Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, and Sociology

Mill's On Liberty

http://www.bartleby.com/130/

Mill's Moral Perspective	Mill's approach to the law stems from his moral considerations, namely his brand of utilitarianism. "I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." Utilitarianism and liberal rights?	In a very flat-footed sense, utility "in the largest sense" seems as though it could permit the promotion of the subjection of a few individuals in favor of the greater group, but liberalism, in equally a flat-footed sense, is the protection of the individual against such subjection.
The Harm Principle	From a moral perspective, Mill argues that the only permissible way for a government to limit a citizen's behavior is when that behavior harms or would harm others: "That principle, that the sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
Mill's Liberalism	This amounts to one of the founding statements of Mill's form of liberalism, where the individual has a certain priority over the community. "In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
Liberty's Region	Mill lists out the domain of liberty prescribed by the Principle of Harm: 1) the private life of consciousness, 2) "the liberty of thought and feeling," 3) the absolute freedom to hold opinions, have sentiments "on all subjects," 4) "the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions, 5) "the liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character," 6) the liberty of "doing what we like," and 7) the liberty to assemble freely. All of those liberties are granted, and constrained, by the Principle of Harm: those liberties can be pursued by us "so long as what we do does not harm [others], even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong."
Liberty's Region / Opinion	Before moving on, let's do as Mill does, and spend a minute looking at the liberty of opinion in a little closer detail. Quite rightly, I think, Mill argues that the "mental well-being of mankind" demands a liberty of opinion. Beyond opinion's fit in the Principle of Harm there are other reasons why opinion ought not be thwarted by society: a) it would take an infallible opinion to silence another, but the assumption of infallible opinion is highly suspect, b) it is only through the clash of opinions that good opinions can be tempered by bad opinions, for even bad opinions can bear "a portion of truth," and c) opinions which are entirely wrong can prevent the dogmatic assumption of true opinions, and d) opinions not challenged by other opinions lose their meanings.
What Freedom Means to Mill	Any society that respects those liberties is free: "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it."
Exceptions	There is one significant exception to that absolute right of self-sovereignty conferred on citizens by the Principle of Harm: "Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury." At least three types of people, Mill argues, require that protection: a) children, b) certain kinds of the elderly, and c) races that of "considered as in [their] nonage."
Whence the Exceptions	Those three groups lack "the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion," and as a result members of those groups can be compelled "as a means to their own good." Should the members of those groups become capable of guiding their own improvements, they then gain the right of self-sovereignty. Before they gain those capacities, however, they are rightfully constrained and cannot be said to be living in freedom.
Others' Direct Interests	Exceptions aside, the harm principle implies a fair amount of societal intervention and compulsion, in order to preserve individuals rights of self-sovereignty. Thus, the self-sovereign interests of the multitude of men "in the largest sense," permit the suppression of behaviors that might harm others, and the compulsion of behaviors where those behaviors are needed to prevent the harm of others. Negatively, "If any one does an act harmful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him," by law or by general "disapprobation." Positively, a citizen "may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing" things that are "obviously a man's duty to do," including a) "to bear his fair share in the common defense, b) "to give evidence in a court of justice, or c) "[to bear is fair share] in any other joint work necessary to the interests of the society ... "
Whence the Obligation to Obey the Laws Regarding Direct Interests	These direct interests that the state has in intervening upon, and compelling, any individual's actions gives rise to an obligation had to, a) (negatively) "not injuring the interests of one another," and b) (positively) to bear "his share ... of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation." Why? you ask? Whence this obligation to obey the laws which dictate a) and b)? "Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every on who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest."
The Law's Limits	But, Mill concedes, there are forms of harm that ought not be covered by either of those negative or positive laws. They amount to offenses, but not to real harm: "The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights." "The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law." The acts of such an individual may permit us to offer our help: "Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but," Mill argues, "he, himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good." It is better to allow the likes of Sheppard and Whittle their hurtful, odious opinions than it is to constrain them, given the rights prescribed by the Principle of Harm? Is there no limit to what opinions a state can permit? Is it merely up to the citizenry to attempt to educate and ridicule them?
Other's Indirect Interests	Mill does admit that opinions can warrant a kind of social punishment, though not a legal one. Social punishment is warranted because of society's indirect interest in what goes on in the mind and house of the individual when those occurrences can lead to harm in others. Society thus has indirect interests in whether or not an individual has moral vices ranging from "irascibility on insufficient cause" to "the pride which derives gratification form the abasement of others." Here is his moralization: "There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called ... lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing [legal] harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt ... . Though doing no [legal] wrong to anyone, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order ... ." Too weak?
Social Punishment	Mill argues that this notion of social punishment can be severe: the contemptibly depraved "may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others," like being passed over for promotion, being boycotted, being shunned in the streets, etc.
Exceptions	"A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect—must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself."