Philosophy
1: Introduction to Philosophy
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology
Lecture
Notes for Plato's Meno
First Essay Prompt:
http://www.christopherlay.com/introfirstessayprompt.html
Group
Work
In "College at Risk" Andrew Delbanco claims that one of the ideals of college education
is in part achieved when you directly interact with your colleagues.
Delbanco
As he puts it: "A well-managed discussion
among peers of diverse interests and talents can help students learn the
difference between informed insights and mere opinionating."
"It can provide the pleasurable chastisement
of discovering that others see the world differently, and that their experience
is not replicable by, or even reconcilable with, one's own."
"It is a rehearsal for deliberative
democracy."
Experiment
Let's do an experiment in attaining 1) the mythical
ideal of college education (where you are confronted by different perspectives
had by your peers and thus foreshadow your experiences in a deliberative
democracy), and 2) a marketable skill.
The Group
Work
1) ____________________
2) ____________________
3) ____________________
4) ____________________
5) ____________________
6) ____________________
7) ____________________
8) ____________________
What is _______________?
a) What is a mediocre answer to that question and
why is it mediocre?
b) What is a bad answer to that question and why is
it bad?
c) What is a good answer to that question and why
is it good?
Lecture Notes for Plato's "Meno"
Meno: Whence Virtue?
Does it come from teaching?
Does it come from practicing?
Does it come with man's nature?
Socratic Ignorance
"I know literally nothing about virtue"
Meno's positive statement on a virtuous man:
"he should know how to administer the state,
and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies;
and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself"
Meno's positive statement on a virtuous woman:
"her duty is to order her house, and keep what
is indoors, and obey her husband"
Meno's positive statement on virtues in general:
"Every age, every condition of life, young or
old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue"
"virtue is relative to the actions and ages of
each of us in all that we do"
(But what is it that all of those different virtues
have in common that compels us to call them all "virtues?")
Socrates asks Meno, to
test Meno's knowledge, about the nature of bees.
"[D]o bees differ as
bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not
rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size,
or shape?"
Meno's reply:
"I should answer that bees do not differ from
one another, as bees"
Socrates connects this with virtue:
The same is true of virtue, "they have all a
common nature which makes them virtues?"
Analogy with
Health
To get Meno to see his
point, Socrates asks him about the health of men as opposed to women
Is there a health for men that is different from
the health of women?
Meno admits that "health is the same, both in man
and woman"
Analogy
with Strength
Meno admits that it is the same with regards to
strength too
Back to Virtue
But Meno is resistant to
say that virtue is the same for both men and women, the same for young and old
alike
Ordering and Temperance and Justice
Socrates asks whether or not something (be it a
state for men, or a house for women) can be well ordered in the absence of
temperance or justice
Meno admits that that they must be present
Sameness of Virtue
Socrates asks:
"Then both men and women [young and old], if they are to be good
men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?"
And Meno replies yes
Thus they agree that "all men are good in the
same way, and by participation in the same virtues"
Meno's Single Virtue of Mankind
"If you want to have one definition of them
all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing
mankind"
But Children & Slaves?
But Meno admits that this
cannot apply to children
Regardless, Socrates asks about the role of justice
Wouldn't we say that it is not just the power of
governing, but the power of governing justly?
Meno then admits that justice is virtue
But is justice virtue, or is justice a virtue?
"Is" of identity "is" of
predication
Multiple Virtues
Meno holds that justice is merely one of many virtues
Other virtues, according to Meno,
include courage, temperance, and wisdom
Commonality?
But we find ourselves, Socrates points out, with
the same problem as before, wanting to know what is common to the various
virtues that allows us to call them all virtues
The Socratic
Pattern of Arriving at a Definition
Socrates presents for Meno
a pattern of arriving at an account of what is common to things that are called
the same thing
Socrates has Meno
consider the case with figures and colors
What is it about various figures or various colors
that allow us to call them figures or colors?
Figures
Socrates asks Meno to
consider this account of what figures are: "Figure is the only thing which
always follows colour"
But what of someone who knows neither figure or
color?
Figure &
Terminus
Socrates proceeds by drawing out what his
interlocutor knows, to lead his interlocutor to what is not known, asking
whether his interlocutor knows if "there is such a thing as an end, or
termination, or extremity"
Figure Explained
In addition to a thing as ended, there are
surfaces, and there are solids
If that is known, then Socrates' definition of a
figure should be understandable
Socrates' definition of a figure:
"that in which the solid ends; or, more
concisely, the limit of solid"
And color, Meno
asks?
Color Explained
Meno admits that such things as effluences exist, that
is, things that flows out of other things do exist
Meno further admits that some effluences are large, and
some small
Meno further admits that there is such a thing as sight
Socrates then offers a definition of color:
"colour is an
effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense"
Virtue's Commonality Definition?
Now it is Meno's turn to
explain "what virtue is in the universal"
Socrates guides Meno: "do not make a singular into a
plural ... but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a
number of pieces: I have given you the pattern"
Meno's New Definition of Virtue
"virtue ... is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself"
And according to Meno, to
desire honor is also to desire the good
And Evil?
But, Socrates asks, are there folks who desire
evil?
Is there a difference between folks who desire evil
that they think is a good and folks who desire evil and know that what they
desire is evil?
Meno thinks that both types of folks exist
As an explanation, Meno
admits:
1) "desire is of possession"
2) "There are some who think that the evils
will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm"
3) Those that think that evils can do them good do
not know that those things they seek are evil
4) Folks "desire what they suppose
to be goods"
5) Folks who unknowingly desire evil actually
desire good
Meno further admits:
1) And for the folks who desire evil and know that
they desire evil, and know that the evils "are hurtful to the possessor of
them" know further that "they will be hurt by" possessing those
evils
2) Such folks know those who are hurt by evils are
as miserable as they are hurt
3) The miserable are ill-fated
4) No one desires to be either miserable or
ill-fated
Meno's Revised Definition of Virtue / Attaining Power
But, Socrates asks, how could there then be folks
who desire evil?
Meno thus admits that none desire evil
But how does this fit with the claim that
"virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?"
If that is the case, and no one desires evil, then
desiring good is common to all men
But then desiring good cannot be used to evaluate
men
The difference must be in the power of attaining
the good
Thus Meno revises his definition:
virtue is the power of attaining good
On Goods
Meno admits that "health and wealth and the
possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour
in the state" are what count as the goods
But, Socrates asks, does it matter how the goods
are attained?
Is, Socrates asks, "any mode of acquisition,
even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?"
Meno admits then that "justice or temperance or
holiness, or some other part of virtue ... must accompany the acquisition"
But Meno also admits that
not acquiring wealth dishonestly is also a virtueÐthat not having wealth can be
virtuous
But Socrates points out that this means that
acquiring goods is "no more virtue" that not acquiring them, and
rather "whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue"
But, Socrates points out, this is a mockery of the
pattern that he set out of Meno
Instead of giving Socrates virtue as a whole, Meno ends up only giving Socrates parts of virtue, like
justice or honesty
Virtue as
a Whole vs. Parts of Virtue
For instance, for Meno,
"virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the
like are said by you to be parts of virtue"
Socrates accuses Meno of
calling "every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as
though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this
too when frittered away into little pieces"
Problem
with Inquiring About Unknown Parts
Meno admits that if one does not know what virtue is,
one cannot identify the parts of virtue
So, they must start over, this time being careful
not to proceed by accepting unexplained parts (thus, following Socrates'
pattern)
Meno is Torpid
Meno finally admits his inability to answer: "at
this moment I cannot even say what virtue is"
But Meno blames his
ignorance on Socrates having made him torpid, as the ugly torpedo fish does to
those who touch it
(Torpidity here seems to be analogous to ignorance)
Socrates admits that he too is ignorant and
perplexed, that he perplexes easily [heh], but that he would like to continue
the enquiry into virtue
On
Enquiry
Meno asks about enquiry
How can one enquire about what one does not
know?
If they find virtue, how will they know that it is
what they sought?
Socrates sums up Meno's
worry: "You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he
knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to
enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about
which he is to enquire"
Socrates' Take on the Problem of Enquiry
Consider what has been said by priests and poets,
that the soul of man is immortal
"they say that the soul of man is immortal,
and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born
again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live
always in perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls
of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again
from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become
noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in
after ages.'"
"The soul, then, as being immortal, and having
been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in
this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all;"
"and it is no wonder that she should be able
to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything;
for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things;"
"there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as
men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest"
"for all enquiry and all learning is but
recollection"
Meno Doesn't Recall
Meno worries about how this could be the case
The Youth To
illustrate his point, Socrates calls for a youth
Socrates will pose questions to the youth, to
discern whether or not the youth learns, or recollects
++++++++++++++
Quizzing / Round One |
"SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you
know that a figure like this is a square? "BOY: I do. "SOCRATES: And you know that a
square figure has these four lines equal? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And these lines which
I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: A square may be of
any size? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And if one side of
the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will
the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet,
and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken
once? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: But since this side
is also of two feet, there are twice two feet? "BOY: There are. "SOCRATES: Then the square is of
twice two feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And how many are
twice two feet? count and tell me. "BOY: Four, Socrates. "SOCRATES: And might there not
be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines
equal? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And of how many feet
will that be? "BOY: Of eight feet. "SOCRATES: And now try and tell
me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is
two feetÑwhat will that be? "BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will
be double. |
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Meno's
Confirmation
about Teaching |
Meno admits that the boy is merely
answering questions, and that Socrates is not teaching They agree that the boy is merely
guessing, and not expressing knowledge |
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Quizzing / Round Two |
"SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you
assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not
speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of
thisÑthat is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say
that a double square comes from double line? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: But does not this
line become doubled if we add another such line here? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And four such lines
will make a space containing eight feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Let us describe such
a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And are there not
these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of
four feet? "BOY: True. "SOCRATES: And is not that four
times four? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: And four times is not
double? "BOY: No, indeed. "SOCRATES: But how much? "BOY: Four times as much. "SOCRATES: Therefore
the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much. "BOY: True. "SOCRATES: Four times four are
sixteenÑare they not? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: What line would give
you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;Ñdo
you see? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And the space of four
feet is made from this half line? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Good; and is not a
space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other? "BOY: Certainly. "SOCRATES: Such a space, then,
will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one? "BOY: Yes; I think so. "SOCRATES: Very good; I like to
hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet
and that of four? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Then the line which
forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and
less than the other of four feet? "BOY: It ought. "SOCRATES: Try and see if you
can tell me how much it will be. "BOY: Three feet. "SOCRATES: Then if we add a half
to this line of two, that will be the line of three. Here are two and there
is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that
makes the figure of which you speak? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: But if there are
three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three
times three feet? "BOY: That is evident. "SOCRATES: And how much are three
times three feet? "BOY: Nine. "SOCRATES: And how much is the
double of four? "BOY: Eight. "SOCRATES: Then the figure of
eight is not made out of a line of three? "BOY: No. "SOCRATES: But from what line?Ðtell me exactly; and if you would rather not reckon,
try and show me the line. "BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not
know. |
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The Value of
Admitted Ignorance |
Meno admits that the youth has advanced
in his power of recollection The youth at first claimed knowledge,
but then admits ignorance They agree that the youth is better
off to know where he is ignorant Ignorance in the face of the unknown,
it is agreed, is an aid to learning (Does Meno
realize that Socrates' engagement with the youth up to this point mirrors, at
least with regards to ignorance, Meno's own
engagement with Socrates?) |
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Quizzing / Round Three |
"SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, is not
this a square of four feet which I have drawn? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And now I add another
square equal to the former one? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And a third, which is
equal to either of them? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill
up the vacant corner? "BOY: Very good. "SOCRATES: Here, then, there are
four equal spaces? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And how many times
larger is this space than this other? "BOY: Four times. "SOCRATES: But it ought to have
been twice only, as you will remember. "BOY: True. "SOCRATES: And does not this
line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And are there not
here four equal lines which contain this space? "BOY: There are. "SOCRATES: Look and see how much
this space is. "BOY: I do not understand. "SOCRATES: Has not each interior
line cut off half of the four spaces? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And how many spaces
are there in this section? "BOY: Four. "SOCRATES: And how many in this? "BOY: Two. "SOCRATES: And four is how many
times two? "BOY: Twice. "SOCRATES: And this space is of
how many feet? "BOY: Of eight feet. "SOCRATES: And from what line do
you get this figure? "BOY: From this. "SOCRATES: That is, from the
line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet? "BOY: Yes. "SOCRATES: And that is the line
which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then
you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm that the
double space is the square of the diagonal? "BOY: Certainly, Socrates. |
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Not
Teaching, but Recollection
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Meno agrees that the youth had the
answers already in him, and thus was not taught by Socrates They agree on an implication: "he
who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not
know" Recollection, it is agreed, is this
process whereby, through questioning, there is a "spontaneous recovery
of knowledge" |
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Whence Knowledge |
Socrates sets up a disjunction:
either the youth acquired the knowledge, or the youth always possessed it Meno reveals that the youth has not been
instructed in the past on geometry And Meno
further agrees that, "if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life,
then he must have had and learned it at some other time?" Meno agrees that the time that it was
learned was when the youth "was not a man" |
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Knowledge Prior to
Birth |
Meno further agrees that "if there
have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was
not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions
to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always
either was or was not a man" From this, Socrates gets Meno to agree that "if the truth of all things
always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal" |
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Socrates Says Something Very Curious |
"SOCRATES: "And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of
which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver
and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have
been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in
seeking to know what we do not know;Ðthat is a theme upon which I am ready to
fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power." |
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Again, Whence Virtue |
They go on to agree to return to
question of virtue, now that they agree that enquiry into what is not currently known is possible Meno requests to return to the original
question, as to whether or not virtue can be taught, or if it is innate,
etc. |
Paraphrasing Over Quotes:
Paraphrasing is, in general, better than quoting. Here is a good, general
guide for when to paraphrase instead of quoting: if you can convey the
same information in your own words without loss of meaning, then a paraphrase
is usually better. Readers of your paper tend to understand you better
than they understand academic articles. When grading your papers, graders
need to see that you understand what it is that you are representing. If
you can properly paraphrase passages, then it shows your grader that you
understand the material better than someone who can only find the correct
passage and quote it. And if a paraphrase won't do, whenever you quote,
you should also explain the quote to the reader, to help them understand it
(and to show your grader that you yourself understand the quote).
Quoting
is usually necessary when:
1) attributing something controversial to the person quoted,
2) you are pointing out something that is too easily overlooked, or
3) your entire thesis depends on particular wording, or
4) there just simply is no
better way of putting it.
Bad
quoting occurs, in my mind, when it seems like:
1) you have nothing to say and so are throwing in quotes,
2) you are using long quotes to fluff up your essay, or
3) you are afraid to commit to a
paraphrase, when a paraphrase would convey the same information.
[Now, "The Structure," a paragraph
structure that you can use to explain a key concept.]
Statement, quote, paraphrase, example, or analogy.
Definition of relevant term(s) from that statement.
What that statement means.
Why is means that.
What the statement doesn't mean X (semi-obviously).
Why the statement doesn't mean X.
What else the statement doesn't mean, say Y (less obviously)
Why the statement doesn't mean Y.
What your reader should think as a result of having read the
paragraph
[Now, if you have space and need, a follow-up paragraph
structure.]
Example of what it means.
Explanation of why that example exemplifies what you say it
exemplifies.
Explain what the example doesn't show.
Explain now how the statement and the example are relevant to
your thesis.
Experiment
Let's do another experiment in attaining 1) the
mythical ideal of college education (where you are confronted by different
perspectives had by your peers and thus foreshadow your experiences in a
deliberative democracy), and 2) a marketable skill.
Each group paraphrases one of the following
sentences, and then provides an explanation to help someone understand the
quoteÐand an example if you have time.
A) "You argue that a man cannot enquire either
about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he
knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know
the very subject about which he is to enquire"
B) "they say that the soul of man is immortal,
and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born
again, but is never destroyed."
C) "The soul, then, as being immortal, and
having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist,
whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all;"
D) "it is no wonder that [someone] should be
able to call to remembrance all that [that person] ever knew about virtue, and
about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all
things;"
E) "we shall be
better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than
we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing
and no use in seeking to know what we do not know"
F) "virtue is or is not knowledge,Ðin
that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying,
'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue
taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that
knowledge alone is taught?"
G) "while they [true opinions] abide with us
they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and
do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are
fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call
it"
H) "virtue is neither natural nor acquired,
but an instinct given by God to the virtuous"
Back to the dialogue:
Socrates proposes that they argue via hypothesis, on the model of the
geometrician's procedure
Is Virtue
Taught?
Socrates argues that "as we know not the
nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught,
under a hypothesis"
The hypothesis then: "virtue is or is not knowledge,Ðin that case will it be taught or not? or, as we
were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the
name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every
one see that knowledge alone is taught?"
Virtue &
Knowledge
If virtue is knowledge, then virtue is taught
But is virtue knowledge?
It is agreed that virtue is good
Knowledge
"is" Good?
But how co-extensive is knowledge and the
good?
If there is a good distinct from knowledge, then
virtue could be that good
If knowledge "embraces all good," the we
can identify virtue with knowledge
Beneficial vs. Harmful
It is agreed that
1) virtue makes good
2) to be good is to be profitable
3) virtue is profitable
4) health, strength, beauty, and wealth are also
profitable
5) yet health, strength, beauty, and wealth can
also harm us
6) it is only the right use of health, strength,
beauty, and wealth that makes them profitable
7) the wrong use of health, strength, beauty, and
wealth make them harmful
Goods of
the Soul
It is then agreed that
1) temperance, justice, courage, quickness of
apprehension, memory, magnanimity, etc., are goods of the soul
2) these too are "sometimes profitable and
sometimes hurtful"
3) when the goods of the soul are done "with
sense," or thoughtfully, they are profitable
4) when the goods of the soul are done
"without sense," or not thoughtfully, they are hurtful
5) when the soul is guided by wisdom, happiness
ensues
6) when the soul is guided by folly, or a lack of
wisdom, unhappiness ensues
Virtue as Wisdom
Then it seems like virtue is a sort of wisdom:
a) if virtue is a profitable quality of the soul,
virtue must be wisdom
b) all other things of the soul are made profitable
or hurtful "by the addition of wisdom or of folly" respectively
So, "virtue is either wholly or partly
wisdom"
Not Good by Nature?
But does this then mean that "the good are not
by nature good?
(If the good are good by nature, then the Athenians
would have sought to discern the good early, so as to preserve their goodness
for the benefit of the polis)
Does this then mean that the good are "made
good by instruction?"
Well, if it is supposed, by hypothesis, that virtue
is knowledge, then it seems that "there can be no doubt that virtue is
taught"
Pressing the Hypothesis / Teachers and the Taught
But what if the hypothesis is wrong?
If it was correct, then there would have to be
teachers and the taught
If there were, then there would obviously be
teachers of virtue
No Teachers
Yet Found
So far, Socrates admits, he's found no such
teachers of virtue
Upon them stumbles Anytus, whom they agree to query
Teachers? Socrates
and Anytus agree that if you want to instruct someone
to be a good physician, you would send that person to a good physician
It is agreed that this means that it is good to
send such a person to "those who profess the art," and to those who
"demand and payment for teaching the art"
Sending such a person elsewhere would be folly
Virtue Instruction?
What then of those who seek instruction in
virtue?
From what has been said, those who seek instruction
in virtue should seek out those who profess to know the art, and those who take
payment for instruction, the Sophists
Anytus objects to sending someone to a sophist for the
instruction of virtue
Anytus asserts that the Sophists corrupt those they
engage with
Socrates wonders how the Sophists could survive as
businesspersons if what Anytus asserts is true
No dry cleaner could be as successful as some
Sophists are, if they did what Anytus asserts the
Sophists do: corrupt as opposed to improve
That worry aside, Socrates asks Anytus
if he thinks the Sophists consciously or unconsciously corrupt those that seek
instruction
Socrates also asks if those who have entrusted the
Sophists with instruction are "out of their minds"
Anytus on Sophists
Anytus replies that those who entrust the Sophists with
instruction are indeed out of their minds
Socrates wonders why Anytus
despises the Sophists so much, and discovers that Anytus
claims to know about the Sophists despite his being unacquainted with them
Anytus on Education
Socrates then asks Anytus
who ought to instruct virtue
Anytus replies: "any Athenian gentlemen," the
type that has learned virtue from "the previous generation of
gentlemen"
Themistocles
But, Socrates asks, are such gentlemen good teachers
of their virtue?
Anytus admits that Themistocles was a good man, and that
Themistocles was capable of being a good teacher of "his own virtue"
Themistocles' Son
Themistocles, it is agreed, was a good instructor
of horsemanship to his son
But Anytus admits that
Themistocles' son is not known for being "a wise or good man, as his
father was"
But if virtue could be taught, then wouldn't
Themistocles have imparted virtue to his son?
Goodbye Anytus
Socrates suspects that virtue cannot be taught
Anytus leaves
Teachers Would Admit of Teaching
Socrates and Meno agree
that teachers are those who would at least "acknowledge the possibility of
their own vocation"
Sophists acknowledge the possibility of teaching
Meno's Professed Ignorance
"SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the
Sophists are teachers?"
"MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the
rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers
and sometimes not"
No Teachers
The teachers of virtue would not be, as the
politicians and poets are, in such a confusion about whether or not virtue can
be taught
It is agreed that "if neither the Sophists nor
the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers"
They further agree that there are not students of
virtue then, as well
So, "virtue cannot be taught"
Then there are no good men?
But what about our intuition that there are good
men?
Guidance Needed
Socrates asserts that they need guidance, that of
knowledge, and without that guidance, "there is no seeing how there can be
any good men at all"
Guidance Socrates
explains:
1) Good men are profitable
2) Good men are profitable "only if they are
true guides to us of action"
But how can men guide others to action?
Guides can have correct knowledge and/or true opinions
Guide Analogy
Both the person who knows how to guide you
someplace because he has been there before, and the person who has the true
opinion of how to guide you to the same place (and who has not been there
before), are equally good at guiding you to that place
Thus, "true opinion is as good a guide to
correct action as knowledge"
True Opinion
vs.
Knowledge
If true opinion of X is always true, won't the
holder of it always be as correct about X as the one who has knowledge of
X?
Daedalus & Recollections
True opinions, Socrates argues, are like the
statues of Daedalus, only valuable if they are tied down, as they are liable to
wander off in the night without being secured as such
"while they [true opinions] abide with us they
are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not
remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened
by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno,
is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it"
Thus, true opinions tied down by the knowledge
affirmed by recollection are "more honourable and
excellent" than mere true opinion
Sufficiency
About the claims that there is this difference
between knowledge and true opinion, Socrates asserts knowledge
While knowledge is "more honourable
and excellent" than mere true opinion, true opinion nevertheless gets, so
to speak, the job done
It is agree that
1) True opinions are useful, and
2) The good man is useful
It is further agreed that neither knowledge or true
opinion is given to men by nature
Not Good by Nature
Thus, they agree, the good are not good by nature
They then recount that
a) if virtue is acquired from teaching, then
knowledge was taught them, and
b) if there were teachers, knowledge could be
taught, and
c) if there were not teachers, knowledge could not
be taught
But they had agreed that
1) there "were no teachers of virtue,"
2) that virtue is not wisdom,
3) that virtue is good,
4) the right guide is useful and good,
5) the only right guides are knowledge and true
opinion
Divining
But, they agreed,
1) virtue is not taught,
2) virtue is not knowledge,
3) knowledge is not the guide in political life,
and
4) this explains why politicians are not capable of
teaching virtue, because "their virtue was not grounded in knowledge"
From this, politicians only guide by true opinion,
as diviners only guide with words they do not themselves understand
A diviner is one who succeeds in word and action
without understanding
Thus we can see politicians as those who are
"being inspired and possessed of God" and who do not know what they
themselves say
Socrates Sums Up / Virtue is an Instinct
"To sum up our enquiryÐthe result seems to be,
if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor
acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct
accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen."
Socrates Concludes / Virtue is a Divine Gift
"Then, Meno, the
conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we
shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we
enquire into the actual nature of virtue."
Summarization of Group Exercise: In groups of 3
explain what your essay's argument is, and what a possible naysayer to that
argument could be.
1) Spend two or three minutes writing out your
argument (and if you already have an objection to your argument, write that out
too)
2) Get into groups of 3 (per in-class instructions)
3) Introduce yourselves
4) Each member presents an argument (and not an objection) to the fellow group members for
five minutes, and during that time entertains questions and suggestions about that
argument from the fellow group
members
5) Each member presents an objection to their argument (and not the original argument) to the fellow
group members for five minutes, and during that time entertains questions and
suggestions about that objection to their
argument from the fellow group members