Reading
Excerpted by Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology
Excerpts from Kant's Fundamental
Principles of the Metaphysic Of Morals, as translated
by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott: http://www.constitution.org/
kant/metamora.txt
"Everyone
must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an
obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the
precept, 'Thou shalt not lie,' is not valid for men alone, as if other rational
beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly
so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the
nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but
a priori simply in the conception of pure reason; ... "
" ... and
although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience
may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the
least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a
precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral
law."
"It is impossible to conceive anything at all
in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without
qualification, except a good will."
"A good will is not good because of what it
effects or accomplishesÑbecause of its fitness for attaining some proposed end:
it is good through its willing alongÑthat is, good in itself."
"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the
world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification,
except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and
the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution,
perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable
in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and
mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore,
constitutes what is called character, is not good."
"Even if it should happen that ... this will
should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest
efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good
will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our
power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing
which has its whole value in itself."
"[W]e can readily distinguish whether the
action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is
much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty and the
subject has besides a direct inclination to it."
"For example, it is always a matter of duty
that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever
there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a
fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men
are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the
tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own
advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that
he might besides have a direct inclination in favour
of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to
one over another. Accordingly the action was done
neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish
view."
"As I have
deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to
any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to
law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am
never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should
become a universal law."
"Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced
from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should
remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least
we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion
means."
"Since the universality of the law according
to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the
most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it
is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus:
Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of
nature."
"A man reduced to despair by a series of
misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his
reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to
himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action
could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I
adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely
to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether
this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now
we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy
life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the
improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as
a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law
of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme
principle of all duty."
"Another finds himself forced by necessity to
borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that
nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a
definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much
conscience as to ask himself: 'Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to
get out of a difficulty in this way?' Suppose however that he resolves to do
so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: 'When I think myself
in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know
that I never can do so.' Now this principle of self-love or of one's own
advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the
question now is, 'Is it right?' I change then the suggestion of self-love into
a universal law, and state the question thus: 'How would it be if my maxim were
a universal law?' Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal
law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be
a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be
able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his
promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that
one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was
promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences."
"A third finds in himself a talent which with
the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he
finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure
rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural
capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural
gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with
what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist
with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should
let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement,
and propagation of their speciesÐin a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot
possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in
us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily
wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given
him, for all sorts of possible purposes."
"A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees
that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help
them, thinks: 'What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven
pleases, or as be can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy
him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his
assistance in distress!' Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a
universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better
than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even
takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also
cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But
although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in
accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle
should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which
resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in
which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by
such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all
hope of the aid he desires."
"Now I say: man and generally any rational
being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used
by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or
other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an
end."
"Beings whose existence depends not on our
will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a
relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on
the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as
ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as
means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of
respect)."
"These, therefore, are not merely subjective
ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but
objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end
moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever
would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore
contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason
whatever."
"Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to
oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can
be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys
himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely
as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is
not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but
must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot,
therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him,
to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle
more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. g., as to the
amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to
danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted
here.)"
"Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or
those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying
promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as
a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For
he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly
assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain
the end of this action."
"This violation of the principle of humanity
in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom
and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the
rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without
considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as
ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the
end of the very same action."
"Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious)
duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not violate humanity
in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now
there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end
that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to
neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as
an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end."
"Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties
towards others: The natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now
humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to
the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything
from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with
humanity as an end in itself, if every one does not also endeavour,
as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any
subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also,
if that conception is to have its full effect with me."