Reading Notes
by Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy & Sociology
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Plato |
"Apology"
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Translator:
Benjamin Jowett Source: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1656/1656-h/1656-h.htm |
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Truth |
Socrates,
in his defense against the charges, purports to speak the truth |
"from me you shall hear the whole truth" |
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Old Reputation |
Socrates
was known (amongst the Athenians) as one who 1)
makes (reckless) speculations about the heavens and earth, 2)
makes "the worse appear the
better cause," and |
"telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated
about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse
appear the better cause." |
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3)
teaches such things to others |
"'Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person,
who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the
worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to
others.'" |
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Socrates' Reputation & Aristophanes |
Socrates
has an inaccurate reputation as a speculator of the heavens that he seeks to
disprove Consider
the playwright Aristophanes who had a character named Socrates who did such
things Aristophanes'
Socrates claimed to even walk on air (in the clouds), "talking a deal of nonsense" |
"Such is the nature of the accusation: it is just
what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes ... , who has
introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks
in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not
pretend to know either much or littleÐnot that I mean to speak disparagingly
of any one who is a student of natural philosophy." |
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Socrates' Defense |
"the simple truth is, O Athenians, [is] that I have
nothing to do with physical speculations" |
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Witnesses |
And
are those who can support Aristophanes' version of Socrates? Nay
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"Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your
neighbours whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or
in many upon such matters ... . You
hear their answer." |
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Socrates' Reputation as a Sophist |
Socrates
has an inaccurate reputation as being a Sophist that he also seeks to
disprove A
sophist is one who charges money to teach people how to make "the worse appear the better cause" "As little foundation is there for the report that I
am a teacher, and take money; this accusation has no more truth in it than
the other" |
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Human Instruction |
Beyond
denying that he is a sophist, Socrates denies that teaching itself doesn't
exist Instructing
humans, he says, would be an honorable thingÐif it was even possible |
"Although, if a man were really able to instruct
mankind, to receive money for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an
honour to him." |
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Foals |
Socrates
presents an analogy between the instruction of humans and the training of
horses If
humans were like foals, finding an instructor would be easy Thus,
humans could be improved and perfected, according to "their own proper virtue and excellence" |
"I came across a man who has spent a world of money
on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had
sons, I asked him: 'Callias,' I said, 'if your two sons were foals or calves,
there would be no difficulty in finding some one to put over them; we should
hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably, who would improve and perfect
them in their own proper virtue and excellence; but as they are human beings,
whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there any one who understands
human and political virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you
have sons; is there any one?'"
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Callias |
Consider
who Callias sought to instruct his sons, a sophist An
admirable endeavor, if it were possibleÐbut, Socrates asserts, it is an
impossible endeavor |
"'There is,' he said. 'Who is he?' said I; 'and of
what country? and what does he charge?' 'Evenus the Parian,' he replied; 'he
is the man, and his charge is five minae.' Happy is Evenus, I said to myself,
if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I
the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that
I have no knowledge of the kind." |
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Whence the Worry Then? |
Socrates
then considers why he is despised |
"some one among you will reply, 'Yes, Socrates, but
what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you; there
must have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumours
and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other
men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to
judge hastily of you.'" |
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Wise |
Socrates
states: "this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort
of wisdom which I possess"
This
is not the "superhuman wisdom" claimed to be had by the sophists |
"this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort
of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom
such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to
believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a
superhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself;
and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character."
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The God of Delphi |
Socrates
appeals to a god as a witness |
"I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of
credit; that witness shall be the God of DelphiÐhe will tell you about my
wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is." |
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"None Wiser" |
Socrates
gives the following account: "Chaerephon,
as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and
boldly asked ... the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was,
and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser" |
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Socrates' Response |
Yet
Socrates knows that he has "no wisdom, small or great" Was
the god's proclamation a riddle? It
could not have been a lie as gods don't do that |
"When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can
the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I
have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am
the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against
his nature." |
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Experiment, Tests, and Socratic Inquiry |
To
discern the nature of the god's proclamation, Socrates tested it "I reflected that
if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with
a refutation in my hand" "I should say to
him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the
wisest'" Hence
we have Socrates' procedure of inquiry, of testing claims |
"After long consideration, I thought of a method of
trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than
myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say
to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the
wisest.'" |
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Testing a Politician |
E.g.:
"When I began to talk with him, I could not help
thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many,
and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he
thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he
hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard
me" |
"Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of
wisdom, and observed himÐhis name I need not mention; he was a politician
whom I selected for examinationÐand the result was as follows: When I began
to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise,
although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and
thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not
really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was
shared by several who were present and heard me." |
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Wisdom |
As
a result of examining the politician Socrates concludes: "I am better off than he is,Ðfor he knows nothing,
and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this
latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him." |
"So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away:
Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful
and good, I am better off than he is,Ðfor he knows nothing, and thinks that
he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular,
then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him." |
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"Then I went to
another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was
exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others
besides him. Then I went to one
man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and
I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me,Ðthe word of God,
I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to
all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle." |
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This Can't End Well |
"the result of my mission was just this: I found
that the men most in repute [those engaged in political actives, which surely
includes members of his audience] were all but the most foolish; and that
others less esteemed were really wiser and better" |
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Artisans |
After
having tested poets and dramatists (having come to similar results), Socrates
tests the artisans They
falsely infer from their skill as artisans that they "also knew all sorts of high matters" |
"At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious
that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many
fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of
which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I
observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;Ðbecause
they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high
matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom;" |
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Wisdom vs. Pretense to Knowledge |
Socrates
asserts that he'd gladly not have the knowledge they have if it includes
having their ignorance too |
"and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the
oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge
nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to
the oracle that I was better off as I was." |
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Hence Socrates' Negative Reputation |
Such
inquiry proved dangerous for Socrates, earning him enemies |
"This inquisition has led to my having many enemies
of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many
calumnies." |
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The Worth of Human Wisdom / The Oracle Interpreted |
Folks
call Socrates wise as they take Socrates to have the wisdom he seeks in
others But,
"God only is wise," Socrates argues And
when the god speaks of Socrates as wise, he only shows that "the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing" When the god speaks of
Socrates as wise, he is only using Socrates as an example of human wisdom,
and how little knowledge that wisdom includes Here's how Socrates
interprets the god's proclamation: "He, O men, is the wisest, who, like
Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing" |
"And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine
that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the
truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he
intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not
speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if
he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom
is in truth worth nothing." |
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Socrates' Days |
And
it is in this way that Socrates busies himself, leaving him no time for any
type of public officeÐor for earning money |
"And so I go about the world, obedient to the god,
and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or
stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication
of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs
me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to
any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to
the god." |
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Teaching? |
The
sons of the rich nevertheless willingly follow Socrates about They
enjoy the way in which Socrates exposes those who claim to have knowledge Those
sons enjoy the way in which the examined become angry with Socrates instead
of themselves The
anger of the examined takes the form of the repeating "the ready-made charges which are used against all
philosophers" And Meletus represents
the anger of the examined with his charges: |
"There is another thing:Ðyoung men of the richer
classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they
like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed
to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who
think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then
those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are
angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader
of youth!Ðand then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or
teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not
appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used
against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the
earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for
they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been
detected--which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and
energetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they
have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies." |
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Contemporary Charges |
According
to Meletus, Socrates 1)
"is a doer of evil" 2) "corrupts the
youth" 3) "does not believe
in the gods of the state" 4) "has other new
divinities of his own" |
"I have said enough in my defence against the first
class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus,
that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against
these, too, I must try to make a defence:ÐLet their affidavit be read: it
contains something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who
corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but
has other new divinities of his own." |
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On the Corruption of the Youth Charge / Socrates Examination of Meletus |
To
defend himself, Socrates argues that the one who brings the charge of
youth-corruption against him is not properly able to understand what counts
as corruption or betterment of the youth Socrates: "You think a
great deal about the improvement of youth?" Meletus: "Yes, I do" Socrates: "Tell the
judges, then, who is their improver" Meletus
is drawn to answer, stating that judges, the audience members, the senators,
the assembly members, and then even every Athenian citizenÐwith the exception
of SocratesÐboth improve and elevate the youths of Athens |
"Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of
you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth? Yes, I do. Tell the judges, then, who is their
improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their
corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell
the judges who their improver is.ÐObserve, Meletus, that you are silent, and
have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable
proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak
up, friend, and tell us who their improver is. The laws. But that, my good sir, is not my
meaning. I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the
laws. The judges, Socrates, who
are present in court. What, do
you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth? Certainly they are. What, all of them, or some only and
not others? All of them. By the goddess Here, that is good
news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the
audience,Ðdo they improve them?
Yes, they do. And the
senators? Yes, the senators
improve them. But perhaps the
members of the assembly corrupt them?Ðor do they too improve them? They improve them. Then every Athenian improves and
elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their
corrupter? Is that what you affirm?
That is what I stoutly affirm." |
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Horses Analogy |
To
show that Meletus is not properly able to understand what counts as
corruption or betterment of the youth, Socrates appeals to analogy Socrates: "How about
horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good?" Socrates: "Is not the exact opposite the
truth?" Socrates: "Ðthe trainer of horses, that is
to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure
them?" Such
is Socrates' argument that Meletus, for one, does not care about the
corruption or betterment of the youth |
"How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all
the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them
good, or at least not many;Ðthe trainer of horses, that is to say, does them
good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that
true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is;
whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of
youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were
their improvers. But you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had
a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about
the very things which you bring against me." |
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To the Point |
But
that initial argument of Socrates doesn't address the charge itself, but
merely the one who brought the charge up |
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Unintentional Corruption, if Any Corruption at All |
Now,
Socrates defends himself against the charge itself, by continuing his
examination of Meletus Socrates: "Which is better,
to live among bad citizens, or among good ones?" Socrates: "Do not the
good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?" Meletus: "Certainly" Socrates: "And is there
anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him?" Meletus: "Certainly not" Socrates: "And when you
accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I
corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?" Meletus: "Intentionally,
I say" |
"Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or
among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be
easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do
them evil? Certainly. And is there anyone who would rather
be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend,
the law requires you to answerÐdoes any one like to be injured? Certainly not. And when you accuse me of corrupting
and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally
or unintentionally?
Intentionally, I say." |
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Summarization |
1)
It is better to live amongst good citizens 2)
Good neighbors do good things for their neighbors 3) Everyone
would rather be benefited than injured by those they live near But
Meletus' accusation is that Socrates intentionally corrupts the youth |
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Socrates:
"But you have just admitted that the good do their
neighbours good, and the evil do them evil" If
a neighbor is corrupted by Socrates, that neighbor would likely harm Socrates
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"But you have just admitted that the good do their
neighbours good, and the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your
superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in
such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to
live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I
corrupt him, and intentionally, tooÐso you say, although neither I nor any
other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you." |
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Innocent of Corrupting the Youth |
So,
Socrates does not corrupt the youth, or he does so unintentionally Either
way, Socrates has not run afoul of the law Socrates
chastises Meletus: "you ought to have
[merely] taken me privately, and warned and admonished me" |
"But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them
unintentionally; and on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is
unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought
to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been
better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionallyÐno
doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach
me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of
instruction, but of punishment." |
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On the Gods Charge |
Socrates
takes the charge regarding theism to be this: He
teaches the youth "not to acknowledge the
gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual
agencies in their stead" |
"I suppose you mean, as I infer from your
indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state
acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their
stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say. Yes, that I say emphatically." |
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Examination of Meletus: |
To
clarify, Socrates asks whether Meletus is claiming that Socrates teaches
"other men to acknowledge some gods" in which case he
does believe in gods, or that Socrates is just an atheist Melitus
clarifies his charge: Socrates is an atheist |
"Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are
speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean!
for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to
acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an
entire atheistÐthis you do not lay to my charge,Ðbut only you say that they
are not the same gods which the city recognizesÐthe charge is that they are
different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of
atheism? I mean the latterÐthat
you are a complete atheist." |
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The Heavens |
Meletus
charges Socrates with atheistic claims about the sun and the moon, that they
are merely stone and earth Socrates
replies that Meletus has Socrates confused with someone else |
"Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do
not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other men? I assure you, judges, that he does
not: for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth. Friend Meletus, you think that you are
accusing Anaxagoras ... ." |
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Socrates' Defends Himself |
Socrates
argues that Meletis contradicts himself with his charge of atheism Socrates
does not believe in divine beings, and Socrates does believe in divine beings
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"he certainly does appear to me to contradict
himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of
not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in themÐbut this is not like
a person who is in earnest. I
should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to
be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer." |
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Horses Analogy |
"Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of
human things, and not of human beings?" "Did ever any man
believe in horsemanship, and not in horses?" Of course not |
"Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of
human things, and not of human beings?...I wish, men of Athens, that he would
answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man
believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in
flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you
refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did." |
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Meletus' Contradiction Laid Out |
When
asked if a man can "believe in spiritual and
divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods," Meletus admits that
"He cannot" But Meletus has charged
Socrates with teaching belief in "spiritual agencies" Mustn't this also mean,
Socrates argues, that he cannot help but also believing in "spirits or
demigods" But spirits or demigods
are either gods or sons of gods Meletus' charge amounts
to affirming the existence of mules, but not the existence of horses or asses
Hence Meletus'
contradiction, that Socrates does, and does not, believe in gods |
"Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies,
and not in spirits or demigods?
He cannot. How lucky I am
to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court! But then you
swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual
agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in
spiritual agencies,Ðso you say and swear in the affidavit; and yet if I
believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods;Ðmust
I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that your silence gives
consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? Are they not either gods or the
sons of gods? Certainly they
are. But this is what I call the
facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you
say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in
gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the
illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of
whom they are said to be the sonsÐwhat human being will ever believe that
there are no gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well affirm the
existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses." |
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Socrates
sums up his defense against the atheism charge: "no one who has a particle of understanding will
ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and
superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and
heroes" |
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Socrates' Destruction |
Yet
Socrates recognizes that he will not likely be able to sway the Athenian
rabble He
predicts that his destruction will come from "the envy and detraction of the world" |
"I have said enough in answer to the charge of
Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary, but I know only too well how
many are the enmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction
if I am destroyed;Ðnot Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction
of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be
the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them." |
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Good vs. Death |
But
if he knows he's to die, shouldn't he be ashamed at not trying to save
himself? Socrates
replies: "a man who is good for anything
ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to
consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrongÐacting the part
of a good man or of a bad" |
"Some one will say: And are you not ashamed,
Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely
end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good
for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought
only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrongÐacting
the part of a good man or of a bad." |
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Honor in the Face of Death |
"Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For
wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in
which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour
of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace." |
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Theism and Socrates' Mission |
Indeed,
if Socrates were to change his course, and stop seeking wisdom, he would
expose himself to the charge of atheism insofar as a god has commanded him to
act as he has |
"if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders
me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other
men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that
would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying
the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of
death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise." |
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On the Fear of Death |
To
be afraid of death is to claim knowledge about it But
about what happens after death, or even during death, we know nothing The
fear of death is thus a pretense to wisdom, but not itself wise |
"For the fear of death is indeed the pretence of
wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the unknown; and no
one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest
evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful
sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not
know?" |
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Disobedience |
While
Socrates admits that he knows very little, he does know that disobedience to
the state is evil, but that disobedience to a god is a greater evil There
is a possible good to obeying the state, but a certain evil to disobeying a
god, and Socrates states that he "will never
fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil" |
"And in this respect only I believe myself to differ
from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are:Ðthat
whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know:
but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or
man, is evil and dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible
good rather than a certain evil." |
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The Soul 's Primacy |
Socrates
considers a scenario where he is let off on the condition that he cease his
enquiries Socrates
says he reports to gods over men, and that he would/will continue to
chastise, via examination, his fellow Athenians for improperly valuing money,
honor, and reputation over wisdom and truth |
"if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not
mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that you are
not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught
doing so again you shall die;Ðif this was the condition on which you let me
go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey
God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease
from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet
and saying to him after my manner: You, my friend,Ða citizen of the great and
mighty and wise city of Athens,Ðare you not ashamed of heaping up the
greatest amount of money and honour and reputation, and caring so little
about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you
never regard or heed at all? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says:
Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I
proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that
he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him with
undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat the
same words to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but
especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren." |
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Socrates ... "Teaching" ? |
Inasmuch,
Socrates seeks after the "greatest improvement" of the Athenian
soul "I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but
that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as
private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the
youth, I am a mischievous person" |
"For know that this is the command of God; and I
believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service
to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young
alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and
chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that
virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every
other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if
this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person." |
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On Injury |
Socrates
warns the Athenians that his death at their hands will injury them, more than
him He
goes on to state that the evil of unjust killing is greater than the injury
of dying an unjust deathÐif there is any injury in such a death at all |
"I would have you know, that if you kill such an one
as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothing
will injure me, not Meletus nor yet AnytusÐthey cannot, for a bad man is not
permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny that Anytus may,
perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights;
and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is inflicting a great
injury upon him: but there I do not agree. For the evil of doing as he is
doingÐthe evil of unjustly taking away the life of anotherÐis greater far."
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Gadfly Analogy |
"if you kill me you will not easily find a successor
to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of
gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed
who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred
into life" "I am that gadfly
which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am
always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you" |
"if you kill me you will not easily find a successor
to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of
gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed
who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be
stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and
all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and
persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and
therefore I would advise you to spare me." |
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"I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a
person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and you think that you might
easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on for the
remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you sent you another
gadfly." |
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The Public Option? |
But
why doesn't Socrates seek to change the Athenian polis via some public life
"and advise the state" that way? |
"Some one may wonder why I go about in private
giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not
venture to come forward in public and advise the state." |
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Socrates' Conscience |
Socrates
hears a veto voice: "This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to
come to me when I was a child; it always forbids but never commands me to do
anything which I am going to do" And it is this voice the
tells him not to be a politician And for good reason, he
speculates, as a political life for him would have meant a short life |
"I will tell you why. You have heard me speak at
sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and
is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign, which
is a kind of voice, first began to come to me when I was a child; it always
forbids but never commands me to do anything which I am going to do. This is
what deters me from being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am
certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have
perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself." |
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"the truth is, that no man who goes to war with you
or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many lawless and unrighteous
deeds which are done in a state, will save his life; he who will fight for
the right, if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private
station and not a public one. I
can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but what you
value far moreÐactions." |
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On the Failure to Secure Fallen Comrades |
In
prior attempts at a public life, Socrates nearly lost his life Socrates
opposed a group trial because he thought it illegal Socrates
was then targeted |
"The only office of state which I ever held, O men
of Athens, was that of senator: the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had
the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies
of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a
body, contrary to law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was
the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my
vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and
you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having
law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I
feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy.
But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four
others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis,
as they wanted to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of
commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many
as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed,
that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for
death, and that my great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or
unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me
into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to
Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have
lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an
end. And many will witness to my words." |
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For
this and similar reasons, Socrates has avoided the public life |
"Now do you really
imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life,
supposing that like a good man I had always maintained the right and had made
justice, as I ought, the first thing?" "No indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other
man. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as
private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are
slanderously termed my disciples, or to any other." |
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Socrates Now Addresses the Teaching Charge |
Socrates
argues that he speaks to all who approach himÐrich and poor, young and
oldÐalike And
the results of those conversations, the improvement or corruptions of his
interlocutors, cannot be pinned on Socrates, he argues Socrates
argues that he does not teach or profess to teach |
"Not that I have any regular disciples. But if any
one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be
young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who pay;
but any one, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to
my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither
result can be justly imputed to me; for I never taught or professed to teach
him anything." |
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Not Teaching, but Amusement |
"And if any one says that he has ever learned or
heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, let me
tell you that he is lying" "But I shall be
asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told
you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this matter: they like to hear
the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is amusement in
it" |
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Can I Get a Witness?!? |
Socrates
calls for witnesses to his having taught them Only
crickets and tumbleweeds respond |
"If I am or have been corrupting the youth, those of
them who are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad
advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers, and take
their revenge; or if they do not like to come themselves, some of their
relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their
families have suffered at my hands. Now is their time." |
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Pity |
Socrates
addresses the worry that he is offensive to some insofar as he does not
present a case of pity by bringing his child before the court |
"Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at
me, when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or even a less serious
occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many tears, and how he
produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a
host of relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger of my
life, will do none of these things." |
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Such
a show, Socrates argues, would be a demeaning discredit to himself, and a
discredit to Athens |
"My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a
creature of flesh and blood, and not 'of wood or stone,' as Homer says; and I
have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one almost a man,
and two others who are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them
hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any
self-assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of
death is another question, of which I will not now speak. But, having regard
to public opinion, I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself,
and to you, and to the whole state." |
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Honor in the Face of Death Again |
"I have seen men of
reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner:
they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if
they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live;
and I think that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger
coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to
whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better than
women" |
"One who has reached my years, and who has a name
for wisdom, ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be
deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some
way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior
in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way,
how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have
been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that
they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they
could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that such are
a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of
them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves
give honour and command, are no better than women." |
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Judges, Reasons, & Emotions |
Socrates
argues that judges should be reasoned with, for it is their job to make
rational judgments, not to succumb to impious emotional appeals |
"And I say that these things ought not to be done by
those of us who have a reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to
permit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to
condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous,
than him who holds his peace.
But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be
something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an
acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to
make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he
will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure;
and we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be
encouraged, in this habit of perjuryÐthere can be no piety in that." |
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Initial Concluding Statement |
"Do not then require me to do what I consider
dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried
for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force
of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be
teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should
simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not
soÐfar otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher
than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God
I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me." |
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Guilt or Innocence Deliberations
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Socrates
is found guilty after deliberations It
is proposed that he is put to death |
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Socrates on the Fear of Death |
"When I do not know whether death is a good or an
evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil?" |
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Why not Exile? |
Socrates
will not propose that he is put in exile, as this would mean that he disobeys
the god "if I tell you that
to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore that I
cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say
again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about
which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man,
and that the unexamined life is not
worth living, you are still less likely to believe me" (emphasis mine) |
"Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and
then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you?"
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Socrates' Proposed Punishment |
a
very small amount of money |
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Punishment Deliberations |
Socrates
is sentence to death |
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Socrates Analyzes Consequences |
As
a result of Socrates being sentenced to death, Athenians will be called evil
for having killed (what the detractors will think is) a wise man |
"Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in
return for the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city,
who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me
wise, even although I am not wise, when they want to reproach you." |
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Suicide |
Socrates
forestalls a reproach Some
may think Socrates to blame for his own death since he could have easily
talked his way out of the death sentence |
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An Unworthy Defense |
Again,
Socrates thinks that the type of discourse that would have been necessary to
secure his life would have been "unworthy" of him As
he says: "I would rather die having spoken after my manner,
than speak in your manner and live" |
"you think that I was convicted because I had no
words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal--I mean, if I had
thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency which
led to my conviction was not of wordsÐcertainly not. But I had not the boldness
or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to do,
weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and doing many things which you
have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I maintain, are
unworthy of me." |
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On Escaping Death |
Socrates
(again) points to analogies in battle Sure,
if you are close to death on the battlefield you can beg and plead for life,
that is easy More
difficult is to "avoid unrighteousness" |
"Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man
will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may
escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if
a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not
to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than
death." |
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Socrates Prophesizes |
Their
having put Socrates to death will only make him a martyr of examination In
seeking to silence Socrates, to prohibit him from examining them, they have
only succeeded in motivating others to examine them Others
will follow Socrates' lead and seek to examine the Athenians, and they will
do so in more offensive ways |
"I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that
immediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have inflicted
on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape
the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be
as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers of
you than there are now; accusers whom hitherto I have restrained: and as they
are younger they will be more inconsiderate with you, and you will be more
offended at them." |
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Counsel |
Socrates
counsels the Athenians that they could have achieved their goals of silencing
examiners by improving themselves, not by killing an examiner |
"If you think that by killing men you can prevent
some one from censuring your evil lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way
of escape which is either possible or honourable; the easiest and the noblest
way is not to be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves." |
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Socrates' Voice |
In
conversation with friends, Socrates discloses the absence of his often times
vetoing voice The
voice did not stop him from coming to court, nor did it stop him from his
defense |
"Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal
oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even
about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now
as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally
believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of
opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was
on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was
going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech,
but now in nothing I either said or did touching the matter in hand has the
oracle opposed me." |
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A Good Sign |
Socrates
interprets his inner voice's silence as a sign of good "the customary sign would surely have opposed me had
I been going to evil and not to good" |
"It is an intimation that what has happened to me is
a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error.
For the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil
and not to good." |
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Deadly Dilemma |
But
how could his death be good? "either death is a state of nothingness and utter
unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul
from this world to another" |
"Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see
that there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two
thingsÐeither death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or,
as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another."
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Nothingness |
If
death is like a lack of consciousness, then it is like a perfect
sleepÐundisturbed "if a person were to select the night in which his
sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other
days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and
nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly
than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even
the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the
others" If
death is like that, then it is a gaining of something good |
"Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness,
but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death
will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in
which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this
the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days
and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly
than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even
the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the
others. Now if death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity
is then only a single night." |
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Elsewhere |
If
death is the transition to a place where "all the dead abide," then
death is a good thing There
we could receive counsel from the greats, and mingle with out heroes |
"But if death is the journey to another place, and
there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges,
can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world
below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and
finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and
Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were
righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making." |
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"What infinite delight would there be in conversing
with them and asking them questions!" |
"there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in
comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to
continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also
in the next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise,
and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the
leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless
others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing
with them and asking them questions! |
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Moreover,
in such a world they don't put examiners to death Further,
you would be immortal in such a world (if the rumors are true) |
"In another world they do not put a man to death for
asking questions: assuredly not. For besides being happier than we are, they
will be immortal, if what is said is true." |
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Death and the Good |
"Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death,
and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in
life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own
approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had
arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble; wherefore
the oracle gave no sign" |
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Socrates Asks a Favor |
"When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my
friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have
troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about
virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing,Ðthen
reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which
they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really
nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at
your hands" |
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