other species' equality by not questioning the basic assumption of
our times, anthrocentrism. (In
the interest of time we'll focus on the third violation.) |
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Philosophy Ought |
Singer
asserts that philosophy "ought to question the basic assumptions of the
age" so that what is taken for granted can be discovered as just
that. |
"Philosophy
ought to question the basic assumptions of the age. Thinking through,
critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe,
the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy a
worthwhile activity." |
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Philosophy Is |
But
philosophers are the products of their culture, and they too can be blind to
their own presuppositions. |
"Regrettably,
philosophy does not always live up to its historic role. Philosophers are
human beings, and they are subject to all the preconceptions of the society
to which they belong." |
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Singer's Indictment of
1974 Philosophy |
"[P]hilosophy
as practiced in the universities today does not challenge anyone's
preconceptions about our relations with other species." |
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Focus within Philosophy
on Equality |
Singer
focuses in on the failure of academic philosophy to uncover its own
unwarranted speciesism within its focus on equality. |
"I
think it would be [an] appropriate conclusion to this article ... if I
concentrated on the problem with which we have been centrally concerned, the
problem of equality." |
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Equality Just Means
Human Equality (Wrongly) |
"It
is significant that the problem of equality, in moral and political
philosophy, is invariably formulated in terms of human equality." |
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Claiming Human Equality / Not Factual
Characteristics |
When
arguing for human equality, one cannot appeal to factual "capacities,
talents or other qualities."
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"
... if humans are to be regarded as equal to one another, we need some sense
of 'equal' that does not require any actual, descriptive equality of
capacities, talents or other qualities." |
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Factual Equality / Lowest Common
Denominator |
When
the equality of humanity is based off of factual characteristics, "these
characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low that
no human lacks them ... ." But
when the bar is set so low, it will include some nonhuman animals. |
"If
equality is to be related to any actual characteristics of humans, these
characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low that
no human lacks themÐbut then the philosopher comes up against the catch that
any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be possessed
only by humans." |
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"In
other words, it turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly say,
as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at least some members of
other species are also equalÐequal, that is, to each other and to humans." |
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Claiming Human Equality / Prescriptively |
If
we instead claim human equality with a prescriptive understanding of equality
then "it is even more difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere of
equality." |
"If,
on the other hand, we regard the statement 'All humans are equal' in some
non-factual way, perhaps as a prescription, then, as I have already argued,
it is even more difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere of equality." |
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Singer on Philosophical
Speciesist in General |
"[M]ost
philosophers try to reconcile their beliefs in human equality and animal
inequality by arguments that can only be described as devious." |
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Frankena E.G. |
Frankena
"proposes the principle that 'all men are to be treated as equals, not
because they are equal, in any respect, but simply because they are human.'"
Frankena
continues: "'They are human because they have emotions and desires, and
are able to think, and hence are capable of enjoying a good life in a sense
in which other animals are not.'" |
"As
a first example, I take William Frankena's well-known article 'The Concept of
Social Justice.' Frankena opposes the idea of basing justice on merit,
because he sees that this could lead to highly inegalitarian results. Instead
he proposes the principle that 'all men are to be treated as equals, not
because they are equal, in any respect, but simply because they are human.
They are human because they have emotions and desires, and are able to think,
and hence are capable of enjoying a good life in a sense in which other
animals are not.'" |
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By
"'the good life'" Frankena admits that he "means 'not so much
the morally good life as the happy or satisfactory life.'" Singer
takes this to mean that thought is not necessary for the good life. Singer:
"This makes it difficult to see what Frankena's principle of equality
has to do with simply being human." |
"Frankena
goes on to admit that by 'the good life' he means 'not so much the morally
good life as the happy or satisfactory life,' so thought would appear to be
unnecessary for enjoying the good life; in fact to emphasize the need for
thought would make difficulties for the egalitarian since only some people
are capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives, or morally good
lives. This makes it difficult to see what Frankena's principle of equality
has to do with simply being human." |
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Singer on The Capacity
for Happiness |
"Surely
every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less
miserable than some alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into
account." |
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Continuum |
"In
this respect the distinction between humans and nonhumans is not a sharp
division, but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and with
overlaps between the species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and
satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex ones." |
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Philosophers |
Philosophers
tend not to face this challenge well.
Philosophers
try and invent ways to show that humans are morally distinct from nonhuman
animals. |
"Faced
with a situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral gulf
that is commonly thought to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete
difference that will do the job without undermining the equality of humans,
philosophers tend to waffle." |
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Philosophers Waffling: |
"They
resort to high-sounding phrases like 'the intrinsic dignity of the human
individual;' they talk of the 'intrinsic worth of all men' as if men
(humans?) had some worth that other beings did not, or they say that humans,
and only humans, are 'ends in themselves,' while 'everything other than a
person can only have value for a person.'" |
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The Allure of
"'intrinsic dignity'" of All Humans |
"[W]hen
one thinks only of humans, it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk
of the dignity of all human beings." |
"Why
should we not attribute 'intrinsic dignity' or 'intrinsic worth' to
ourselves? Fellow-humans are unlikely to reject the accolades we so
generously bestow on them, and those to whom we deny the honor are unable to
object. Indeed, when one thinks only of humans, it can be very liberal, very
progressive, to talk of the dignity of all human beings." |
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It Does Sound Good |
"In
so doing, we implicitly condemn slavery, racism, and other violations of
human rights." "We
admit that we ourselves are in some fundamental sense on a par with the
poorest, most ignorant members of our own species." |
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But
the elevation of our entire species as equal lowers the "relative status
of all other species." |
"It
is only when we think of humans as no more than a small sub-group of all the
beings that inhabit our planet that we may realize that in elevating our own
species we are at the same time lowering the relative status of all other
species." |
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Singer on Appeals to
Human Equality from Intrinsic Dignity |
"The
truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appears to
solve the egalitarian's problems only as long as it goes unchallenged." |
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Challenging the
Invocation of Intrinsic Dignity |
But
why should it be that all humans including "mental defectives,
psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the restÐhave some kind of dignity or worth
that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve?" When
we ask that question, Singer argues that we see that answering it is as
difficult as answering the original question: What
is the "relevant fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other
animals"? |
"Once
we ask why it should be that all humansÐincluding infants, mental defectives,
psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the restÐhave some kind of dignity or worth
that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this
question is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant
fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals." |
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Singer
argues that these two questions boil down to one: if there is some intrinsic
human dignity, then "some relevant capacities or characteristics that
all and only humans possess" would need to be identified and argued
for. |
"In
fact, these two questions are really one: talk of intrinsic dignity or moral
worth only takes the problem back one step, because any satisfactory defence
of the claim that all and only humans have intrinsic dignity would need to
refer to some relevant capacities or characteristics that all and only humans
possess." |
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"Philosophers
frequently introduce ideas of dignity, respect, and worth at the point at
which other reasons appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough." |
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On Fine Phrases |
"Fine
phrases are the last resource of those who have run out of arguments." |
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Humans that Lack |
Consider
the existence of humans "who quite clearly are below the level of
awareness, self-consciousness, intelligence, and sentience, of many
non-humans." Their
existence challenges "those who still think it may be possible to find
some relevant characteristic that distinguishes all humans from all members
of other species ... ." |
"In
case there are those who still think it may be possible to find some relevant
characteristic that distinguishes all humans from all members of other
species, I shall refer again, before I conclude, to the existence of some
humans who quite clearly are below the level of awareness,
self-consciousness, intelligence, and sentience, of many non-humans." |
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Brain Damage |
Singer
has in mind "humans with [non-self inflicted] severe and irreparable
brain damage," amongst other types of humans. |
"I
am thinking of humans with severe and irreparable brain damage, and also of
infant humans. To avoid the complication of the relevance of a being's
potential, however, I shall henceforth concentrate on permanently retarded
humans." |
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First
off, the philosophers that seek to in part explain human equality by
excluding nonhuman animals "rarely" lump such brain-damaged humans
"in with the other [nonhuman] animals." |
"Philosophers
who set out to find a characteristic that will distinguish humans from other
animals rarely take the course of abandoning these groups of humans by
lumping them in with the other animals. It is easy to see why they do not." |
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If
such humans were lumped in with other animals, that would "entail that
we have the right to perform painful experiments on retarded humans for
trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that we had the right to rear and
kill these humans for food." |
"To
take this line without re-thinking our attitudes to other animals would
entail that we have the right to perform painful experiments on retarded
humans for trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that we had the right
to rear and kill these humans for food. To most philosophers these
consequences are as unacceptable as the view that we should stop treating
nonhumans in this way." |
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Benn's Argument for
Inequality with Animals |
Benn
is one of the philosophers that seek to in part explain human equality by
excluding nonhuman animals, but Benn does not avoid considering the problem brain-damaged
humans present. |
"My
final example of speciesism in contemporary philosophy has been selected to
show what happens when a writer is prepared to face the question of human
equality and animal inequality without ignoring the existence of mental
defectives, and without resorting to obscurantist mumbo jumbo. Stanley Benn's
clear and honest article 'Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of
Interests' fits this description." |
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Benn's Equality |
Benn's
notion of equality admittedly has "only [to do with the] 'equal consideration
of human interests.'" |
"Benn,
after noting the usual 'evident human inequalities' argues, correctly I
think, for equality of consideration as the only possible basis for
egalitarianism. Yet Benn, like other writers, is thinking only of 'equal consideration
of human interests.' Benn is quite open in his defence of this restriction of
equal consideration:" |
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Benn / Qualifying Condition for
Equality |
Benn:
"' . . . not to possess human shape is a disqualifying condition.
However faithful or intelligent a dog may be, it would be a monstrous
sentimentality to attribute to him interests that could be weighed in an
equal balance with those of human beings . . . if, for instance, one had to
decide between feeding a hungry baby or a hungry dog, anyone who chose the
dog would generally be reckoned morally defective, unable to recognize a fundamental
inequality of claims.'" |
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Benn / Equality of Interests Despite Difference in
Capacities |
Benn:
"'This is what distinguishes our attitude to animals from our attitude
to imbeciles. It would be odd to say that we ought to respect equally the
dignity or personality of the imbecile and of the rational man . . . but
there is nothing odd about saying that we should respect their interests
equally, that is, that we should give to the interests of each the same
serious consideration as claims to considerations necessary for some standard
of well-being that we can recognize and endorse.'" |
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Singer / Whence the Inequality of
Animals? |
Singer:
"Benn's statement of the basis of the consideration we should have for
imbeciles seems to me correct, but why should there be any fundamental
inequality of claims between a dog and a human imbecile?" |
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Benn (According to
Singer) on Animals |
"Benn
sees that if equal consideration depended on rationality, no reason could be
given against using imbeciles for research purposes, as we now use dogs and guinea
pigs." |
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"This
will not do: 'But of course we do distinguish imbeciles from animals in this
regard,' he says. That the common distinction is justifiable is something
Benn does not question; his problem is how it is to be justified." |
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Benn / Species Differing Norms |
Benn:
"The answer he gives is this: ' . . . we respect the interests of men
and give them priority over dogs not insofar as they are rational, but
because rationality is the human norm. We say it is unfair to exploit
the deficiencies of the imbecile who falls short of the norm, just as it
would be unfair, and not just ordinarily dishonest, to steal from a blind
man." |
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Benn / Deficiencies vs. Norms |
Benn:
"'If we do not think in this way about dogs, it is because we do not see
the irrationality of the dog as a deficiency or a handicap, but as normal for
the species.'" |
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Benn |
Benn:
"'The characteristics, therefore, that distinguish the normal man from
the normal dog make it intelligible for us to talk of other men having
interests and capacities, and therefore claims, of precisely the same kind as
we make on our own behalf.'" |
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Benn / Becoming Differing
Species? |
Benn:
"'But although these characteristics may provide the point of the
distinction between men and other species, they are not in fact the
qualifying conditions for membership, to the distinguishing criteria of the
class of morally considerable persons; and this is precisely because a man
does not become a member of a different species, with its own standards of
normality, by reason of not possessing these characteristics.'" |
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Singer's Evaluation of
Benn |
Singer
argues that the problem can be seen in that last sentence. Benn: " ... a man does not become a
member of a different species, with its own standards of normality, by reason
of not possessing [those] characteristics." Singer's
interpretation of Benn: "An
imbecile ... may have no characteristics superior to those of a dog; nevertheless
this does not make the imbecile a member of 'a different species' as the dog
is. Therefore it would be 'unfair' to use the imbecile for medical research
as we use the dog." |
"The
final sentence of this passage gives the argument away. An imbecile, Benn
concedes, may have no characteristics superior to those of a dog;
nevertheless this does not make the imbecile a member of 'a different
species' as the dog is. Therefore it would be 'unfair' to use the imbecile
for medical research as we use the dog." |
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Responsibility |
Singer
points out that neither the brain damaged person nor other nonhuman animals
are "responsible for their mental level." |
"But
why? That the imbecile is not rational is just the way things have worked
out, and the same is true of the dogÐneither is any more responsible for
their mental level." |
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Fairness |
"If
it is unfair to take advantage of an isolated defect, why is it fair to take
advantage of a more general limitation?" |
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Singer's Evaluation |
Singer
argues that Benn's argument is actually just an expression of interests in
one's own species merely because they are of one's own species. |
"I
find it hard to see anything in this argument except a defense of preferring
the interests of members of our own species because they are members of our
own species." |
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Singer's Substitution
Challenge |
To
those not yet convinced Singer proposes the following substitution
exercise. Assume:
"it has been proven that there is a difference in the average [I.Q.] for
two different races, say whites and blacks." Substitute: "'white'"
for "'men'" "'black"
for "'dog'" "'high
I.Q.'" for "'rationality'" "'imbeciles'"
for "'dumb whites'" "'species'"
for "'race'" |
"To
those who think there might be more to it, I suggest the following mental
exercise. Assume that it has been proven that there is a difference in the
average, or normal, intelligence quotient for two different races, say whites
and blacks. Then substitute the term 'white' for every occurrence of 'men'
and 'black' for every occurrence of 'dog' in the passage quoted; and
substitute 'high I.Q.' for 'rationality' and when Benn talks of 'imbeciles'
replace this term by 'dumb whites'_Ðthat is, whites who fall well below the
normal white I.Q. score. Finally, change 'species' to 'race.' Now re-read the
passage." |
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When Substitutions Made |
"It
has become a defense of a rigid, no-exceptions division between whites and
blacks, based on l.Q. scores, not withstanding an admitted overlap between
whites and blacks in this respect." |
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Outrageous |
But
that is outrageous, according to Singer.
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"The
revised passage is, of course, outrageous, and this is not only because we
have made fictitious assumptions in our substitutions. The point is that in
the original passage Benn was defending a rigid division in the amount of
consideration due to members of different species, despite admitted cases of
overlap." |
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If the Reader Missed the
Outrageousness Prior to the Substitution |
"If
the original did not, at first reading strike us as being as outrageous as
the revised version does, this is largely because although we are not racists
ourselves, most of us are speciesists." |
"Like
the other articles, Benn's stands as a warning of the ease with which the
best minds can fall victim to a prevailing ideology." |
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