Philosophy 1: Introduction to Philosophy

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology

Lecture Notes for Plato's Meno

First Essay Prompt: http://www.christopherlay.com/introfirstessayprompt.html

Group Work

In "College at Risk" Andrew Delbanco claims that one of the ideals of college education is in part achieved when you directly interact with your colleagues.

Delbanco

As he puts it: "A well-managed discussion among peers of diverse interests and talents can help students learn the difference between informed insights and mere opinionating."

"It can provide the pleasurable chastisement of discovering that others see the world differently, and that their experience is not replicable by, or even reconcilable with, one's own."

"It is a rehearsal for deliberative democracy."

Experiment

Let's do an experiment in attaining 1) the mythical ideal of college education (where you are confronted by different perspectives had by your peers and thus foreshadow your experiences in a deliberative democracy), and 2) a marketable skill.

The Group Work

1) ____________________

2) ____________________

3) ____________________

4) ____________________

5) ____________________

6) ____________________

7) ____________________

8) ____________________

What is _______________?

a) What is a mediocre answer to that question and why is it mediocre?

b) What is a bad answer to that question and why is it bad?

c) What is a good answer to that question and why is it good?

Lecture Notes for Plato's "Meno"

Meno: Whence Virtue?

Does it come from teaching?

Does it come from practicing?

Does it come with man's nature?

Socratic Ignorance

"I know literally nothing about virtue"

Meno's positive statement on a virtuous man:

"he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself"

Meno's positive statement on a virtuous woman:

"her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband"

Meno's positive statement on virtues in general:

"Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue"

"virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do"

(But what is it that all of those different virtues have in common that compels us to call them all "virtues?")

Socrates asks Meno, to test Meno's knowledge, about the nature of bees.

"[D]o bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape?"

Meno's reply:

"I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees"

Socrates connects this with virtue:

The same is true of virtue, "they have all a common nature which makes them virtues?"

Analogy with Health

To get Meno to see his point, Socrates asks him about the health of men as opposed to women

Is there a health for men that is different from the health of women?

Meno admits that "health is the same, both in man and woman"

Analogy with Strength

Meno admits that it is the same with regards to strength too

Back to Virtue

But Meno is resistant to say that virtue is the same for both men and women, the same for young and old alike

Ordering and Temperance and Justice

Socrates asks whether or not something (be it a state for men, or a house for women) can be well ordered in the absence of temperance or justice

Meno admits that that they must be present

Sameness of Virtue

Socrates asks: "Then both men and women [young and old], if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?"

And Meno replies yes

Thus they agree that "all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues"

Meno's Single Virtue of Mankind

"If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind"

But Children & Slaves?

But Meno admits that this cannot apply to children

Regardless, Socrates asks about the role of justice

Wouldn't we say that it is not just the power of governing, but the power of governing justly?

Meno then admits that justice is virtue

But is justice virtue, or is justice a virtue?

"Is" of identity ≠ "is" of predication

Multiple Virtues

Meno holds that justice is merely one of many virtues

Other virtues, according to Meno, include courage, temperance, and wisdom

Commonality?

But we find ourselves, Socrates points out, with the same problem as before, wanting to know what is common to the various virtues that allows us to call them all virtues

The Socratic Pattern of Arriving at a Definition

Socrates presents for Meno a pattern of arriving at an account of what is common to things that are called the same thing

Socrates has Meno consider the case with figures and colors

What is it about various figures or various colors that allow us to call them figures or colors?

Figures

Socrates asks Meno to consider this account of what figures are: "Figure is the only thing which always follows colour"

But what of someone who knows neither figure or color?

Figure & Terminus

Socrates proceeds by drawing out what his interlocutor knows, to lead his interlocutor to what is not known, asking whether his interlocutor knows if "there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity"

Figure Explained

In addition to a thing as ended, there are surfaces, and there are solids

If that is known, then Socrates' definition of a figure should be understandable

Socrates' definition of a figure:

"that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid"

And color, Meno asks?

Color Explained

Meno admits that such things as effluences exist, that is, things that flows out of other things do exist

Meno further admits that some effluences are large, and some small

Meno further admits that there is such a thing as sight

Socrates then offers a definition of color:

"colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense"

Virtue's Commonality Definition?

Now it is Meno's turn to explain "what virtue is in the universal"

Socrates guides Meno: "do not make a singular into a plural ... but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern"

Meno's New Definition of Virtue

"virtue ... is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself"

And according to Meno, to desire honor is also to desire the good

And Evil?

But, Socrates asks, are there folks who desire evil?

Is there a difference between folks who desire evil that they think is a good and folks who desire evil and know that what they desire is evil?

Meno thinks that both types of folks exist

As an explanation, Meno admits:

1) "desire is of possession"

2) "There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm"

3) Those that think that evils can do them good do not know that those things they seek are evil

4) Folks "desire what they suppose to be goods"

5) Folks who unknowingly desire evil actually desire good

Meno further admits:

1) And for the folks who desire evil and know that they desire evil, and know that the evils "are hurtful to the possessor of them" know further that "they will be hurt by" possessing those evils

2) Such folks know those who are hurt by evils are as miserable as they are hurt

3) The miserable are ill-fated

4) No one desires to be either miserable or ill-fated

Meno's Revised Definition of Virtue / Attaining Power

But, Socrates asks, how could there then be folks who desire evil?

Meno thus admits that none desire evil

But how does this fit with the claim that "virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?"

If that is the case, and no one desires evil, then desiring good is common to all men

But then desiring good cannot be used to evaluate men

The difference must be in the power of attaining the good

Thus Meno revises his definition:

virtue is the power of attaining good

On Goods

Meno admits that "health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the state" are what count as the goods

But, Socrates asks, does it matter how the goods are attained?

Is, Socrates asks, "any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?"

Meno admits then that "justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue ... must accompany the acquisition"

But Meno also admits that not acquiring wealth dishonestly is also a virtue–that not having wealth can be virtuous

But Socrates points out that this means that acquiring goods is "no more virtue" that not acquiring them, and rather "whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue"

But, Socrates points out, this is a mockery of the pattern that he set out of Meno

Instead of giving Socrates virtue as a whole, Meno ends up only giving Socrates parts of virtue, like justice or honesty

Virtue as a Whole vs. Parts of Virtue

For instance, for Meno, "virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue"

Socrates accuses Meno of calling "every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces"

Problem with Inquiring About Unknown Parts

Meno admits that if one does not know what virtue is, one cannot identify the parts of virtue

So, they must start over, this time being careful not to proceed by accepting unexplained parts (thus, following Socrates' pattern)

Meno is Torpid

Meno finally admits his inability to answer: "at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is"

But Meno blames his ignorance on Socrates having made him torpid, as the ugly torpedo fish does to those who touch it

(Torpidity here seems to be analogous to ignorance)

Socrates admits that he too is ignorant and perplexed, that he perplexes easily [heh], but that he would like to continue the enquiry into virtue

On Enquiry

Meno asks about enquiry

How can one enquire about what one does not know?

If they find virtue, how will they know that it is what they sought?

Socrates sums up Meno's worry: "You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire"

Socrates' Take on the Problem of Enquiry

Consider what has been said by priests and poets, that the soul of man is immortal

"they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages.'"

"The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all;"

"and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things;"

"there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest"

"for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection"

Meno Doesn't Recall

Meno worries about how this could be the case

The Youth To illustrate his point, Socrates calls for a youth

Socrates will pose questions to the youth, to discern whether or not the youth learns, or recollects

++++++++++++++

Quizzing / Round One

"SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? "BOY: I do. "SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: A square may be of any size? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet? "BOY: There are. "SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. "BOY: Four, Socrates. "SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be? "BOY: Of eight feet. "SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet—what will that be? "BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.

Meno's Confirmation about Teaching

Meno admits that the boy is merely answering questions, and that Socrates is not teaching They agree that the boy is merely guessing, and not expressing knowledge

Quizzing / Round Two

"SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this—that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from double line? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet? "BOY: True. "SOCRATES: And is not that four times four? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And four times is not double? "BOY: No, indeed. "SOCRATES: But how much? "BOY: Four times as much. "SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much. "BOY: True. "SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen—are they not? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;—do you see? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one? "BOY: Yes; I think so. "SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? "BOY: It ought. "SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be. "BOY: Three feet. "SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet? "BOY: That is evident. "SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet? "BOY: Nine. "SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four? "BOY: Eight. "SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three? "BOY: No. "SOCRATES: But from what line?–tell me exactly; and if you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line. "BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

The Value of Admitted Ignorance

Meno admits that the youth has advanced in his power of recollection The youth at first claimed knowledge, but then admits ignorance They agree that the youth is better off to know where he is ignorant Ignorance in the face of the unknown, it is agreed, is an aid to learning (Does Meno realize that Socrates' engagement with the youth up to this point mirrors, at least with regards to ignorance, Meno's own engagement with Socrates?)

Quizzing / Round Three	"SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? "BOY: Very good. "SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other? "BOY: Four times. "SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember. "BOY: True. "SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space? "BOY: There are. "SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is. "BOY: I do not understand. "SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section? "BOY: Four. "SOCRATES: And how many in this? "BOY: Two. "SOCRATES: And four is how many times two? "BOY: Twice. "SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet? "BOY: Of eight feet. "SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure? "BOY: From this. "SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal? "BOY: Certainly, Socrates.
Not Teaching, but Recollection	Meno agrees that the youth had the answers already in him, and thus was not taught by Socrates They agree on an implication: "he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know" Recollection, it is agreed, is this process whereby, through questioning, there is a "spontaneous recovery of knowledge"
Whence Knowledge	Socrates sets up a disjunction: either the youth acquired the knowledge, or the youth always possessed it Meno reveals that the youth has not been instructed in the past on geometry And Meno further agrees that, "if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time?" Meno agrees that the time that it was learned was when the youth "was not a man"
Knowledge Prior to Birth	Meno further agrees that "if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man" From this, Socrates gets Meno to agree that "if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal"
Socrates Says Something Very Curious	"SOCRATES: "And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;–that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power."
Again, Whence Virtue	They go on to agree to return to question of virtue, now that they agree that enquiry into what is not currently known is possible Meno requests to return to the original question, as to whether or not virtue can be taught, or if it is innate, etc.

Paraphrasing Over Quotes: Paraphrasing is, in general, better than quoting.  Here is a good, general guide for when to paraphrase instead of quoting:  if you can convey the same information in your own words without loss of meaning, then a paraphrase is usually better.  Readers of your paper tend to understand you better than they understand academic articles.  When grading your papers, graders need to see that you understand what it is that you are representing.  If you can properly paraphrase passages, then it shows your grader that you understand the material better than someone who can only find the correct passage and quote it.  And if a paraphrase won't do, whenever you quote, you should also explain the quote to the reader, to help them understand it (and to show your grader that you yourself understand the quote).

Quoting is usually necessary when:

    1) attributing something controversial to the person quoted,

    2) you are pointing out something that is too easily overlooked, or

    3) your entire thesis depends on particular wording, or

4) there just simply is no better way of putting it.

Bad quoting occurs, in my mind, when it seems like:

    1) you have nothing to say and so are throwing in quotes,

    2) you are using long quotes to fluff up your essay, or

    3) you are afraid to commit to a paraphrase, when a paraphrase would convey the same information.

[Now, "The Structure," a paragraph structure that you can use to explain a key concept.]

Statement, quote, paraphrase, example, or analogy.

Definition of relevant term(s) from that statement.

What that statement means.

Why is means that.

What the statement doesn't mean X (semi-obviously).

Why the statement doesn't mean X.

What else the statement doesn't mean, say Y (less obviously)

Why the statement doesn't mean Y.

What your reader should think as a result of having read the paragraph

[Now, if you have space and need, a follow-up paragraph structure.]

Example of what it means.

Explanation of why that example exemplifies what you say it exemplifies.

Explain what the example doesn't show.

Explain now how the statement and the example are relevant to your thesis.

Experiment

Let's do another experiment in attaining 1) the mythical ideal of college education (where you are confronted by different perspectives had by your peers and thus foreshadow your experiences in a deliberative democracy), and 2) a marketable skill.

Each group paraphrases one of the following sentences, and then provides an explanation to help someone understand the quote–and an example if you have time.

A) "You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire"

B) "they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed."

C) "The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all;"

D) "it is no wonder that [someone] should be able to call to remembrance all that [that person] ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things;"

E) "we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know"

F) "virtue is or is not knowledge,–in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?"

G) "while they [true opinions] abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it"

H) "virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous"

Back to the dialogue:

Socrates proposes that they argue via hypothesis, on the model of the geometrician's procedure

Is Virtue Taught?

Socrates argues that "as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis"

The hypothesis then: "virtue is or is not knowledge,–in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?"

Virtue & Knowledge

If virtue is knowledge, then virtue is taught

But is virtue knowledge?

It is agreed that virtue is good

Knowledge "is" Good?

But how co-extensive is knowledge and the good?

If there is a good distinct from knowledge, then virtue could be that good

If knowledge "embraces all good," the we can identify virtue with knowledge

Beneficial vs. Harmful

It is agreed that

1) virtue makes good

2) to be good is to be profitable

3) virtue is profitable

4) health, strength, beauty, and wealth are also profitable

5) yet health, strength, beauty, and wealth can also harm us

6) it is only the right use of health, strength, beauty, and wealth that makes them profitable

7) the wrong use of health, strength, beauty, and wealth make them harmful

Goods of the Soul

It is then agreed that

1) temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, etc., are goods of the soul

2) these too are "sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful"

3) when the goods of the soul are done "with sense," or thoughtfully, they are profitable

4) when the goods of the soul are done "without sense," or not thoughtfully, they are hurtful

5) when the soul is guided by wisdom, happiness ensues

6) when the soul is guided by folly, or a lack of wisdom, unhappiness ensues

Virtue as Wisdom

Then it seems like virtue is a sort of wisdom:

a) if virtue is a profitable quality of the soul, virtue must be wisdom

b) all other things of the soul are made profitable or hurtful "by the addition of wisdom or of folly" respectively

So, "virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom"

Not Good by Nature?

But does this then mean that "the good are not by nature good?

(If the good are good by nature, then the Athenians would have sought to discern the good early, so as to preserve their goodness for the benefit of the polis)

Does this then mean that the good are "made good by instruction?"

Well, if it is supposed, by hypothesis, that virtue is knowledge, then it seems that "there can be no doubt that virtue is taught"

Pressing the Hypothesis / Teachers and the Taught

But what if the hypothesis is wrong?

If it was correct, then there would have to be teachers and the taught

If there were, then there would obviously be teachers of virtue

No Teachers Yet Found

So far, Socrates admits, he's found no such teachers of virtue

Upon them stumbles Anytus, whom they agree to query

Teachers? Socrates and Anytus agree that if you want to instruct someone to be a good physician, you would send that person to a good physician

It is agreed that this means that it is good to send such a person to "those who profess the art," and to those who "demand and payment for teaching the art"

Sending such a person elsewhere would be folly

Virtue Instruction?

What then of those who seek instruction in virtue?

From what has been said, those who seek instruction in virtue should seek out those who profess to know the art, and those who take payment for instruction, the Sophists

Anytus objects to sending someone to a sophist for the instruction of virtue

Anytus asserts that the Sophists corrupt those they engage with

Socrates wonders how the Sophists could survive as businesspersons if what Anytus asserts is true

No dry cleaner could be as successful as some Sophists are, if they did what Anytus asserts the Sophists do: corrupt as opposed to improve

That worry aside, Socrates asks Anytus if he thinks the Sophists consciously or unconsciously corrupt those that seek instruction

Socrates also asks if those who have entrusted the Sophists with instruction are "out of their minds"

Anytus on Sophists

Anytus replies that those who entrust the Sophists with instruction are indeed out of their minds

Socrates wonders why Anytus despises the Sophists so much, and discovers that Anytus claims to know about the Sophists despite his being unacquainted with them

Anytus on Education

Socrates then asks Anytus who ought to instruct virtue

Anytus replies: "any Athenian gentlemen," the type that has learned virtue from "the previous generation of gentlemen"

Themistocles

But, Socrates asks, are such gentlemen good teachers of their virtue?

Anytus admits that Themistocles was a good man, and that Themistocles was capable of being a good teacher of "his own virtue"

Themistocles' Son

Themistocles, it is agreed, was a good instructor of horsemanship to his son

But Anytus admits that Themistocles' son is not known for being "a wise or good man, as his father was"

But if virtue could be taught, then wouldn't Themistocles have imparted virtue to his son?

Goodbye Anytus

Socrates suspects that virtue cannot be taught

Anytus leaves

Teachers Would Admit of Teaching

Socrates and Meno agree that teachers are those who would at least "acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation"

Sophists acknowledge the possibility of teaching

Meno's Professed Ignorance

"SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?"

"MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not"

No Teachers

The teachers of virtue would not be, as the politicians and poets are, in such a confusion about whether or not virtue can be taught

It is agreed that "if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers"

They further agree that there are not students of virtue then, as well

So, "virtue cannot be taught"

Then there are no good men?

But what about our intuition that there are good men?

Guidance Needed

Socrates asserts that they need guidance, that of knowledge, and without that guidance, "there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all"

Guidance Socrates explains:

1) Good men are profitable

2) Good men are profitable "only if they are true guides to us of action"

But how can men guide others to action?

Guides can have correct knowledge and/or true opinions

Guide Analogy

Both the person who knows how to guide you someplace because he has been there before, and the person who has the true opinion of how to guide you to the same place (and who has not been there before), are equally good at guiding you to that place

Thus, "true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge"

True Opinion

vs.

Knowledge

If true opinion of X is always true, won't the holder of it always be as correct about X as the one who has knowledge of X?

Daedalus & Recollections

True opinions, Socrates argues, are like the statues of Daedalus, only valuable if they are tied down, as they are liable to wander off in the night without being secured as such

"while they [true opinions] abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it"

Thus, true opinions tied down by the knowledge affirmed by recollection are "more honourable and excellent" than mere true opinion

Sufficiency

About the claims that there is this difference between knowledge and true opinion, Socrates asserts knowledge

While knowledge is "more honourable and excellent" than mere true opinion, true opinion nevertheless gets, so to speak, the job done

It is agree that

1) True opinions are useful, and

2) The good man is useful

It is further agreed that neither knowledge or true opinion is given to men by nature

Not Good by Nature

Thus, they agree, the good are not good by nature

They then recount that

a) if virtue is acquired from teaching, then knowledge was taught them, and

b) if there were teachers, knowledge could be taught, and

c) if there were not teachers, knowledge could not be taught

But they had agreed that

1) there "were no teachers of virtue,"

2) that virtue is not wisdom,

3) that virtue is good,

4) the right guide is useful and good,

5) the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion

Divining

But, they agreed,

1) virtue is not taught,

2) virtue is not knowledge,

3) knowledge is not the guide in political life, and

4) this explains why politicians are not capable of teaching virtue, because "their virtue was not grounded in knowledge"

From this, politicians only guide by true opinion, as diviners only guide with words they do not themselves understand

A diviner is one who succeeds in word and action without understanding

Thus we can see politicians as those who are "being inspired and possessed of God" and who do not know what they themselves say

Socrates Sums Up / Virtue is an Instinct

"To sum up our enquiry–the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen."

Socrates Concludes / Virtue is a Divine Gift

"Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of virtue."

Summarization of Group Exercise: In groups of 3 explain what your essay's argument is, and what a possible naysayer to that argument could be.

1) Spend two or three minutes writing out your argument (and if you already have an objection to your argument, write that out too)

2) Get into groups of 3 (per in-class instructions)

3) Introduce yourselves

4) Each member presents an argument (and not an objection) to the fellow group members for five minutes, and during that time entertains questions and suggestions about that argument from the fellow group members

5) Each member presents an objection to their argument (and not the original argument) to the fellow group members for five minutes, and during that time entertains questions and suggestions about that objection to their argument from the fellow group members