Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, and Sociology

Mill's Utilitarianism, as found at: www.utilitarianism.com/mill2.htm

Mill	Utilitarianism "Chapter II: What Utilitarianism Is"
Step One, "The Greatest Happiness Principle"	The Greatest Happiness Principle states that actions are morally right to the extent that they tend to promote happiness, and morally wrong to the extent that they tend to promote the opposite of happiness.
	According to the "Greatest Happiness Principle" "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."
Happiness	"pleasure, and the absence of pain … ."
Unhappiness	"pain, and the privation of pleasure."
Theory of Life	If we understand life, then we can understand how to treat living things morally. According to theory of life that grounds the morality of happiness: "pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends … ."
	Since living things desire pleasure, then actions that promote the happiness that comes from pleasure are moral.
Swine Worry	But, if actions that promote the happiness that comes from pleasure are moral, then stewing in our own filth becomes the morally correct thing to do, if one derives happiness from it. "To suppose that life has ... no higher end than pleasure–no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit– ... [means that Utilitarianism is] a doctrine worthy only of swine ... ." Mill must qualify what he means by "pleasure."
Behind the Worry	"[T]he accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable."
Pleasure or Pleasures?	But, "a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness." "Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification."
Pleasures High and Low	Humans have rationality that beasts lack, which accounts for the differences in pleasures
Quality and Quantity	We should see that "some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." The quality of pleasures is not to be overlooked.
Discerning Pleasures / Competent Judges	But which pleasures are good and which are not? "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference ... that is the more desirable pleasure." Mill argues that we should consult individuals who have experienced both types of pleasures and take their words as our guide. So, when wondering which of two pleasures to pursue, you ought to seek out "competent judges." They are competent since they've already experienced the two pleasures in question.
Trading Places	"Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures."
Trading Places E.G.	Consider the following thought experiment: Suppose that some wacky pharmacologist has invented a pill which, if consumed by humans, makes it such that those human's desires would be equivalent to a honey badger's. You would desire what a honey badger-slob desires, and you would be satisfied by the things that satisfy honey badgers (e.g., terrorizing snakes, snorting ants, and making a ruckus all day). Likewise, taking the pill will relieve you of your human desires. Now, supposing further, you are approached by that pharmacologist who, in an effort to promote this new pill, says that he will insure that all of your honey badger desires will be fulfilled without fail Would you take the pill? If you would take the pill, then you think, Mill would argue, that there are no differences in the pleasures of the beasts and the pleasures of man If you would not take the pill, then you are admitting, Mill would argue, that there are differences in what beasts and men find pleasurable
Higher Faculties	Human capacity for reasoning accounts for higher pleasures. Humans have base pleasures and intellectual pleasures.
The Pig Quote	"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."
Theory's Scope	A question of scope emerges: whose happiness are we talking about? An individual's? A group's? A city's? A state's? A nation's? All of mankind's happiness? Mill argues that "it is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether." Similarly, "it is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned." Even "the whole of sentient creation" seems to be involved, so Skippy the family dog is included.
Particular Judgment's Scope	Less broadly, the scope of any particular judgment rendered by a competent judge is limited to the involved parties. So, "the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on [many occasions] travel beyond the particular persons concerned ... ." Interest in "public utility" is relatively rare, but interest in "private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons," is far more common.
Scope Reconsidered	"I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned."
Impartiality	"As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."
Achieving Impartiality / Laws	"[L]aws and social arrangements should place the happiness ... of every individual ... in harmony with the interest of the whole."
Achieving Impartiality / Education and Upbringing	"[E]ducation and opinion ... should ... establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole."
Altruistic Characters	Man should be "unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good" Man should have "a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual [as] one of the habitual motives of action."
"Too High of a Standard" Objection	Some "find fault with [this] standard as being too high for humanity." "They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society." If I had to think of the pleasure of all those creatures that are capable of pleasure whenever I want to act ethically, then I'll have to spend too much time considering how my actions will affect them. This makes being moral too difficult.
Mill's Reply to the "Too High of a Standard" Objection / Scope Restriction	Mill's reply is to reduce the scope of the judgment, but not the theory. "[I]t is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large."
Local Utility	Unless one has the power to change the lives of a great number of people, then "The most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned ... ." "private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to."
Public Utility	"Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about so large an object."
"Too Slow" Objection	The Too Slow objection contends that there is not enough time to calculate what are the appropriate courses of action, and then run them by competent judges, in many cases which require morally correct actions.
The Basis of the "Too Slow" Objection	Mill argues that the one who makes this objection underestimates man's capacity too much. "There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it."
1^st Principles ≠ That Which is Based on 1^st Principles	"But to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another."
Mill's Reply to the "Too Slow" Objection	Mill replies thusly: "all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish."
Teasing out Act vs. Rule Utilitarianism	Before the "Too Slow" objection, Mill is largely operating with a kind of Act Utilitarianism. Act Utilitarianism asserts that acts are morally good to the extent to which they produce as much pleasure as possible in the relevant number of people. After the "Too Slow" objection, Mill seems to be operating with a kind of Rule Utilitarianism. Rule Utilitarianism asserts that acts are morally good to the extent that they follow the rules of Utilitarianism, rules which are designed to produce as much pleasure as possible in as many people as possible.
Act vs. Rule Utilitarianism	This distinction seems to save Mill from the "Too Slow" objection. Moreover, this distinction seems plausible outside of the context supplied by the objection. In our normal interactions, following the rules of Utilitarianism would produce what Utilitarianism seeks, the maximization of pleasure. In abnormal cases, where there is time to reflect and consult competent judges, then one can engage in Act Utilitarianism. "If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible." "[O]nly in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to."
Rule Utilitarianism's Problems	But notice that Rule Utilitarianism can seem to deviate from the Act Utilitarianism's consequentialist position. Following the rules set out by Utilitarianism does not guarantee that the consequences of following that rule will result in the maximization of pleasure. I can follow a rule, which means that according to Rule Utilitarianism it is morally correct, but pain, not pleasure, can nevertheless result. In such a case, it is morally wrong to commit an act according to Act Utilitarianism since it did not achieve the proper consequence, but morally good according to Rule Utilitarianism.
Mill	Utilitarianism "Chapter V: On the Connection Between Justice and Utility"
Justice as an Objection	The idea of justice seems to stand opposed in our minds to the Happiness Principle.
The Difference Between Justice and Morality	Consider the morality of generosity, or of beneficence. "Wherever there is right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence: and whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general, where we have now placed it, will be found to make no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality in justice."
The Happiness of Security	All of the various ways of securing happiness depend on security. We cannot go without security: "no human being can possibly do without [security for which] we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment."
Justice is:	"Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual implies and testifies to this more binding obligation."
	This is why we hold justice so dearly: our ability to remain happy depends on it.
	And this is why we are so angered by those who act unjustly.
Justice Is:	"It appears from what has been said, that justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice."
Overriding	"Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner." "[W]hat is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case."
Justice is not an Objection	If we recognize what justice is we see that it is not in opposition to utilitarianism, but a part of it.
	"Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a class (though not more so than others may be in particular cases); and which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not only different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from the milder feeling which attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or convenience, at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner character of its sanctions."