Reading Notes by Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, and
Sociology
Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy
From the John Veitch translation, found in
the "Trilingual HTML Edition" of Descartes' Meditations, edited by D. B. Manley and C. S. Taylor, at
http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/
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Rene Descartes |
Meditations on First
Philosophy |
Quotations
harvested from the John Veitch translation, found in the "Trilingual
HTML Edition" of Descartes' Meditations,
edited by D. B. Manley and C. S. Taylor |
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Sixth Meditation |
"Of
the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction Between the
Mind and Body of Man" |
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Passively Present |
Descartes
notes that some sensations are passively present: "I was conscious that the ideas were presented to me
without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any object,
however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of sense;
and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus
present." |
"And certainly, considering the ideas of all these
qualities, which were presented to my mind, and which alone I properly and
immediately perceived, it was not without reason that I thought I perceived
certain objects wholly different from my thought, namely, bodies from which
those ideas proceeded; for I was conscious that the ideas were presented to
me without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any
object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of
sense; and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus
present." |
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Ansto§ |
"And because the ideas I perceived by the senses
were much more lively and clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct
than any of those I could of myself frame by meditation, or which I found
impressed on my memory, it seemed that they could not have proceeded from
myself, and must therefore have been caused in me by some other objects;" |
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Distinctness of the Mind |
Insofar
as Descartes experiences himself as merely a thinking thing, distinct from
any sensations he might have of his body, he is, essentially, a thinking
thing |
"And, firstly, because I know that all which I
clearly and distinctly conceive can be produced by God exactly as I conceive
it, it is sufficient that I am able clearly and distinctly to conceive one
thing apart from another, in order to be certain that the one is different
from the other, seeing they may at least be made to exist separately, by the
omnipotence of God; and it matters not by what power this separation is made,
in order to be compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely
because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I
do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence beyond
my being a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only
in my being a thinking thing [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is
merely thinking]." |
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Distinctness of the Body |
The
body is experienced as being distinct from the mind Mind,
the thinking thing, un-extended Body,
the non-thinking thing, extended The
un-extended mind can exist independently of the extended body |
"And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly
say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely
conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and
distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended
thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as
far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I,
[that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct
from my body, and may exist without it." |
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Mind Body "Unity" |
Unlike
the captain of a ship that sees a sea-monster chewing on his ship's hull, the
mind has a "certain unity" with the body |
"Nature likewise teaches me by these sensations of
pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot
in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were
intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity." |
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When
a bear is gnawing on my leg, I not only can see it, I can also feel it "all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc.,
are nothing more than certain confused modes of thinking, arising from the
union and apparent fusion of mind and body" |
"For if this were not the case, I should not feel
pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should
perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by
sight when any part of his vessel is damaged; and when my body has need of
food or drink, I should have a clear knowledge of this, and not be made aware
of it by the confused sensations of hunger and thirst: for, in truth, all
these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are nothing more than certain
confused modes of thinking, arising from the union and apparent fusion of
mind and body." |
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Safe Conclusions |
The
existence of other things are frequently safe conclusions |
"Besides this, nature teaches me that my own body is
surrounded by many other bodies, some of which I have to seek after, and
others to shun. And indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colors, sounds,
odors, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are in the
bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain
varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like them;
and since, among these diverse perceptions of the senses, some are agreeable,
and others disagreeable, there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my
entire self, in as far as I am composed of body and mind, may be variously
affected, both beneficially and hurtfully, by surrounding bodies." |
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Despite "Unity" Distinct |
Note
that mind is un-extended and the body is extended You
can cut a part of the body off, and it changes, but you cannot cut a part of
the mind off As
un-extended, the mind does not have parts (at least not in the same way) as
bodies do |
"For in truth, when
I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a
thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly
discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole
mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any
other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my
mind; nor can the faculties of willing, perceiving, conceiving, etc.,
properly be called its parts, for it is the same mind that is exercised [all
entire] in willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving, etc." |
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"This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind
or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been
apprised of it on other grounds" |
"But quite the opposite holds in corporeal or
extended things; for I cannot imagine any one of them [how small soever it
may be], which I cannot easily sunder in thought, and which, therefore, I do
not know to be divisible. This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind
or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been
apprised of it on other grounds." |
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On Dreaming |
"in respect that our memory can never connect our
dreams with each other and with the course of life, in the way it is in the
habit of doing with events that occur when we are awake." "if some one, when
I am awake, appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared, as do
the images I see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he came
or whither he went, I should not without reason esteem it either a specter or
phantom formed in my brain, rather than a real man." |
"And I ought to reject all the doubts of those
bygone days, as hyperbolical and ridiculous, especially the general
uncertainty respecting sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking
state: for I now find a very marked difference between the two states, in
respect that our memory can never connect our dreams with each other and with
the course of life, in the way it is in the habit of doing with events that
occur when we are awake. And, in truth, if some one, when I am awake,
appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared, as do the images
I see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he came or whither
he went, I should not without reason esteem it either a specter or phantom formed
in my brain, rather than a real man." |
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On Knowing Wakefulness |
"But when I perceive objects with regard to which I
can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that in which
they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without
interruption, I can connect the perception I have of them with the whole of
the other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive
occurs while I am awake and not during sleep." |
"But when I perceive objects with regard to which I
can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that in which
they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without
interruption, I can connect the perception I have of them with the whole of
the other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive
occurs while I am awake and not during sleep. And I ought not in the least
degree to doubt of the truth of these presentations, if, after having called
together all my senses, my memory, and my understanding for the purpose of
examining them, no deliverance is given by any one of these faculties which
is repugnant to that of any other: for since God is no deceiver, it
necessarily follows that I am not herein deceived." |
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"But because the necessities of action frequently
oblige us to come to a determination before we have had leisure for so
careful an examination, it must be confessed that the life of man is
frequently obnoxious to error with respect to individual objects; and we
must, in conclusion, acknowledge the weakness of our nature." |
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