Reading Notes by Christopher Lay
Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, and
Sociology
Descartes'
Meditations on First Philosophy
From the John Veitch translation, found in
the "Trilingual HTML Edition" of Descartes' Meditations, edited by D. B. Manley and C. S. Taylor, at
http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/
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Rene Descartes |
Meditations on First
Philosophy |
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First Mediation |
"Of
the Things of Which We May Doubt" |
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Foundations |
Seeks
after a firm foundation for his knowledge Questioning
of knowledge that has been previously received |
"Several
years have now elapsed since I first became aware
that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and
that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly
doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking
once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of
commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to
establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences." |
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Doubt |
Reject
all false knowledge Withholding
belief from what can be doubted |
"my reason convinces me that I ought not the less
carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and
indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to
justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for
doubt." |
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Starts
with beliefs that other beliefs rest upon |
"as the removal from below of the foundation
necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once
approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs
rested." |
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Senses |
The
senses provide much of what we believe Senses
can deceive Ought
not trust what has deceived in the past Senses
do not provide certain beliefs |
"All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as
possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or
through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and
it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which
we have even once been deceived." |
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Dreams |
Can
Descartes be sure of his belief that he is clothed? Such
a belief could be the result of a dream When
dreaming, you sometimes cannot tell you are dreaming |
"How often have I dreamt that I was in these
familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the
fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I
certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head which I now
move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with express purpose,
and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so distinct as all this.
But I cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived in sleep by
similar illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I perceive so
clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can
ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in
amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming." |
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Dreamt Objects |
But
objects dreamt about must come from some source in reality |
"Nevertheless it must be admitted at least that the
objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations
which could not have been formed unless in the likeness of realities; and,
therefore, that those general objects, at all events, namely, eyes, a head,
hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really existent." |
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Unicorns |
Imagists
of fictional unicorns get their representations of unicorns by combining real
things (like extended patches of color) |
"For, in truth, painters themselves, even when they
study to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and
extraordinary, cannot bestow upon them natures absolutely new, but can only
make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if they chance
to imagine something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen
before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it
is at least certain that the colors of which this is composed are real." |
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So
perhaps beliefs about things like extension, or quantity have some reality to
them |
"To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal
nature in general and its extension; the figure of extended things, their
quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time
during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort." |
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"We will not, therefore, perhaps reason
illegitimately if we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine,
and all the other sciences that have for their end the consideration of
composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic,
Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the
simplest and most general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these
are really existent, contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable:" |
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Mathematics in Dreams |
How
can I doubt that 2+2=4 if it is true when I am awake or asleep? |
"for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true
that two and three make five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does
it seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of
falsity [or incertitude]." |
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Doubting Mathematical Truths? |
But
the belief that 2+2=4 could be the product in my mind of an evil genie |
"Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God who is
all powerful, and who created me, such as I am, has, for a long time,
obtained steady possession of my mind. How, then, do I know that he has not
arranged that there should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing,
nor figure, nor magnitude, nor place, providing at the same time, however,
for [the rise in me of the perceptions of all these objects, and] the
persuasion that these do not exist otherwise than as I perceive them? And
further, as I sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of
which they believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know
that I am not also deceived each time I add together two and three, or number
the sides of a square, or form some judgment still more simple, if more
simple indeed can be imagined? But perhaps Deity has not been willing that I
should be thus deceived, for he is said to be supremely good. If, however, it
were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me subject to
constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness to
allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this is
permitted." |
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"Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be
disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe
that there is nothing certain. But let us for the present refrain from
opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous:" |
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"nevertheless, in whatever way it be supposed that I
reach the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an
endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is
clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect
) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant
victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power
possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To these
reasonings I have assuredly nothing to reply, but
am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly
believed to be true of which it is impossible to doubt, and that not through
thoughtlessness or levity, but from cogent and maturely considered reasons;
so that henceforward, if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not
the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to
what might be shown to be manifestly false." |
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Any Object of Thought |
Indeed,
any object of thought could be the product of some evil genie I
cannot have certain knowledge, then, of any object of thought |
"I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is
sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon,
who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his
artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth,
colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the
illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my
credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or
any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these;" |
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"just as the captive, who, perchance, was enjoying
in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but
a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions that
the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the
train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest
the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in
place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the
darkness that will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised." |
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Rene Descartes |
Meditations on First
Philosophy |
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Second Meditation |
"Of
the Nature of the Human Mind; and That it is More Easily Known than the
Body" |
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Certainty |
If
all of my thoughts could be the product of an evil genie, is there anything
of which I can be certain? If
Descartes can find one belief that he can have certain knowledge of, he can
then build upon that |
"by casting aside all that admits of the slightest
doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false; and I
will continue always in this track until I shall find something that is
certain, or at least, if I can do nothing more, until I shall know with
certainty that there is nothing certain. Archimedes, that he might transport
the entire globe from the place it occupied to another, demanded only a point
that was firm and immovable; so, also, I shall be entitled to entertain the
highest expectations, if I am fortunate enough to discover only one thing
that is certain and indubitable." |
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"But how do I know that there is not something
different altogether from the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is
impossible to entertain the slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some
being, by whatever name I may designate him, who causes these thoughts to
arise in my mind ? But why suppose such a being, for
it may be I myself am capable of producing them?" |
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Descartes is not his Body |
Notice
that Descartes cannot believe that he has a body Does
that mean that Descartes himself does not exist? |
"Am I, then, at
least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses or a body; I
hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body
and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion
that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no
earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded
that I did not exist?" |
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Descartes Exists |
But
Descartes does exist |
"Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was
persuaded." |
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To Be |
To
be deceived, is to exist |
"But there is I know not what being, who is
possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is
constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I
exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never
bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am
something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely
and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum
) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or
conceived in my mind." |
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Existing? |
But
what exists? |
"But I do not yet know with sufficient clearness
what I am, though assured that I am;" |
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"I will now consider anew what I formerly believed
myself to be, before I entered on the present train of thought; and of my previous
opinion I will retrench all that can in the least be invalidated by the
grounds of doubt I have adduced, in order that there may at length remain
nothing but what is certain and indubitable." |
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The Body? |
Since
he can doubt the existence of his body, he can't be sure that what exists is
his body |
"But [as to myself, what can I now say that I am],
since I suppose there exists an extremely powerful, and, if I may so speak,
malignant being, whose whole endeavors are directed toward deceiving me? Can
I affirm that I possess any one of all those attributes of which I have
lately spoken as belonging to the nature of body? After attentively
considering them in my own mind, I find none of them that can properly be said
to belong to myself." |
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Rene Descartes |
Meditations on First
Philosophy |
Quotations
harvested from the John Veitch translation, found in the "Trilingual
HTML Edition" of Descartes' Meditations,
edited by D. B. Manley and C. S. Taylor, at
http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/ |
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Sixth Meditation |
"Of
the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction Between the
Mind and Body of Man" |
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Passively Present |
Descartes
notes that some sensations are passively present: "I was conscious that the ideas were presented to me
without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any object,
however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of sense;
and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus
present." |
"And certainly, considering the ideas of all these
qualities, which were presented to my mind, and which alone I properly and
immediately perceived, it was not without reason that I thought I perceived
certain objects wholly different from my thought, namely, bodies from which
those ideas proceeded; for I was conscious that the ideas were presented to
me without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any
object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of
sense; and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus
present." |
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Ansto§ |
"And because the ideas I perceived by the senses
were much more lively and clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct
than any of those I could of myself frame by meditation, or which I found
impressed on my memory, it seemed that they could not have proceeded from
myself, and must therefore have been caused in me by some other objects;" |
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Distinctness of the Mind |
Insofar
as Descartes experiences himself as merely a thinking thing, distinct from
any sensations he might have of his body, he is, essentially, a thinking
thing |
"And, firstly, because I know that all which I
clearly and distinctly conceive can be produced by God exactly as I conceive
it, it is sufficient that I am able clearly and distinctly to conceive one
thing apart from another, in order to be certain that the one is different
from the other, seeing they may at least be made to exist separately, by the
omnipotence of God; and it matters not by what power this separation is made,
in order to be compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely
because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I
do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence beyond
my being a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only
in my being a thinking thing [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is
merely thinking]." |
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Distinctness of the Body |
The
body is experienced as being distinct from the mind Mind,
the thinking thing, un-extended Body,
the non-thinking thing, extended The
un-extended mind can exist independently of the extended body |
"And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly
say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely
conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and
distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a
distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking
thing, it is certain that I, [that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is
entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it." |
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Mind Body "Unity" |
Unlike
the captain of a ship that sees a sea-monster chewing on his ship's hull, the
mind has a "certain unity" with the body |
"Nature likewise teaches me by these sensations of
pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot
in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were
intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity." |
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When
a bear is gnawing on my leg, I not only can see it, I can also feel it "all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc.,
are nothing more than certain confused modes of thinking, arising from the
union and apparent fusion of mind and body" |
"For if this were not the case, I should not feel
pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should
perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by
sight when any part of his vessel is damaged; and when my body has need of
food or drink, I should have a clear knowledge of this, and not be made aware
of it by the confused sensations of hunger and thirst: for, in truth, all
these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are nothing more than certain
confused modes of thinking, arising from the union and apparent fusion of
mind and body." |
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Safe Conclusions |
The
existence of other things are frequently safe conclusions |
"Besides this, nature teaches me that my own body is
surrounded by many other bodies, some of which I have to seek after, and
others to shun. And indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colors, sounds,
odors, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are in the
bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain
varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like them;
and since, among these diverse perceptions of the senses, some are agreeable,
and others disagreeable, there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my entire
self, in as far as I am composed of body and mind, may be variously affected,
both beneficially and hurtfully, by surrounding bodies." |
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Despite "Unity" Distinct |
Note
that mind is un-extended and the body is extended You
can cut a part of the body off, and it changes, but you cannot cut a part of
the mind off As
un-extended, the mind does not have parts (at least not in the same way) as
bodies do |
"For in truth, when
I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a
thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly
discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole
mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any
other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my
mind; nor can the faculties of willing, perceiving, conceiving, etc.,
properly be called its parts, for it is the same mind that is exercised [all
entire] in willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving, etc." |
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"This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind
or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been
apprised of it on other grounds" |
"But quite the opposite holds in corporeal or
extended things; for I cannot imagine any one of them [how small soever it may be], which I cannot easily sunder in
thought, and which, therefore, I do not know to be divisible. This would be
sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different
from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on other grounds." |
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On Dreaming |
"in respect that our memory can never connect our
dreams with each other and with the course of life, in the way it is in the
habit of doing with events that occur when we are awake." "if some one, when I am awake, appeared to me all of a sudden
and as suddenly disappeared, as do the images I see in sleep, so that I could
not observe either whence he came or whither he went, I should not without
reason esteem it either a specter or phantom formed in my brain, rather than
a real man." |
"And I ought to reject all the doubts of those
bygone days, as hyperbolical and ridiculous, especially the general
uncertainty respecting sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking
state: for I now find a very marked difference between the two states, in
respect that our memory can never connect our dreams with each other and with
the course of life, in the way it is in the habit of doing with events that
occur when we are awake. And, in truth, if some one,
when I am awake, appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared,
as do the images I see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he
came or whither he went, I should not without reason esteem it either a
specter or phantom formed in my brain, rather than a real man." |
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On Knowing Wakefulness |
"But when I perceive objects with regard to which I
can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that in which
they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without
interruption, I can connect the perception I have of them with the whole of
the other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive
occurs while I am awake and not during sleep." |
"But when I perceive objects with regard to which I
can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that in which
they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without
interruption, I can connect the perception I have of them with the whole of
the other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive
occurs while I am awake and not during sleep. And I ought not in the least
degree to doubt of the truth of these presentations, if, after having called
together all my senses, my memory, and my understanding for the purpose of
examining them, no deliverance is given by any one of these faculties which
is repugnant to that of any other: for since God is no deceiver, it
necessarily follows that I am not herein deceived." |
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"But because the necessities of action frequently
oblige us to come to a determination before we have had leisure for so
careful an examination, it must be confessed that the life of man is
frequently obnoxious to error with respect to individual objects; and we
must, in conclusion, acknowledge the weakness of our nature." |
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