Excerpts by
Christopher Lay
Los Angeles
Pierce College
Department of History,
Philosophy, and Sociology
Mill's
On Liberty
http://www.bartleby.com/130/
"I
regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be
utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being."
"That
principle, that the sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
"But
there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the
individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that
portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it
also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent
and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first
instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and
the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive
consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human
liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding
liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and
feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical
or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing
and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it
belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other
people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought
itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically
inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and
pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing
as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from
our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong."
"The
only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our
own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede
their efforts to obtain it."
"Those
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be
protected against their own actions as well as against external
injury."
"If
any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prim‰
facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely
applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for
the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such
as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the
common defence, or in any other joint work necessary
to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to
perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a
fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless
against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he
may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause
evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case
he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true,
requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former."
"What,
then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself?
Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be
assigned to individuality, and how much to society?
"Each
will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly
concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is
chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society."
"Though
society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by
inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one
who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the
fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest."
"This
conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather
certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's
bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society
or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is
justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavour
to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an
individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their
welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights.
The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon
as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to
discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a
person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs
not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age,
and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be
perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
"It
would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of
selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with
each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about
the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is
involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of
disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested
benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the
metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding
virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It
is equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education
works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the
former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding
virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to
distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former
and avoid the latter. They should be for ever stimulating each other to
increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their
feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of
degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number
of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years,
that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do
with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest
which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have
in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which
society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is
fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings
and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge
immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The
interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only
regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be
altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to
individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of
such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this
department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of
action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary
that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people
may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his
individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his
judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even
obtruded on him, by others; but he himself is the final judge. All errors which
he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the
evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good."
"I
do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought
not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies.
This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the
qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of
admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature.
If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of
admiration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be
called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of
taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests
it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme
cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due
strength without entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one,
a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool,
or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a
fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of
it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes
himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely
rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one
person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without
being considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in various
ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any
one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours.
We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it
(though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society
most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution
others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a
pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a
preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his
improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties
at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he
suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it
were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they
are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows
rashness, obstinacy, self-conceitÑwho cannot live within moderate meansÑwho
cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgencesÑwho pursues animal pleasures
at the expense of those of feeling and intellectÑmust expect to be lowered in
the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable
sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited
their favour by special excellence in his social
relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not
affected by his demerits towards himself."