Reading Excerpted by Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology
Excerpts
of Descartes' Meditations on First
Philosophy
From the
John Veitch translation, found in the "Trilingual HTML Edition" of
Descartes' Meditations, edited by D.
B. Manley and C. S. Taylor, at http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/
First
Meditation: "Of the Things
of Which We May Doubt"
"Several years have now elapsed since I first
became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for
true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was
highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of
undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted,
and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired
to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences."
"my reason convinces me that I ought not the
less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and
indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to
justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for
doubt."
"as the removal from below of the foundation
necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach
the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested."
"All that I have, up to this moment, accepted
as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or
through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it
is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we
have even once been deceived."
"How often have I dreamt that I was in these
familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the
fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I
certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head which I now move
is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with express purpose, and I
perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so distinct as all this. But I
cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived in sleep by similar
illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I perceive so clearly that
there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be
distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I
almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming."
"Nevertheless it must be admitted at least
that the objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted
representations which could not have been formed unless in the likeness of
realities; and, therefore, that those general objects, at all events, namely,
eyes, a head, hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really
existent."
"For, in truth, painters themselves, even when
they study to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and
extraordinary, cannot bestow upon them natures absolutely new, but can only
make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if they chance to
imagine something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen
before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it
is at least certain that the colors of which this is composed are real."
"To this class of objects seem to belong
corporeal nature in general and its extension; the figure of extended things,
their quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the
time during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort."
"We will not, therefore, perhaps reason
illegitimately if we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and
all the other sciences that have for their end the consideration of composite
objects, are indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and
the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most
general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these are really existent,
contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable:"
"for whether I am awake or dreaming, it
remains true that two and three make five, and that a square has but four
sides; nor does it seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a
suspicion of falsity [or incertitude]."
"Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God
who is all powerful, and who created me, such as I am, has, for a long time,
obtained steady possession of my mind. How, then, do I know that he has not arranged
that there should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing, nor
figure, nor magnitude, nor place, providing at the same time, however, for [the
rise in me of the perceptions of all these objects, and] the persuasion that
these do not exist otherwise than as I perceive them? And further, as I
sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of which they
believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not
also deceived each time I add together two and three, or number the sides of a
square, or form some judgment still more simple, if more simple indeed can be
imagined? But perhaps Deity has not been willing that I should be thus
deceived, for he is said to be supremely good. If, however, it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me
subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his
goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this
is permitted."
"I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is
sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who
is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to
deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures,
sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of
dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will
consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and
as falsely believing that I am possessed of these;"
"just as the captive, who, perchance, was
enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it
is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions
that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the
train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest the
time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in place of
bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the darkness that
will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised."
Second
Meditation: "Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and That it is More Easily
Known than the Body"
"by casting aside all that admits of the
slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false;
and I will continue always in this track until I shall find something that is
certain, or at least, if I can do nothing more, until I shall know with
certainty that there is nothing certain. Archimedes, that he might transport
the entire globe from the place it occupied to another, demanded only a point
that was firm and immovable; so, also, I shall be entitled to entertain the
highest expectations, if I am fortunate enough to discover only one thing that
is certain and indubitable."
"But how do I know that there is not something
different altogether from the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is
impossible to entertain the slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being,
by whatever name I may designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind ? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I myself
am capable of producing them?"
"Am I, then, at least not something? But I
before denied that I possessed senses or a body; I hesitate, however, for what
follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without
these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely
nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor
bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not
exist?"
"Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was
persuaded."
"But there is I know not what being, who is
possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is
constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I
exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never
bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am
something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely
and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I
exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my
mind."
"But I do not yet know with sufficient
clearness what I am, though assured that I am;"
"I will now consider anew what I formerly
believed myself to be, before I entered on the present train of thought; and of
my previous opinion I will retrench all that can in the least be invalidated by
the grounds of doubt I have adduced, in order that there may at length remain
nothing but what is certain and indubitable."
"But [as to myself, what can I now say that I
am], since I suppose there exists an extremely powerful, and, if I may so
speak, malignant being, whose whole endeavors are directed toward deceiving me?
Can I affirm that I possess any one of all those attributes of which I have
lately spoken as belonging to the nature of body? After attentively considering
them in my own mind, I find none of them that can properly be said to belong to
myself."
Sixth
Meditation: "Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real
Distinction Between the Mind and Body of Man"
"I was conscious that the ideas were presented
to me without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any
object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of
sense; and it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus
present."
"And certainly, considering the ideas of all
these qualities, which were presented to my mind, and which alone I properly
and immediately perceived, it was not without reason that I thought I perceived
certain objects wholly different from my thought, namely, bodies from which
those ideas proceeded; for I was conscious that the ideas were presented to me
without my consent being required, so that I could not perceive any object,
however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organ of sense; and
it was wholly out of my power not to perceive it when it was thus
present."
"And because the ideas I perceived by the
senses were much more lively and clear, and even, in their own way, more
distinct than any of those I could of myself frame by meditation, or which I
found impressed on my memory, it seemed that they could not have proceeded from
myself, and must therefore have been caused in me by some other objects;"
"And, firstly, because I know that all which I
clearly and distinctly conceive can be produced by God exactly as I conceive
it, it is sufficient that I am able clearly and distinctly to conceive one
thing apart from another, in order to be certain that the one is different from
the other, seeing they may at least be made to exist separately, by the
omnipotence of God; and it matters not by what power this separation is made,
in order to be compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely
because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I do
not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence beyond my
being a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only in my
being a thinking thing [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely
thinking]."
"And although I may, or rather, as I will
shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very
closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct
idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended
thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far
as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, [that is,
my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body,
and may exist without it."
"Nature likewise teaches me by these
sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body
as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as
it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain
unity."
"For if this were not the case, I should not
feel pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but should
perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives by
sight when any part of his vessel is damaged; and when my body has need of food
or drink, I should have a clear knowledge of this, and not be made aware of it
by the confused sensations of hunger and thirst: for, in truth, all these
sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are nothing more than certain
confused modes of thinking, arising from the union and apparent fusion of mind
and body."
"Besides this, nature teaches me that my own
body is surrounded by many other bodies, some of which I have to seek after,
and others to shun. And indeed, as I perceive different sorts of colors,
sounds, odors, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I safely conclude that there are
in the bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed, certain
varieties corresponding to them, although, perhaps, not in reality like them;
and since, among these diverse perceptions of the senses, some are agreeable,
and others disagreeable, there can be no doubt that my body, or rather my entire
self, in as far as I am composed of body and mind, may be variously affected,
both beneficially and hurtfully, by surrounding bodies."
"For in truth, when I consider the mind, that
is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can
distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat
absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to
the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am
conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind; nor can the faculties of
willing, perceiving, conceiving, etc., properly be called its parts, for it is
the same mind that is exercised [all entire] in willing, in perceiving, and in
conceiving, etc."
"This would be sufficient to teach me that the
mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already
been apprised of it on other grounds" "But
quite the opposite holds in corporeal or extended things; for I cannot imagine
any one of them [how small soever it may be], which I
cannot easily sunder in thought, and which, therefore, I do not know to be
divisible. This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is
entirely different from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on
other grounds."
"in respect that our memory can never connect
our dreams with each other and with the course of life, in the way it is in the
habit of doing with events that occur when we are awake."
"if some one, when I
am awake, appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared, as do the
images I see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he came or
whither he went, I should not without reason esteem it either a specter or
phantom formed in my brain, rather than a real man."
"And I ought to reject all the doubts of those
bygone days, as hyperbolical and ridiculous, especially the general uncertainty
respecting sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking state: for I
now find a very marked difference between the two states, in respect that our
memory can never connect our dreams with each other and with the course of
life, in the way it is in the habit of doing with events that occur when we are
awake. And, in truth, if some one, when I am awake,
appeared to me all of a sudden and as suddenly disappeared, as do the images I
see in sleep, so that I could not observe either whence he came or whither he
went, I should not without reason esteem it either a specter or phantom formed
in my brain, rather than a real man."
"But when I perceive objects with regard to
which I can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that in
which they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without
interruption, I can connect the perception I have of them with the whole of the
other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive occurs
while I am awake and not during sleep." "But
when I perceive objects with regard to which I can distinctly determine both
the place whence they come, and that in which they are, and the time at which
they appear to me, and when, without interruption, I can connect the perception
I have of them with the whole of the other parts of my life, I am perfectly
sure that what I thus perceive occurs while I am awake and not during sleep.
And I ought not in the least degree to doubt of the truth of these
presentations, if, after having called together all my senses, my memory, and
my understanding for the purpose of examining them, no deliverance is given by
any one of these faculties which is repugnant to that of any other: for since
God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am not herein deceived."
"But because the necessities of action
frequently oblige us to come to a determination before we have had leisure for
so careful an examination, it must be confessed that the life of man is
frequently obnoxious to error with respect to individual objects; and we must,
in conclusion, acknowledge the weakness of our nature."