Philosophy 20: Ethics

Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lecture Notes for Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

What is the best way to manage a good that is unowned? 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When one owns land, there is an incentive to care for it in a particular way. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When the land is open to anyone, users' needs are uncontrolled and grow as much as the land can sustain. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Supply is governed by nature, and can be influenced by things like droughtsÐwhich can deplete resources. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Self-interested users frequently fail to account for such depleted resources when those resources are unowned and (otherwise) unregulated. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Herding Example:

 

"At the point when the carrying capacity of the commons [is] fully reached, a herdsman might ask himself, 'Should I add another animal to my herd?'"

 

If the herdsman owns his animals, then any gains from adding an animal will be all his. 

 

If the herdsman doesn't own the common pasture, then any losses to the common pasture from adding an animal will be "'commonized'" to all those who rely on the common pasture. 

 

"Because the privatized gain would exceed his share of the commonized loss, a self-seeking herdsman would add another animal to his herd." 

 

Any self-interested herdsman would do the same. 

 

This destroys the common. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the absence of "some coercive means of controlling the actions of each individual," folks seem individually powerless to prevent that outcome. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Knowing the long-term consequences of behavior does nothing when one is firstly concerned with short-term survival. 

 

"An unmanaged commons in a world of limited material wealth and unlimited desires inevitably ends in ruin."

 

"[E]very workable distribution system must meet the challenge of [competitive] human self-interest."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When oceans or fish are owned for instance, " an owner could sue those who encroach on his fish, owners would have an incentive to refrain from overfishing."

 

Governments instead restrict the number of fish or the amount of time one can fish. 

 

This results in "a vast overinvestment in fishing boats and equipment as individual fishermen compete to catch fish quickly."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

What if there was a tradition wherein herdsmen are limited to a set number of animals? 

 

"Such cases are spoken of as 'managed commons,' which is the logical equivalent of socialism."

 

"Viewed this way, socialism may be good or bad, depending on the quality of the management."

 

"As with all things human, there is no guarantee of permanent excellence. The old Roman warning must be kept constantly in mind: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who shall watch the watchers themselves?)"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Communes sometimes appear to instances of "unmanaged commons." 

 

But their success depends on not exceeding an upper population limit of around 150 people. 

 

"[B]elow 150 people, the distribution system can be managed by shame; above that approximate number, shame loses its effectiveness."