Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, and Sociology

Heilbroner	"What Has Posterity Ever Done for Me?"
Who Cares?	Who cares enough to trade their use of aerosols for someone's future use of the planet for an extra hundred years? Most, it seems, don't
"Empathic Imagination"	Our empathic capacities seem to be such that they don't extend too far into the future
What does it Matter	What does the distant future matter to us if we won't be there to live the consequences of our current actions?
Reason	And it seems like reason won't give us the answer Posterity seems to be beyond my rational care
Rationality	Consider the voice of rationality, as presented in Business and Society Review: "Suppose that, as a result of using up all the world's resources, human life did come to an end. So what? What is so desirable about an indefinite continuation of the human species, religious convictions apart? It may well be that nearly everybody who is already here on earth would be reluctant to die, and that everybody has an instinctive fear of death. But one must not confuse this with the notion that, in any meaningful sense, generations who are yet unborn can be said to be better off if they are born than if they are not."
	Or from The Economic Growth Controversy: " ... Geological time [has been] made comprehensible to our finite human minds by the statement that the 4.5 billion years of the earth's history [are] equivalent to once around the world in an SST. ... Man got on eight miles before the end, and industrial man got on six feet before the end. ... Today we are having a debate about the extent to which man ought to maximize the length of time that he is on the airplane. "According to what the scientists think, the sun is gradually expanding and 12 billion years from now the earth will be swallowed up by the sun. This means that our airplane has time to go round three more times. Do we want man to be on it for all three times around the world? Are we interested in man being on for another eight miles? Are we interested in man being on for another six feet? Or are we only interested in man for a fraction of a millimeter–our lifetimes? "That led me to think: Do I care what happens a thousand years from now? ... Do I care when man gets off the airplane? I think I basically [have come] to the conclusion that I don't care whether man is on the airplane for another eight feet, or if man is on the airplane another three times around the world."
Beyond Reason	And they are correct, such are the dictates of reason and rationality But perhaps our problem lies beyond the capacities of our rationality?
Smith	Consider Adam Smith: "Suppose, asked Smith, that 'a man of humanity' in Europe were to learn of a fearful earthquake in China—an earthquake that swallowed up its millions of inhabitants. How would that man react? He would, Smith mused, 'make many melancholy reflections about the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labors of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might product upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general.' Yet, when this fine philosophizing was over, would our 'man of humanity' care much about the catastrophe in distant China? He would not. As Smith tells us, he would 'pursue his business or his pleasure; take his repose for his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility as if nothing had happened.' "But now suppose, Smith says, that our man were told he was to lose his little finger on the morrow. A very different reaction would attend the contemplation of this 'frivolous disaster.' Our man of humanity would be reduced to a tormented state, tossing all night with fear and dread—whereas 'provided he never saw them he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of hundred millions of his brethren.' "Next, Smith puts the critical question: Since the hurt to his finger bulks so large and the catastrophe in China so small, does this mean that a man of humanity, given the choice, would prefer the extinction of a hundred million Chinese in order to save his little finger? Smith is unequivocal in his answer. 'Human nature startles at the thought,' he cries, 'and the world in its greatest depravity and corruption never produced such a villain as would be capable of entertaining it.'"
	But why lose the finger, if given such a choice? It is the "'man within the beast,'" An "inner creature of conscience whose insistent voice brooks no disobedience" As Smith puts it: "'it is the love of what is honorable and noble, of the grandeur and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.'"
Rationality & Responsibility	As Heilbroner puts it: "it is one thing to appraise matters of life and death by the principles of rational self-interest and quite another to take responsibility for our choice." This difference is understood by the "'survivalist'" principle
	But the "'survivalist'" principle has its own problems The will be, in self-restraint now with regards to things like population control, a "sacrifice [of] some portion of life-to-come in order that life itself may be preserved."
Heilbroner's Conclusion	"I am hopeful that in the end a survivalist ethic will come to the fore–not from the reading of a few books or the passing twinge of a pious lecture, but from an experience that will bring home to us, as Adam Smith brought home to his “man of humanity,” the personal responsibility that defies all the homicidal promptings of reasonable calculation." "Moreover, I believe that the coming generations, in their encounters with famine, war, and the threatened life-carrying capacity of the globe, may be given just such an experience. It is a glimpse into the void of a universe without man. I must rest my ultimate faith on the discovery by these future generations, as the ax of the executioner passes into their hands, of the transcendent importance of posterity for them."