Reading Notes by
Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History,
Philosophy, and Sociology
Steven Kelman,
"Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique"
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Decision Making |
Many argue that
cost-benefit analyses are necessary for making decisions. They argue: |
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1) We ought not do
something if the costs outweigh the benefits. 2) To determine if we
ought to do something we should "express all benefits and costs in a
common scale or denominator, so that they can be compared with each
other." 3) Policy-makers need to
know the costs and benefits and this justifies the costs needed to gather the
relevant data. |
"(1) There exists a strong presumption
that an act should not be undertaken unless its benefits outweigh its costs." "(2) In order to determine whether
benefits outweigh costs, it is desirable to attempt to express all benefits
and costs in a common scale or denominator, so that they can be compared with
each other, even when some benefits and costs are not traded on markets and
hence have no established dollar values." "(3) Getting decision-makers to make
more use of cost-benefit techniques is important enough to warrant both the
expense required to gather the data for improved cost-benefit estimation and
the political efforts needed to give the activity higher priority compared to
other activities, also valuable in and of themselves." |
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Kelman |
Kelman's conclusion: |
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1) There may be
situations where something is right despite the costs. 2) Not everything can be
quantified in the cost-benefit calculus.
3) The expense of
collecting data for cost-benefits analyses is not always justified. |
"(1) In areas of environmental,
safety, and health regulation, there may be many instances where a certain
decision might be right even though its benefits do not outweigh its costs."
"(2) There are good reasons to oppose
efforts to put dollar values on non-marketed benefits and costs." "(3) Given the relative frequency of
occasions in the areas of environmental, safety, and health regulation where
one would not wish to use a benefits-outweigh-costs test as a decision rule,
and given the reasons to oppose the monetizing of non-marketed benefits or
costs that is a prerequisite for cost-benefit analysis, it is not justifiable
to devote major resources to the generation of data for cost-benefit calculations
or to undertake efforts to 'spread the gospel' of cost-benefit analysis
further." |
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Starting Question |
"How do we decide
whether a given action is morally right or wrong and hence, assuming the
desire to act morally, why it should be undertaken or refrained from?" |
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CBA Answer |
"[T]he answer given
by cost-benefit analysis, that actions should be undertaken so as to maximize
net benefits, represents one of the classic answers given by moral
philosophersÑthat given by utilitarians." |
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Utilitarianism |
"The act that
maximizes attainment of satisfaction under the circumstances is the right
act." |
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"The positive and
negative consequences of an act for satisfaction may go beyond the act's
immediate consequences." |
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Impetuous Utilitarianism
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"A facile version
of utilitarianism would give moral sanction to a lie, for instance, if the
satisfaction of an individual attained by telling the lie was greater than the
suffering imposed on the lie's victim." "Few utilitarians
would agree." |
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Long-Term Consequences
Matter |
Most non-facile
utilitarians would point to the many long-term, negative consequences from
permitting lies. |
"Most
of them would add to the list of negative consequences the effect of the one
lie on the tendency of the person who lies to tell other lies, even in
instances when the lying produced less satisfaction for him than
dissatisfaction for others. They would also add the negative effects of the
lie on the general level of social regard for truth-telling, which has many consequences
for future utility." |
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Moral Pains and
Pleasures |
Important: The pains and pleasures
associated with doing what is morally good or morally bad cannot figure into
the calculation. Calculations that use
such pains and pleasures to determine the morality of an action beg the
question. |
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Kelman's Move / Utilitarian Roots |
"Utilitarianism is
an important and powerful moral doctrine." "But it is probably
a minority position among contemporary moral philosophers." "It is amazing that
economists can proceed in unanimous endorsement of cost-benefit analysis as
if unaware that their conceptual framework is highly controversial in the
discipline from which it aroseÐmoral philosophy." |
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Nazi Example |
"Imagine the case
of an old man in Nazi Germany who is hostile to the regime." "He is wondering
whether he should speak out against Hitler." "If he speaks out,
he will lose his pension." "And his action
will have done nothing to increase the chances that the Nazi regime will be
overthrown: he is regarded as somewhat eccentric by those around him, and
nobody has ever consulted his views on political questions." "Recall that one
cannot add to the benefits of speaking out any satisfaction from doing 'the
right thing,' because the purpose of the exercise is to determine whether
speaking out is the right thing." " How would the
utilitarian calculation go?" "The benefits of
the old man's speaking out would, as the example is presented, be nil, while
the costs would be his loss of his pension." "So the costs of
the action would out-weigh the benefits." "By the
utilitarians' cost-benefit calculation, it would be morally wrong for
the man to speak out." |
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Evaluative Pause |
Does this mean that the
pensioner ought do nothing according to
utilitarianism? |
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Candle |
"Another example:
two very close friends are on an Arctic expedition together." "One of them falls
very sick in the snow and bitter cold, and sinks quickly before anything can
be done to help him." "As he is dying, he
asks his friend one thing, 'Please, make me a solemn promise that ten years
from today you will come back to this spot and place a lighted candle here to
remember me.'" "The friend
solemnly promises to do so, but does not tell a soul." "Now, ten years
later, the friend must decide whether to keep his promise." "It would be
inconvenient for him to make the long trip." "Since he told
nobody, his failure to go will not affect the general social faith in
promise-keeping." "And the incident
was unique enough so that it is safe to assume that his failure to go will
not encourage him to break other promises." "Again, the costs
of the act outweigh the benefits." "A utilitarian
would need to believe that it would be morally wrong to travel to the
Arctic to light the candle." |
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Evaluative Pause |
What would Singer, the
utilitarian, say that the living person should do? |
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Justice/Innocence |
"A third example: a
wave of thefts has hit a city and the police are having trouble finding any
of the thieves." "But they believe,
correctly, that punishing someone for theft will have some deterrent effect
and will decrease the number of crimes." "Unable to arrest
any actual perpetrator, the police chief and the prosecutor arrest a person
whom they know to be innocent and, in cahoots with each other, fabricate a
convincing case against him." "The police chief
and the prosecutor are about to retire, so the act has no effect on any
future actions of theirs." "The fabrication is
perfectly executed, so nobody finds out about it." "Is the only question
involved in judging the act of framing the innocent man that of whether his
suffering from conviction and imprisonment will be greater than the suffering
avoided among potential crime victims when some crimes are deterred?" "A utilitarian
would need to believe that it is morally right to punish the innocent man as
long as it can be demonstrated that the suffering prevented outweighs his
suffering." |
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Evaluative Pause |
Would Utilitarian
legislators say that such actions should be enshrined into law? |
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Possible Worlds |
"And a final
example: imagine two worlds, each containing the same sum total of happiness."
"In the first
world, this total of happiness came about from a series of acts that included
a number of lies and injustices (that is, the total consisted of the
immediate gross sum of happiness created by certain acts, minus any long-term
unhappiness occasioned by the lies and injustices)." "In the second
world the same amount of happiness was produced by a different series of
acts, none of which involved lies or injustices." "Do we have any
reason to prefer the one world to the other?" "A utilitarian
would need to believe that the choice between the two worlds is a matter
of indifference." |
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Evaluative Pause |
What can a Utilitarian
say in response? |
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Kelman's Conviction |
"We believe that
some acts whose costs are greater than their benefits may be morally right
and, contrariwise, some acts whose benefits are greater than their costs may
be morally wrong." |
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CBA Included |
Kelman doesn't argue that
there is no place for cost-benefit analyses. |
"This
does not mean that the question whether benefits are greater than costs is
morally irrelevant. Few would claim such. Indeed, for a broad range of
individual and social decisions, whether an act's benefits outweigh its costs
is a sufficient question to ask. But not for all such decisions." |
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CBA Excluded |
But it does not belong
in a number of areas, such as the "freedom of speech or trial by jury." |
"We
do not do cost-benefit analyses of freedom of speech or trial by jury." |
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Human Rights |
"The notion of
human rights involves the idea that people may make certain claims to be
allowed to act in certain ways or to be treated in certain ways, even if the
sum of benefits achieved thereby does not outweigh the sum of costs." |
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Not CBA, But ... / In the Face of Conflicts |
"In the most
convincing versions of nonutilitarian ethics,
various duties or rights are not absolute." "But each has a prima
facie moral validity so that, if duties or rights do not conflict, the
morally right act is the act that reflects a duty or respects a right." "If duties or
rights do conflict, a moral judgment, based on conscious deliberation, must
be made." "Since one of the
duties non-utilitarian philosophers enumerate is the duty of beneficence (the
duty to maximize happiness), which in effect incorporates all of
utilitarianism by reference, a nonutilitarian who
is faced with conflicts between the results of cost-benefit analysis and
nonutility-based considerations will need to undertake such
deliberation." "But in that
deliberation, additional elements, which cannot be reduced to a question of
whether benefits outweigh costs, have been introduced." "Indeed, depending
on the moral importance we attach to the right or duty involved, cost-benefit
questions may, within wide ranges, become irrelevant to the outcome of the
moral judgment." |
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Conflict Example |
"When officials are
deciding what level of pollution will harm certain vulnerable peopleÐsuch as
asthmatics or the elderlyÐwhile not harming others, one issue involved may be
the right of those people not to be sacrificed on the altar of somewhat
higher living standards for the rest of us." |
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In General |
"But more broadly
than this, many environmentalists fear that subjecting decisions about clean
air or water to the cost-benefit tests that determine the general run of
decisions removes those matters from the realm of specially valued things." |
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Assigning Costs and
Benefits |
Common measures are
needed if one is to compare costs to benefits. $ But we usually squirm
when assigning monetary value to things like "human life itself,"
and "peace and quiet, fresh-smelling air, swimmable rivers, spectacular
vistas [etc.] ... ." |
"In
order for cost-benefit calculations to be performed the way they are supposed
to be, all costs and benefits must be expressed in a common measure,
typically dollars, including things not normally bought and sold on markets,
and to which dollar prices are therefore not attached. The most dramatic
example of such things is human life itself; but many of the other benefits
achieved or preserved by environmental policyÑsuch as peace and quiet,
fresh-smelling air, swimmable rivers, spectacular vistasÑare not traded on
markets either." |
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But people do seem
willing to put prices on many of those things, economists point out. When you buy a house,
something that can have a monetary value, it comes bundled with things that
don't have direct market value, like views etc. "[F]resh air is not marketed, but houses in different parts
of Los Angeles that are similar except for the degree of smog are." |
"They
have tried to develop methods for imputing a person's 'willingness to pay'
for such things, their approach generally involving a search for bundled
goods that are traded on markets and that vary as to whether they
include a feature that is, by itself, not marketed." |
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Problem 1 / We're Not All Alike |
Some value quiet more
than others. "[T]o use the property value discount of homes near airports as
a measure of people's willingness to pay for quiet means to accept as a proxy
for the rest of us the behavior of": 1] "those least
sensitive to noise," 2] "airport
employees (who value the convenience of a near-airport location)" or 3] "others who are
susceptible to an agent's assurances that 'it's not so bad.'" |
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Problem 2 / Giving Up & Gaining |
"[T]he attempts of
economists to measure people's willingness to pay for non-marketed things
assume that there is no difference between the price a person would require
for giving up something to which he has a preexisting right and the
price he would pay to gain something to which he enjoys no right."
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But Giving Up Gaining |
"[M]ost people would insist on being paid far more to assent
to a worsening of their situation than they would be willing to pay to
improve their situation." |
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Problem 3 / Private & Public |
"Those who use
figures garnered from ["private"]
analysis to provide guidance for public decisions assume no difference
between how people value certain things in private individual transactions
and how they would wish those same things to be valued in public collective
decisions." |
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Behavioral Cues |
"[W]e show [it is
argued] by our daily risk-taking behavior that we do not value life
infinitely, and therefore our public decisions should not reflect the high
value of life that proponents of strict regulation propose." |
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But Private Public |
"[P]ublic, social decisions provide an opportunity to give
certain things a higher valuation than we choose, for one reason or another,
to given them in our private activities." |
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"Precisely because
we fail, for whatever reasons, to give life-saving the value in everyday personal
decisions that we in some general terms believe we should give it, we may
wish our social decisions to provide us the occasion to display the reverence
for life that we espouse but do not always show." |
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Problem 4 / Cheapening |
"[T]he very act of [assigning
a cost to something] will reduce the thing's perceived value." "To place a price
on the benefit may, in other words, reduce the value of that benefit." "Cost-benefit
analysis thus may be like the thermometer that, when placed in a liquid to be
measured, itself changes the liquid's temperature." |
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Cheapened E.G. |
"Praise that is
bought is worth little, even to the person buying it." |
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Cheapening Reason A |
"The first reason
that pricing something decreases its perceived value is that, in many
circumstances, non-market exchange is associated with the production of
certain values not associated with market exchange." |
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Cheapening Reason A / Sex E.G. |
"The willingness to
pay for sex bought from a prostitute is less than the perceived value of the
sex consummating love." "(Imagine the
reaction if a practitioner of cost-benefit analysis computed the benefits of
sex based on the price of prostitute services.)" |
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Cheapening Reason A / Environmental E.G. |
"[F]or many people
who value ["pristine streams or undisturbed forests"], part of
their value comes from their position as repositories of values the
non-market sector represents." |
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Cheapening Reason B / "Not For Sale" |
"The second way in
which placing a market price on a thing decreases its perceived value is by
removing the possibility of proclaiming that the thing is 'not for sale,'
since things on the market by definition are for sale." |
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NFS |
"[T]he statement is
a way of showing that a thing is valued for its own sake, whereas selling a
thing for money demonstrates that it was valued only instrumentally." |
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"Such an
announcement does more, however, than just reflect a preexisting high
valuation." "It signals a
thing's distinctive value to others and helps us persuade them to value the
thing more highly than they otherwise might." "It also expresses
our resolution to safeguard that distinctive value." "To state that
something is not for sale is thus also a source of value for that thing,
since if a thing's value is easy to affirm or protect, it will be worth more
than an otherwise similar thing without such attributes." "If we proclaim
that something is not for sale, we make a once-and-for-all judgment of its
special value." |
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Without NFS |
"When something is
priced, the issue of its perceived value is constantly coming up, as a
standing invitation to reconsider that original judgment." "Were people
constantly faced with questions such as 'how much money could get you to give
up your freedom of speech?' or 'how much would you sell your vote for if you
could?', the perceived value of the freedom to speak or the right to vote
would soon become devastated as, in moments of weakness, people started
saying 'maybe it's not worth so much after all.'" |
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Cheapening Reason C / Priceless |
Some things NFS are
extra-special: they are "priceless," or have "infinite
value." "Such expressions
are reserved for a subset of things not for sale, such as life or health." |
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Priceless and Economists
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"Economists tend to
scoff at talk of pricelessness." "For them, saying
that something is priceless is to state a willingness to trade off an
infinite quantity of all other goods for one unit of the priceless good, a
situation that empirically appears highly unlikely." |
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Priceless |
"Its
value-affirming and value-protecting functions cannot be bestowed on
expressions that merely denote a determinate, albeit high, valuation." |
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Priceless / Kennedy E.G. |
"John Kennedy in
his inaugural address proclaimed that the nation was ready to 'pay any price
[and] bear any burden ... to assure the survival and the success of
liberty.'" "Had he said instead
that we were willing to 'pay a high price' or 'bear a large burden' for
liberty, the statement would have rung hollow." |
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Possible, "In
Effect" Objection to Kelman Considered |
Recall Kelman from earlier: 1) "in cases where
various non-utility-based duties or rights conflict with the maximization of
utility, it is necessary to make a deliberative judgment about what act is
finally right." 2) "the search for
commensurability might not always be a desirable one, that the attempt to go
beyond expressing benefits in terms of (say) lives saved and costs in terms
of dollars is not something devoutly to be wished." |
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"In Effect" Valuation
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The objection goes like
this: we value human life "in effect," so we might as well be
straightforward and explicit about it.
"If government
regulators promulgate a regulation that saves 100 lives at a cost of $1
billion, they are 'in effect' valuing a life at (a minimum of) $10 million,
whether or not they say that they are willing to place a dollar value on a
human life." |
"In
situations involving things that are not expressed in a common measure,
advocates of cost-benefit analysis argue that people making judgments 'in
effect' perform cost-benefit calculations anyway. If government regulators
promulgate a regulation that saves 100 lives at a cost of $1 billion, they
are 'in effect' valuing a life at (a minimum of) $10 million, whether or not
they say that they are willing to place a dollar value on a human life.
Since, in this view, cost-benefit analysis 'in effect' is inevitable, it
might as well be made specific." |
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Kelman's Reply "In
Effect" Objection |
"This argument
misconstrues the real difference in the reasoning processes involved." |
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CBA |
"In cost-benefit
analysis, equivalencies are established in advance as one of the raw
materials for the calculation." "One determines
costs and benefits, one determines equivalencies (to be able to put various
costs and benefits into a common measure), and then one sets to toting things
upÑwaiting, as it were, with bated breath for the results of the calculation
to come out." "The outcome is
determined by the arithmetic; if the outcome is a close call or if one is not
good at long division, one does not know how it will turn out until the
calculation is finished." |
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Non-CBA |
"In the kind of
deliberative judgment that is performed without a common measure, no
establishment of equivalencies occurs in advance." "Equivalencies are
not aids to the decision process." "In fact, the
decision-maker might not even be aware of what the 'in effect' equivalencies
were, at least before they are revealed to him afterwards by someone pointing
out what he had 'in effect' done." "The decision-maker
would see himself as simply having made a deliberate judgment; the 'in
effect' equivalency number did not play a causal role in the decision but at
most merely reflects it." |
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"Given this, the
argument against making the process explicit is the one discussed earlier in
the discussion of problems with putting specific quantified values on things
that are not normally quantifiedÐthat the very act of doing so may serve to
reduce the value of those things." |
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