Reading
Notes by Christopher Lay
Los
Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy,
and Sociology
Kant's
Duty Theory
Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
as found at:
http://www.constitution.org/
kant/metamora.txt
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Immanuel Kant |
"Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" |
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Preface |
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Kant's Concern |
Herein we focus in on moral philosophy. The question at hand, then: "Whether it is not of the
utmost necessity to construct a pure thing which is only empirical and which
belongs to anthropology?" [A better translation, by Mary J. Gregor,
from the Cambridge edition, is this: "[I]s it not thought to be of the
utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely
cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to
anthropology?"] |
"As my concern here is
with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this: Whether it is
not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure thing which is only empirical
and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy must be
possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws." |
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Moral Law & Moral Force |
"Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral
force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute
necessity; that, for example, the precept, 'Thou shalt not lie,' is not valid
for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so
with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis
of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the
circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the
conception of pure reason; ... " " ... and although any other precept which is founded
on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in
as far as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps
only as to a motive, such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can
never be called a moral law." |
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Immanuel Kant |
"Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" |
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One |
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"The Good Will" |
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Good Will Over All |
Only one thing that is totally good
("good without qualification"), and that is the good will. Other things can be good, but they are
only good insofar as they help one achieve and maintain that good will. |
"It is
impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which
can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will." |
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Not The Consequences of the Good Will |
What matters here are intentions. |
"A good
will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishesÑbecause of its
fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing
alongÑthat is, good in itself."
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Only Conditionally Good |
A good will is not any of the
following: intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, constancy of purpose the qualities of temperament power, wealth, honor, health, complete well-being, contentment, and happiness for none of which are good all by
themselves. These goods are only good so long as they
are used by a good will. These goods can be exercised by a bad
will. Imagine a criminal who exhibits all of
the above. |
"Nothing
can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be
called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however
they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of
temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these
gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will
which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is
called character, is not good." |
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Kant, Happiness, and Necessity vs. Sufficiency |
Happiness is neither sufficient nor
necessary for having a good will. For Kant happiness is not the morally
best accomplishment for man, rather, it is to achieve and maintain a good
will. As such, you can be morally good, while
being altogether unhappy. |
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Good Will Over All / Necessary vs. Contingent |
"It is impossible to conceive
anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good
without qualification, except a good will." Other things can be good, but they are
only good insofar as they help one achieve and maintain that good will. This is the distinction between what is
necessarily good as opposed to what is only contingently or conditionally
good. Happiness is only good on the condition
that it is related to a good will. Thus, the goodness of happiness is
contingent upon its being properly related to a good will. |
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Consequences |
Happiness is a consequence, and
consequences can be brought about in good and bad ways. Unlike consequences, "A good will is
not good because of what it effects or accomplishes." Results, positive and negative
"could have been brought about by [different] causes and consequently
their production did not require the will of a rational being." Should a fruit fall from the tree and
land in your hand, we don't morally praise the tree since the fruit's landing
in your hand did not wind up there due to some good will. And should a fruit be placed in your hand
by someone who hates fruit, we don't morally praise that personÐunless they
handed you the fruit because of their having a good will. That you find fruit in your hand is not
enough, it had to get there in the right way. Favorable consequences are insufficient
for moral goodness, since favorable consequences can be achieved without a
good will. |
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Not The Consequences of the Good Will |
And we're not even concerned about the
consequences that might stem from someone acting out of a good will. "A good will is not good because of
what it effects or accomplishesÑbecause of its fitness for attaining some
proposed end: it is good through its willing aloneÑthat is, good in
itself." If, out of a good will, you give out
fruit, like a vogelbeere to someone who has an
unknown allergy to vogelbeeres, then just because
there is a bad consequence, in this case a long and protracted death, does
nothing to the morality of the situation. Your act was still morally good, even
though it had bad consequences. |
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But Why Not Consequences? |
This is vitally important to
understanding Kant's Duty Theory. Kant is after a morality that is
universal, one that applies to all rational creatures and at all times. Anything less is a kind of moral
relativism, and moral relativism is a slippery slope: if you stand on it, you will slide all
the way down to radical moral relativism where what you do is morally right,
no matter what others say (and they can say the same thing too). To avoid relativism, Kant seeks after
what is necessarily morally good. Since consequences are only contingently
good, they cannot serve us in our quest for a non-relative ethics. We are only after what is necessarily
good. |
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Paralysis Notwithstanding |
Even if a will is incapable of achieving
anything, as long as it is a good will, it is good. "Its usefulness or fruitfulness can
neither add nor take away anything from this value." |
"Even
if it should happen that ... this will should wholly lack power to accomplish
its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and
there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the
summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still
shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself."
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"Why Reason as Made To Guide The
Will" |
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A Good Will |
The goodness of such a will "exists
already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up
than to be taught." |
"We
have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly
esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion
which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to
be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our
actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the
rest." |
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To see how such a good will already
exists in the minds of rational creatures, consider the wider notion of duty.
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"In
order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a
good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances.
These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable,
rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the
brighter." |
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"The First Proposition of
Morality" |
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"[An action must be done from a sense of duty, if it is to have moral
worth]" |
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Good Will Described Good Will Governed
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Actions which conform with duty Actions which are done from duty. |
"For in
this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with
duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make
this distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has
besides a direct inclination to it." |
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Not from Self-Interest |
Notice the shopkeeper who deals fairly
with inexperienced customers, treating them fairly when pricing goods. He seems to be acting honestly. But if he is not acting from a duty born
out of good will, then he is merely acting out of self-interest. It behooves him to have a good reputation
as a shopkeeper, and dealing honestly with customers perpetuates that
reputation. As such, he is only being honest out of
self-interest, and not a duty born out of good will. |
"For
example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge
an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent
tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that
a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but
this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from
duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out
of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct
inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it
were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from
direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view." |
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Not from Inclination |
Suppose, for some reason, that you've
grown up in a society that has implanted in you the immediate reflex to help
others without question. In this case, you are not responsible for
the desire to help others, since it did not come from your rational
capacities. Since you don't even really have a desire
to help, you don't even have a will, so this action is not done out of a duty
born out of a good will. |
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Not from Happiness |
Suppose, for some reason, that you find
happiness in helping others, but you do not feel compelled to help others. In this case, you are not responsible for
the desire to help others, since it did not come from your rational
capacities. Since these actions are not done out of a
duty born out of a good will, you cannot be praised for them. |
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Non-Suicide Version |
Suppose that not killing yourself is a
duty mandated by good will. Just because you don't kill yourself does
not mean that you deserve moral praise, for the reason you have for not
killing yourself may not be a good will. Just because we can describe your not killing yourself as an instance of following the
dictates of a good will does not mean that your not killing yourself results
from your in fact being governed by a good will. These are two distinct things. |
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"The Second Proposition of
Morality" |
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Second Proposition |
Actions done from duty derive their moral
goodness or badness from the maxim or intention that determined those
actions, not the consequences of those actions. |
"The
second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth,
not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by
which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of
the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which
the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire." |
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Consequences are Not Necessarily Good |
Consider consequences again. |
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Consequential Examples |
Consider GW + GC = MG GW + BC = MG BW + BC = MB BW + GC = MB where Good Will = GW Bad Will = BW Good Consequence = GC Bad Consequence = BC Morally Good = MG Morally Bad = MB And in more detail: GW + GC = MG I understand my duty to not to kill
myself, and this motivates me to remove my hand from my own ventilator, the
only thing keeping me alive. As a consequence, I live on. GW + BC = MG I understand my duty to not to kill
myself, and this motivates me to remove my hand from my own ventilatorÐbut,
this conducting this thought process prevents me from listening to the doctor
who ways that if I don't consume a pill immediately, I will die. As a consequence, I die. BW + BC = MB I do not understand my duty to not to
kill myself, and this motivates me to unplug my ventilator. As a consequence, I die. BW + GC = MB I do not understand my duty to not to
kill myself, and this motivates me to unplug my ventilatorÐbut a doctor walks
in and takes the ventilator cord from my hand. As a consequence, I live on. |
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Objection: In BW + GC = MB There is Unexplained Good |
In BW + GC = MB, there is a good
consequence, but there does not seem to be a good will associated with it,
soÐyou might askÐwhy is it called a good consequence? Rational beings are the types of things
that have wills, and as such are capable of having a Good Will, and so
deserve to be treated good (and more on this in the second section). And since it is bad for a Good Will to
end, not dying is good for any will, since any will is capable of being
good. Hence, BW + GC = MB is associated with a
Good Will, even if only indirectly. Further, notice how GW + BC = MG is good,
even though it has a bad consequence. Notice how we are only audience to the
consequence, and not the will. In the example, we don't know why the
patient didn't take the pill. We don't know if the patient didn't take
the pill because of a BW to kill herself, or a GW. Since we cannot know from either bad
consequences or good consequence if they are directly associated with either
Good or Bad Wills, we must treat them as if they are Good Wills. |
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"The Third Proposition of
Morality" |
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Third Proposition |
"Duty is the necessity of action
from respect for the law." "It is only what is connected with
my will as a principle ... the law of itself, which can be an object of
respect, and hence a command."
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"The
third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would
express thus Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. I may
have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I
cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and
not an energy of will. Similarly I cannot have
respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my
own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; i.e., look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is only what is
connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effectÐwhat does not
subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at
least in case of choice excludes it from its calculationÐin other words,
simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence a
command." |
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Actions from duty exclude the influences
of inclination and can even act against inclinations. |
"Now an
action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and
with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine
the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this
practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even
to the thwarting of all my inclinations." |
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Maxims |
"A maxim is the subjective principle
of volition. The objective principle (i.e., that which would also serve
subjectively as a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had
full power over the faculty of desire) is the practical law." |
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Moral goodness "consist[s] in
nothing else than the conception of law in itself" and not the outcomes
of following that law. |
"The
pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else
than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a
rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect,
determines the will." |
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"The Supreme Principle of Morality:
The Categorical Imperative" |
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Content |
But what is the content of this otherwise
merely formal law? |
"But
what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the
will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order
that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification?"
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First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative |
"I am never to act otherwise than so that I could
also will that my maxim should become a universal law." [That is an okay translation. A better translation, by Mary J. Gregor, from the Cambridge edition, is this: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I
could also will that my maxim should become a universal law."] |
"As I have deprived the
will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law,
there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in
general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to
act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law." |
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Honest E.G. |
"Let the question be, for example": "May I when in distress make a promise with the
intention not to keep it?" |
"The common reason of
men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides
with this and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the
question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the
intention not to keep it?" |
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Prudential Case for Honesty |
But it can also sometimes seem to imprudent to lie in
general. We oftentimes end up crafting a web of lies in which we
entangle ourselves. So even from the prudential standpoint, lying can be wrong
(in general). |
"I see clearly indeed
that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means
of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered whether there may not
hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from
which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the
consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be
much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present,
it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein
according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing
except with the intention of keeping it." |
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Consequential Justification |
"But it is soon clear to me that such a [prudential]
maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences." |
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But ... Exceptions |
"[T]o be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often
be very advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly
safer." |
"Now it is a wholly
different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of
injurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action
already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about
elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect
myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked;
but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous
to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer." |
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Against Lying |
While one can (practically) lie, one cannot consistently
lie in a world where such a lie has been universalized. "Then I presently become aware that while I can will
the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law." |
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Against the Universalization of the Deceitful Intention |
"For with such a law there would be no promises at
all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future
actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over
hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin." |
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Contradictory?
Immoral. |
"Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a
universal law, would necessarily destroy itself." |
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Immanuel Kant |
"Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" |
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Two |
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Concept of Duty |
Whence our concept of duty? Not from experience ... . |
"it is
by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as an empirical
notion." |
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Conformity With Done From |
"Although many things are done in
conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful
whether they are done strictly from duty, so as to have a moral worth." |
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Duty Prior |
"prior to all experience ... duty is
involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining the will by a priori principles." |
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Absolute Necessity |
Kant argues that if "notion of morality has any
truth," "we must admit that its law must be valid ... with absolute
necessity." But experience does not give us anything with absolute
necessity. |
"unless
we deny that the notion of morality has any truth or reference to any
possible object, we must admit that its law must be valid, not merely for men
but for all rational creatures generally, not merely under certain contingent
conditions or with exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear
that no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such apodeictic laws." |
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"First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative:
Universal Law" |
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Maxims |
Maxims are subjective principles of action. Maxims are practical rules "set by reason according
to conditions of the subject." The objective principle of action is called practical law.
The objective principle does not depend on the conditions
of the subject and so is "valid for every rational being." |
"A
maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be distinguished from the
objective principle, namely, practical law. The former contains the practical
rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject (often its
ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle on which the
subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid for every rational
being, and is the principle on which it ought to act that is an
imperative." |
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The Categorical Imperative |
"There is ... but one categorical imperative, namely,
this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law." Imperatives of duty are to be derived from this principle.
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"Now if
all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their
principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is
not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we
understand by it and what this notion means." "Since
the universality of the law according to which effects are produced
constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to
form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general
laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of
thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature." |
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"Four Illustrations" |
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Perfect and Imperfect Duties |
"We will now enumerate a few duties,
adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves
and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties." |
"I
understand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of inclination and then I have not merely external
but also internal perfect duties." |
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Suicide E.G. |
The situation: "A man reduced to
despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far
in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be
contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life." His maxim is: "From self-love I
adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely
to bring more evil than satisfaction." Can that maxim "founded on
self-love" be universalized?
The verdict: "Now we see at once that a system of
nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very
feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would
contradict itself." "[T]herefore,
[such a law] could not exist as a system of nature." So, "that maxim cannot possibly
exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly
inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty." |
"A man
reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is
still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it
would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he
inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of
nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to
shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than
satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on
self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a
system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the
very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life
would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of
nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature
and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of
all duty." |
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Lying E.G. |
The situation: "Another finds
himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be
able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he
promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time." The maxim: "When I think myself in
want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know
that I never can do so." The verdict: "it could never hold as
a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For
supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a
difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of
not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well
as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider
that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as
vain pretences." |
"Another
finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not
be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he
promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this
promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: 'Is it not
unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?'
Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would
be expressed thus: 'When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money
and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so.' Now this
principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent
with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, 'Is it right?' I
change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the
question thus: 'How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?' Then I see
at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would
necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that
everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise
whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise
itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in
view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him,
but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences." |
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Wasting Away E.G. |
The situation: "A third finds in
himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful
man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and
prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and
improving his happy natural capacities." The maxim: "neglect ... natural
gifts" The verdict: "a system of nature
could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men ... should let
their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness,
amusement, and propagation of their speciesÐin a word, to enjoyment." "[B]ut he
cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be
implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he
necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and
have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes." |
"A
third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might
make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable
circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in
enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however,
whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his
inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then
that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law
although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and
resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation
of their speciesÐin a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that
this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a
natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his
faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all
sorts of possible purposes." |
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Stingy E.G. |
The situation: "A
fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with
great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: 'What concern is it
of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can make
himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish
to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in
distress!'" The maxim: "'I will
take nothing from him,'" nor will I "contribute anything to his
welfare or to his assistance in distress.'" The verdict: "it is
impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity
of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself,
inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love
and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from
his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires." |
"A
fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with
great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: 'What concern is it
of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can make
himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish
to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!' Now
no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race
might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which
everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to
put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can,
betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is
possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that
maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the
universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would
contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have
need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of
nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the
aid he desires." |
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"We must be able to will that a maxim of our action
should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the
action generally." |
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Duty v. Exceptions |
When we fail to live up to our duty, we seek to act as
exceptions to the law. "[I]f we considered
all cases from one and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, we
should find a contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle
should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively
should not be universal, but admit of exceptions." |
"If now
we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall
find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law,
for that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite
should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an
exception in our own favour or (just for this time
only) in favour of our inclination." |
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"Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative:
"Humanity as an End in Itself" |
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Rational Beings, Humans Included, are Ends In Themselves |
"Now I say: man and generally any
rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be
arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they
concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same
time as an end." |
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Object's Worth |
Objects, non-rational beings, have only conditional worth.
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"Thus
the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always
conditional." |
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Persons Things |
"[T]hings, non-rational
beings, have "only a relative value as means." "[P]ersons" have
absolute value. Having absolute value means that persons ought not be
treated merely as things. |
"Beings
whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless,
if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are
therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called
persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that
is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore
restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect)." |
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Objective Ends |
Persons are objective ends in and of themselves. Persons cannot be substitutes for things. |
"These,
therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us
as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose
existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be
substituted, which they should subserve merely as
means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if
all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no
supreme practical principle of reason whatever." |
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[Examples with the Second Formulation in mind, not
included in the reading.] |
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Suicide E.G. |
Regarding a duty to oneself: "He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action
can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself." Suicide: "If he
destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a
person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of
life." |
"Firstly,
under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide
should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of
humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from
painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a
tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is
to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his
actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore,
dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage
or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more
precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation
of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to danger
with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted
here.)" |
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Lying E.G. |
Regarding the duty to others not to lie: "He who is thinking of making a lying promise to
others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean,
without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself." Lack of consent: "[H]e
whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly
assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself
contain the end of this action." |
"Secondly,
as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others:
He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that
he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing
at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise
to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting
towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this
action." |
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Duty to Others in General |
Regarding the duty to others to not impinge on their
freedom or harm or take their property: He who considers violating others'
freedoms, or taking their property should recognize that in doing so he is
acting against the will of others, treating them merely as tools, as
things. Lack of consent: "[H]e
who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely
as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to
be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of
containing in themselves the end of the very same action." |
"This
violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we
take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then
it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the
person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational
beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who
must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same
action." |
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Wasting Away E.G. |
Regarding contingent duties to oneself: "It is not enough that the action does not violate
humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with
it." Against the "advancement" of ends: "Now there are in humanity capacities of greater
perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to
humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be
consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with
the advancement of this end." |
"Thirdly,
as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that
the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself,
it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of
greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard
to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be
consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with
the advancement of this end." |
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Stingy E.G. |
Regarding contingent duties to others: "The natural end which all men have is their own
happiness." Humanity could subsist: "Now
humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to
the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything
from it." Selfishly forwarding one's own end alone
is a failure to positively harmonize with humanity: "but after all this
would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in
itself, if every one does not also endeavour, as
far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others." Altruism amongst persons: "For the
ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be
my ends also, if that conception is to have its full effect with me." |
"Fourthly,
as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end which all men
have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no
one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did
not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all this would only
harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if
every one does not also endeavour, as far as in him
lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an
end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that
conception is to have its full effect with me." |
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