Philosophy 5: Critical Thinking and Composition

Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lecture Notes for Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint

 

 

Book I, Chapter II §§ 1, 3, 4, & the last paragraph of 5

 

&

 

Book II, Chapter I §§ 5 & 6, Chapter II §§ 1, 2, 3, & 7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Book I, Chapter II §§ 1, 3, 4, & the last paragraph of 5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Book I, Chapter Two, §1

Observational Awareness

Incidental Awareness

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Book I, Chapter Two, §3

Observational Awareness in Memory / Temporal Mediation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Book I, Chapter Two, §4

Verification and Analogy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Book I, Chapter Two, last paragraph: 

"What we have said is sufficient to show from which areas the psychologist gains the experiences upon which he bases his investigation of mental laws. We found inner perception to be his primary source, but it has the disadvantage that it can never become observation. To inner perception we added the contemplation of our previous mental experiences in memory, and in this case it is possible to focus attention on them and, so to speak, observe them. The field of experience which up to this point is limited to our own mental phenomena was then extended, in that expressions of the mental life of other persons allow us to gain some knowledge of mental phenomena which we do not experience directly. Certainly the facts which are important for psychology are thus increased a thousand-fold. This last type of experience, however, presupposes observation through memory, just as the latter presupposes the inner perception of present mental phenomena. Inner perception, therefore, constitutes the ultimate and indispensable precondition of the other two sources of knowledge. Consequently, and on this point traditional psychology is correct as against Comte, inner perception constitutes the very foundation upon which the science of psychology is erected."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Book II, Chapter I §§ 5 & 6, Chapter II §§ 1, 2, 3, & 7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brentano's distinctions:

 

 

 

 

 

Phenomena ≠ causes of phenomena. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mental phenomena are characterized by intentionality.  

 

Physical phenomena lack that characteristic. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

All mental phenomena are "perceived in inner consciousness." 

 

Physical phenomena are only the objects of "external perception." 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We can ask "whether there are any mental phenomena which are not objects of consciousness.  All mental phenomena are states of consciousness; but are all mental phenomena conscious, or might there also be unconscious mental acts?" 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Could it be that some unconscious mental phenomena cause us to have some experiences? 

 

 

Could it be that some unconscious mental phenomena are caused by our experiences? 

 

 

Could it be that if we appeal to unconscious mental phenomena as necessary for conscious mental phenomena we end up with "infinite complexity of mental states"? 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brentano's Problem:

 

mental Phenomena are a) intentional (directed, or about something), and mental phenomena are b) the objects of inner perception. 

 

 

 

Is inner perception¹ a mental phenomenon?  Yes. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If inner perception¹ is a mental phenomenon, then it is the object of inner perception². 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If inner perception² is a mental phenomenon, then it is the object of inner perception³. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If inner perception³ is a mental phenomenon, then it is the object of inner perception⁴. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If inner perception⁴ is a mental phenomenon, then it is the object of inner perception⁵. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If inner perception⁵ is a mental phenomenon, then it is the object of inner perception⁶. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If inner perception⁶ is a mental phenomenon, then it is the object of inner perception⁷. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This would mean that we would have an infinite regress of inner perceptions necessary to account for the inner perception of one single mental phenomenon. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The path Brentano admits could exist, but the path he does not want us to go down: Brentano admits that you could solve this problem by saying that there is awareness of the directedness of a mental phenomenon because it is the object of a distinct inner perception, but that you are not aware of the inner perception because inner perception itself is not normally the object of some other inner perception. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brentano's Preferred Answer: The directedness of mental phenomena includes self-directedness, and this self-directedness does not result from some distinct, separate mental phenomenon. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If the inner perception is the result of a distinct, directed mental phenomenon then you have two choices: an infinite regress, or two distinct mental phenomena with only one of them being conscious.  But Brentano argues that inner perception is not the result of a distinct directed mental phenomenon–it is the result of one mental phenomenon with self-direction.