Philosophy 5: Critical Thinking and Composition
Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology
Lecture Notes for Stein's On the Problem of Empathy
Description of Empathy in Comparison with Other Acts
"A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain."
"What kind of awareness is this?"
Outer Perception?
"I have no outer perception of the pain."
Objects of outer perception are spatio-temporal beings concretely embodied.
Objects of outer perception come to me with "embodied givenness."
Embodied Givenness
Having "embodied givenness" means having "the quality of being there itself right now."
The facing side of this cup has embodied givenness.
The facing side of this cup is "primordially there."
The non-facing side of this cup is not.
The non-facing side of this cup is "co-perceived."
The non-facing side of this cup is "averted."
Pain
Pain is not like a cup.
Pain does not have a primordial side that can have embodied givenness.
While the cup has non-primordially side that are averted, the non-primordially given sides can be primordially given.
A Limited Parallel Between Outer Perception & Empathy
But just as we can gain clarity about the cup by turning it about.
We can gain some clarity about the pain by investigating it.
But, "in principle, I can never get an 'orientation' where the pain itself is primordially given."
Empathy & Primordiality
While objects of both outer perception and empathy have objects "present here and now."
Empathy lacks the primordiality possible in outer perception.
Primordiality "Within"
But pain can be experienced primordially, if it is our own.
"[O]ur own experiences as they are given in reflection have the character of primordiality."
But not all of our pain is experience primordially.
Remembered pain is not primordially present.
"It is possible for every experience to be primordially given, i.e., it is possible for the reflecting glance of the 'I' in the experience to be there bodily itself. Furthermore, it is possible for our own experiences to be given non-primordially in memory, expectation, or fantasy."
Empathy is Analogous to Memory
"The memory of joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non-primordial."
"This act has the total character of joy which I could study, but the joy is not primordially and bodily there, rather as having once been alive (and this 'once,' the time of the past experience, can be definite or indefinite)."
I Now I Then
In memory, the I remembering faces the I remembered.
I remembering is primordially given.
I remembered is non-primordially given.
Self-Surrogate
"[I]t is possible for me to represent a past situation to myself and be unable to remember my inner behavior in this situation. As I transfer myself back into this situation, a surrogate for the missing memory comes into focus."
You've asked yourself before, haven't you, "What was I thinking?"
Empathy
Similar to memory, in empathy we see "an act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content."
Empathic act: primordially present
Empathized content: non-primordially present
Object / Content / Subject / Understanding
E.G.: The empathic object is another's sadness.
The empathic content is that about which the other is sad.
The empathic subject:
"I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am I at the subject of the content in the original subjects' place"
The empathic understanding of the content is something even further.
Levels
"These are (1) the emergence of experience, (2) the fulfilling expectation, and (3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience."
Alterity
"The subject of the empathized experience, however, is not the subject of the empathizing, but another."
"These two subjects are separate and not joined together, as previously [in memory], by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience."
Non-Primordiality as Empathic Subject
"And while I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial joy."
Other's Primordiality
"This other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial."
Empathy So Far
"Empathy, which we examined and sought to describe, is the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of the experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced."
"This is how human being comprehend the psychic life of their fellows."
Section 5(m)
"The Correction of Empathic Acts"
"If he clenches his fist or utters an oath as he blushes, I see that he is angry. If he has just stooped or walked quickly, I empathize a causal context instead of a motivational one."
Section 5(p)
"The Significance of the Foreign Individual's Constitution for the Constitution of Our Own Psych Individual"
"To consider ourselves in inner perception, i.e., to consider our psychic 'I' and its attributes, means to see ourselves as we see another and as he sees us."
"And, in principle, it is possible for all the interpretations of myself with which I become acquainted to be wrong."
"It is possible for another to 'judge me more accurately' than I judge myself and give me clarity about myself."
"This is how empathy and inner perception work hand in hand to give me myself to myself."
Section 5(k)
"Causality in the Structure of the Individual"
"Let us try to make this clear by examples of what we having in mind."
"A deliberate decision on a problem put to me continues to direct the course of my action long after the actual decision without my being 'conscious' of this as present in current action."
"Does this mean that an isolated past experience determines my present experience form that time on? Not at all."
"This volition that remained unfulfilled for a long time has not fallen 'into forgottenness' during this time, has not sunk back into the stream of the past, become 'lived life' in Scheler's terms."
"It has gone out of the mode of actuality over into that of non-actuality, out of activity into passivity."
"Part of the nature of consciousness is that the cogito, the act in which the 'I' lives, is surrounded by a marginal one of background experiences in each moment of experience."
"These are non-actualities no longer or not yet cogito and therefore not accessible to reflection, either."
"In order to be comprehended, they must first pass through the form of the cogito, which they can do at any time."
"They are still primordially present, even if not actually, and therefore have efficacy."
"The unfulfilled volition is not dead, but continues to live in the background of consciousness until its time comes and it can be realized."
"Then its effect begins."
"Thus it is not something past which affects the present, but something that reaches into the present."
"Therefore, we quite agree that a reproduction of the volition does not set the action in motion."
"And, indeed, we will go even further and say that volition would not be in a position to do this at all."
"A forgotten volition cannot have an effect, and a 'reproduced' volition is not an alive one, either, but a represented one."
"As such it is unable to affect any behavior (as little as in a dark room we can produce the fantasy of a burning lamp to provide the necessary light for reading)."
"It must first be relived, lived through again, in order to be able to have an effect."
"Future events which 'throw their shadows in advance' are no different. Scheler gives an example of James who, under the influence of an unpleasant logic course he had to teach afternoons, undertook many unnecessary activities the entire day before simply so that he would find no time for the burdensome preparation. Yet he did not 'think about it.' ... Rather, it remains 'in the background' and influences our entire conduct. As a non-actual experience not specifically direct, this fear has its object in the expected event. This is not completely present, but constantly tends toward going over into actual experience, toward pulling the 'I' into itself. The fear constantly resists giving itself into this cogito. Its recue is in other actual experiences that are sill blocked in their pure course by that background experience. And of what finally concerns the efficacy of the whole life on every moment of its existence [Daseins] we must say: Everything living into the present can have an effect, irrespective of how far the initiation of the affective experience is from 'now.' Experiences of early childhood can also endure into my present, even though pushed in the background by the profusion of later events. This can be clearly seen in dispositions toward others persons. I do not 'forget' my friends when I am not thinking of them. They then belong to the unnoticed present horizon of my world. My love for them is living even when I am not living in it. It influences my actual feelings and conduct. Out of love for someone, I can abstain from activities which would cause displeasure without 'being conscious' of this. Likewise, animosity against a person, inculcated into me in my childhood, can make an impression on my later life. This is true even though this animosity is pushed entirely into the background and I do not think of this person at all any more. Then, when I meet the animosity again, it can go over into actuality and be discharged in an action or else be brought to reflective clarity and so be made ineffectual. On the contrary, what belongs to my past, what is temporarily or permanently forgotten and can only come to givenness to me in the character of representation by reminiscence or by another's account, has no effect on me. A remembered love is not a primordial feeling and cannot influence me. If I do someone a favor because of a past preference, this inclination is based on a positive opinion of this past preference, not on the represented feeling."