Philosophy 5: Critical Thinking and Composition

Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lecture Notes for Russell's "The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds"

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We feel and think & others feel and think. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

Analogy    

"It is clear that we must appeal to something that may be vaguely called 'analogy.'  The behaviour of other people is in many ways analogous to our own, and we suppose that it must have analogous causes." 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inference

"This is a boring lecture," uttered by a colleague of yours, would be said by you if you had the thought that this lecture is boring, and so you infer that they too think that this lecture is boring. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

Behavior  

Your colleague yawns, and this too is evidence that they are bored, as you have yawned when you are bored.  

 

"There are, in short, very many ways in which my responses to stimuli differ from those of 'dead' matter, and in all these ways other people resemble me."

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Similar Causes

Thoughts cause, in a law-governed way, my behavior. 

 

And "it is natural to infer that the same is true of the analogous behaviour of my friends."

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Knowledge        

Russell's goal is to determine what kind of knowledge we can have of others' thoughts, feelings, and thoughts.   

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Doubt       

Here, we will be dealing with levels of doubt, not certitude.  

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Behavior is Insufficient     

Notice that human behaviors can occur in the (immediate, at least) absence of a live human: MP3 players, televisions, and the like all evince human behavior, but they often times like an immediate live human.   

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Robots      

And we can imagine (easily now-a-days) very lifelike robots that evince all sorts of human behavior that are nevertheless not backed, so to speak, by a living human. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

But How Do You Know?     

And how do we know that an MP3, heard through an MP3 player, is not evidence of occurrent thought by some living human (or humanlike creature)? 

   

Behavioral Differences      

Well, there are behavioral differences between the two

        

The Difference

"One of the most notable peculiarities of human behaviour is change of response to a given stimulus."

   

But

That difference is not enough to prove that "there are 'thoughts' connected with living bodies other than my own."

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

External Observation Materialism

"It is probably possible theoretically to account for the behaviour of living bodies by purely physical causal laws, and it is probably impossible to refute materialism by external observation alone."

   

Inner Observation

Taking inner observation into consideration, we must appeal to inferences from the relationship between our own thoughts and behaviors to others' thoughts corresponding to their observable behaviors. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

Rational Connection

We need a rational connection between behaviors we externally observe in others, and the thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and experiences we cannot externally observe in others. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

Self Observation       

"We know, from observation of ourselves, a causal law of the form 'A causes B,' where A is a 'thought' and B a physical occurrence." 

 

When I think to myself, "I am fat," that causes me to suck in my gut. 

 

A:  thought "I am fat"

 

Causes

 

B:  behavior of sucking in gut

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Other Observation    

I see a colleague sit up and suck in his gut when I enter a room. 

 

I infer the thought "I am fat" in my colleague

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

Evidence  

The more evidence I observe, the less doubtful my inference.

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

Certitude

For me to have certain knowledge, my inference would have to conclude that I had isolated the only cause behind my colleague's behavior.

 

But there are other, possible causes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

   

Probability        

"Or, if we are content to infer that A is probable, it will suffice if we can know that in most cases it is A that causes B."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

        

Evidence & Probability       

Our inference is more probable when we find complementary evidence.

 

My colleague, for instance, could utter at the very same time that he sucks his gut in, "I feel so fat."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

   

Inference w/Certitude      

"From subjective observation I know that A, which is a thought or feeling, causes B, which is a bodily act, e.g. a statement.  I know also that, whenever B is an act of my own body, A is its cause.  I now observe an act of the kind B in a body not my own, and I am having no thought or feeling of the kind A.  But I still believe, on the basis of self-observation, that only A can cause B; I therefore infer that there was an A which caused B, though it was not an A that I could observe."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

   

Conclusion        

"On this ground I infer that other people's bodies are associated with minds, which resemble mine in proportion as their bodily behaviour resembles my own."

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Doubts     

 

Yet,

 

"We cannot be sure that, in our subjective experience, A is the only cause of B." 

 

"And even if A is the only cause of B in our experience, how can we know that this holds outside our experience?"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

Mere Probability Is Sufficient    

"It is not necessary that we should know this with any certainty; it is enough if it is highly probable."

   

   

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

Inference w/Probability   

"If, whenever we can observe whether A and B are present or absent, we find that every case of B has an A as a causal antecedent, then it is probable that most B's have A's as causal antecedents, even in cases where observation does not enable us to know whether A is present or not."

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

Conclusion        

"This postulate, if accepted, justifies the inference to other minds, as well as many other inferences that are made unreflectingly by common sense."