Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy, and Sociology

Churchland (Paul)	"Eliminative Materialism"	From: Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Fifth Edition), Edited by J. Perry, M. Bratman and J.M. Fischer. Published by Oxford University Press (2009). ISBN13: 9780195390360, pp. 280 to 284 ("From Matter and Consciousness, Brandford Books.").
Identity Theory	Needs a "one-to-one match-up" between neuroscientific concepts and folk psychology, which is unlikely coming. If the mind is nothing but what neuroscientific concepts name, then it is not identical to what those concepts name.	"The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, between the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction requires."
Neuronal Chauvinism	Moreover, it is possible that other creatures, without our particular neuronal particularities might also have our folk psychological attributes.	"The reason for that doubt was the great variety of quite different physical systems that could instantiate the required functional organization. "
Eliminative Materialism	Likewise denies the possibility of that identification, but for a different reason.	"Eliminative materialism also doubts that the correct neuroscientific account of human capacities will produce a neat reduction of our common-sense framework, but here the doubts arise from a quite different source."
	Eliminative materialism argues that there is no identification to make, as: "our common-sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity."	"As the eliminative materialists see it, the one-to-one match-ups will not be found, and our common-sense psychological framework will not enjoy an intertheoretic reduction, because our common-sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity."
Folk Psychology	For eliminative materialism, folk psychology is "an outright misrepresentation."	"On this view, folk psychology is not just an incomplete representation of our inner natures; it is an outright misrepresentation of our internal states and activities."
Elimination Over Reduction	"[W]e must expect that the older framework will simply be eliminated, rather than be reduced, by a matured neuroscience."
	"Historical Parallels"
Precedent	There are historical examples of such elimination.	"historical cases of the outright elimination of the ontology of an older theory in favor of the ontology of a new and superior theory"
"'Caloric'" to Explain Heat	Back in the day, heat was understood as "a subtle fluid [called "'caloric'"] held in bodies" Caloric, it was argued, "flowed within a body, or from one body to another, and how it produced thermal expansion, melting, boiling, and so forth." But then, our current understanding of heat was argued for Heat was "not a substance at all, but just the energy of motion of the trillions of jostling molecules that make up the heated body itself." Due to the success of this new "'corpuscular/kinetic theory of matter and heat,'" we ceased to speculate about the existence of caloric.	"For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, learned people believed that heat was a subtle fluid held in bodies, much in the way water is held in a sponge. A fair body of moderately successful theory described the way this fluid substance–called 'caloric'–flowed within a body, or from one body to another, and how it produced thermal expansion, melting, boiling, and so forth. But by the end of the last century it had become abundantly clear that heat was not a substance at all, but just the energy of motion of the trillions of jostling molecules that make up the heated body itself. The new theory–the 'corpuscular/kinetic theory of matter and heat'–was much more successful than the old in explaining and predicting the thermal behavior of bodies."
Caloric Eliminated	And because the new conception of heat was a better theory, the idea of caloric was eliminated from our ontology.	"And since we were unable to identify caloric fluid with kinetic energy (according to the old theory, caloric is a material substance; according to the new theory, kinetic energy is a form of motion), it was finally agreed that there is no such thing as caloric. Caloric was simply eliminated from our accepted ontology."
"'Phlogiston'" to Explain Fire	Back in the day, when wood burns, a "spiritlike substance called 'phlogiston' was being released."	"It used to be thought that when a piece of wood burns, or a piece of metal rusts, a spiritlike substance called 'phlogiston' was being released: briskly, in the former case, slowly in the latter."
	With the phlogiston gone, all that remained was a "base pile of ash."	"Once gone, that 'noble' substance left only a base pile of ash or rust."
Oxygen	But we came up with a better theory. Fire involves, "not the loss of something, but the gaining of a substance taken from the atmosphere: oxygen."	"It later came to be appreciated that both processes involve, not the loss of something, but the gaining of a substance taken from the atmosphere: oxygen."
Phlogiston Elimination	And because the new conception of fire was a better theory, the idea of phlogiston was eliminated, and not merely modified, from our ontology.	"Phlogiston emerged, not as an incomplete description of what was going on, but as a radical misdescription. Phlogiston was therefore not suitable for reduction to or identification with some notion from within the new oxygen chemistry, and it was simply eliminated from science."
Witches to Explain Psychosis	Back in the day, women who (frequently?) suffered from psychotic episodes were called witches. Their bodies were possessed by satan, and this, it was supposed, explained their behaviors.	"Witches provide another example. Psychosis is a fairly common affliction among humans, and in earlier centuries its victims were standardly seen as cases of demonic possession, as instances of Satan's spirit itself, glaring malevolently out at us from behind the victims' eyes. That witches exist was not a matter of any controversy."
	"But observable or not, we eventually decided that witches simply do not exist. We concluded that the concept of a witch is an element in a conceptual framework that misrepresents so badly the phenomena to which it was standardly applied that literal application of the notion should be permanently withdrawn."
Mental Dysfunction & Witches Eliminated	And because the new conception of mental dysfunction was a better theory, the idea of witches was eliminated from our ontology.	"Modern theories of mental dysfunction led to the elimination of witches from our serious ontology."
Folk Psychology to Explain Human Behavior	Back in the day, and even today, we appeal to beliefs and desires to explain human behavior.	"The concepts of folk psychology–belief, desire, fear, sensation, pain, joy, and so on–await a similar fate, according to the view at issue. And when neuroscience has matured to the point where the poverty of our current conceptions is apparent to everyone, the superiority of the new framework is established, we shall then be able to set about reconceiving our internal states and activities, within a truly adequate conceptual framework at last."
Neuro-Pharmacological States & Beliefs and Desires Eliminated	But when the sciences mature, we'll replace talk of beliefs and desires with talk of neuropharmacological states. Beliefs and desires will go the way of caloric, phlogiston and witches–eliminated from our theoretical explanations.	"Our explanations of one another's behavior will appeal to such things as our neuropharmacological states, the neural activity in specialized anatomical areas, and whatever other states are deemed relevant by the new theory. Our private introspection will also be transformed, and may be profoundly enhanced by reason of the more accurate and penetrating framework it will have to work with ... "
Benefits and Drawbacks of the Elimination	"The simple increase in mutual understanding that the new framework made possible could contribute substantially toward a more peaceful and humane society. Of course, there would be dangers as well: increased knowledge means increased power, and power can always be misused."
	"Arguments for Eliminative Materialism"
Against the Reduction	A main argument is that folk psychology cannot be reduced to the fruits of a matured neuroscience.	"The distinguishing feature of this position is its denial that a smooth intertheoretic reduction is to be expected–even a species-specific reduction–of the framework of folk psychology to the framework of a matured neuroscience."
Folk Psychology	Why? Because folk psychology is " a hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal activities."	"The reason for this denial is the eliminative materialist's conviction that folk psychology is a hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal activities."
Argument One / Folk Psychological Failures	Just consider some of the failures of folk psychology.	"There are at least three reasons. First, the eliminative materialist will point to the widespread explanatory, predictive, and manipulative failures of folk psychology."
	"So much of what is central and familiar to us remains a complete mystery from within folk psychology."
Sleep	"We do not know what sleep is, or why we have to have it, despite spending a full third of our lives in that condition. (The answer, 'For rest,' is mistaken. Even if people are allowed to rest continuously, their need for sleep is undiminished. Apparently, sleep serves some deeper functions, but we do not yet know what they are.)"
Learning and Intelligence	"We do not understand how learning transforms each of us from a gaping infant to a cunning adult, or how differences in intelligence are grounded."
Memory	"We have not the slightest idea how memory works, or how we manage to retrieve relevant bits of information instantly from the awesome mass we have stored."
Mental Illness	"We do not know what mental illness is, nor how to cure it."
Mystery!	"In sum, the most central things about us remain almost entirely mysterious from within folk psychology."
Possible Reply: Youth	And the defenders of the theory cannot say that folk psychology just needs time: its had more than 2,000 years. And over those 2,000 years, it "has enjoyed no significant changes or advances."	"the defects noted cannot be blamed on inadequate time allowed for their correction, for folk psychology has enjoyed no significant changes or advances in well over 2,000 years, despite its manifest failures."
Damaged Brains	The problems with folk psychology are more blatant when one considers damaged brains. Here, folk psychology's "descriptive and explanatory resources start to claw the air."	"This argument from explanatory poverty has a further aspect. So long as one sticks to normal brains, the poverty of folk psychology is perhaps not strikingly evident. But as soon as one examines the many perplexing behavioral and cognitive deficits suffered by people with damaged brains, one's descriptive and explanatory resources start to claw the air."
Folk Psychology is not just Impoverished it is Wrong-Headed	"As with other humble theories asked to operate successfully in unexplored extensions of their old domain (for example, Newtonian mechanics in the domain of velocities close to the velocity of light, and the classical gas law in the domain of high pressures or temperatures), the descriptive and explanatory inadequacies of folk psychology become starkly evident."
Argument Two / Miraculous Success	Look at all of those failed appeals to things like caloric, phlogiston, and witches. Eliminated	"The second argument tries to draw an inductive lesson from our conceptual history. Our early folk theories of motion were profoundly confused, and were eventually displaced entirely by more sophisticated theories."
	"[T]he phenomenon of conscious intelligence is surely a more complex and difficult phenomenon than any of those just listed." "So far as accurate understanding is concerned, it would be a miracle if we had got that one right the very first time, when we fell down so badly on all the others."	"the phenomenon of conscious intelligence is surely a more complex and difficult phenomenon than any of those just listed. So far as accurate understanding is concerned, it would be a miracle if we had got that one right the very first time, when we fell down so badly on all the others. Folk psychology has survived for so very long, presumably, not because it is basically correct in its representations, but because the phenomena addressed are so surprisingly difficult that any useful handle on them, no matter how feeble, is unlikely to be displaced in a hurry."
Argument Three / Comparative Advantage	You might think that eliminative materialism has no chance, as it appears so outlandish. But compare it to identity theory (or functionalism). The likelihood of our coming up with things like neuropharmacological states to explain behavior is higher than the likelihood of coming up with folk psychological match-ups.	"A third argument attempts to find an a priori advantage for eliminative materialism over the identity theory and functionalism. It attempts to counter the common intuition that eliminative materialism is distantly possible, perhaps, but is much less probable than either the identity theory or functionalism. The focus again is on whether the concepts of folk psychology will find vindicating match-ups in a matured neuroscience. The eliminativist bets no; the other two bet yes. (Even the functionalist bets yes, but expects the match-ups to be only species-specific, or only person-specific. Functionalism, recall, denies the existence only of universal type/type identities.)"
	"[T]he fact is, there are vastly many more ways of being an explanatorily successful neuroscience while not mirroring the structure of folk psychology, than there are ways of being an explanatorily successful neuroscience while also mirroring the very specific structure of folk psychology."
	"Accordingly, the a priori probability of eliminative materialism is not lower, but substantially higher than that of either of its competitors."
	Arguments Against Eliminative Materialism
Eliminative Materialism Counters Deeply Held Intuitions	Eliminative materialism, from a lay perspective, seems patently false.	"The initial plausibility of this rather radical view is low for almost everyone, since it denies deeply entrenched assumptions."
First Argument / Introspection	Just look at one's own pains, or beliefs: "Their existence is as obvious as anything could be"	"Eliminative materialism is false, runs the argument, because one's introspection reveals directly the existence of pains, beliefs, desires, fears, and so forth. Their existence is as obvious as anything could be."
Eliminativists' Reply: Conceptual Framework	Yes, but those "inner" observations are only as good as the conceptual framework underpinning them. "[A]ll observation occurs within some system of concepts, and our observation judgments are only as good as the conceptual framework in which they are expressed."	"The eliminative materialist will reply that this argument makes the same mistake that an ancient or medieval person would be making if he insisted that he could just see with his own eyes that the heavens form a turning sphere, or that witches exist. The fact is, all observation occurs within some system of concepts, and our observation judgments are only as good as the conceptual framework in which they are expressed."
	"In all three cases–the starry sphere, witches, and the familiar mental states–precisely what is challenged is the integrity of the background conceptual frameworks in which the observation judgments are expressed."
	Appealing to one's own conceptual framework to argue that one's own conceptual framework exists doesn't prove that it is the best conceptual framework. "To insist on the validity of one's experiences, traditionally interpreted, is therefore to beg the very question at issue." "For in all three cases, the question is whether we should reconceive the nature of some familiar observational domain."
Second Argument / Incoherence	To claim that "familiar mental states do not really exist" is meaningful only if it expresses a belief. The claims of eliminative materialism against beliefs are beliefs themselves, and so only exist only if beliefs exist.	"A second criticism attempts to find an incoherence in the eliminative materialist's position. The bald statement of eliminative materialism is that the familiar mental states do not really exist. But that statement is meaningful, runs the argument, only if it is the expression of a certain belief, and an intention to communicate, and a knowledge of the language, and so forth."
	"But if the statement is true, then no such mental states exist, and the statement is therefore a meaningless string of marks or noises, and cannot be true. Evidently, the assumption that eliminative materialism is true entails that it cannot be true."
Reply: Meaningfulness from a Different Source	If eliminative materialism is true, then the source of the meaningfulness of its claims resides not in beliefs. "To insist on the 'old' source is to insist on the validity of the very framework at issue."	"The hole in this argument is the premise concerning the conditions necessary for a statement to be meaningful. It begs the question. If eliminative materialism is true, then meaningfulness must have some different source. To insist on the 'old' source is to insist on the validity of the very framework at issue."
Reply: Meaningfulness from a Different Source / E.G.	Back in the day, we sometimes used to account for biological life by saying that matter was "ensouled" by an immaterial soul/spiri.t	"Consider the medieval theory that being biologically alive is a matter of being ensouled by an immaterial vital spirit. And consider the following response to someone who has expressed disbelief in that theory."
Bad Reply to E.G.	"My learned friend has stated that there is no such thing as vital spirit. But this statement is incoherent. For if it is true, then my friend does not have vital spirit, and must therefore be dead. But if he is dead, then his statement is just a string of noises, devoid of meaning or truth. Evidently, the assumption that antivitalism is true entails that it cannot be true!"
	"This second argument is now a joke, but the first argument begs the question in exactly the same way."
Third Argument / Misplaced Enthusiasm	Here the criticism has eliminative materialism exaggerating the defects of folk psychology, and downplaying its successes. Sure, we may need to adjust folk psychology in places in the face of neuroscientific findings, but that is not elimination. "[T]he large-scale elimination forecast by the eliminative materialist is just an alarmist worry or a romantic enthusiasm."	"A final criticism draws a much weaker conclusion, but makes a rather stronger case. Eliminative materialism, it has been said, is making mountains out of molehills. It exaggerates the defects in folk psychology, and underplays its real successes. Perhaps the arrival of a matured neuroscience will require the elimination of the occasional folk-psychological concept, continues the criticism, and a minor adjustment in certain folk-psychological principles may have to be endured. But the large-scale elimination forecast by the eliminative materialist is just an alarmist worry or a romantic enthusiasm."
Reply: Maybe, but ...	"Perhaps this complaint is correct. And perhaps it is merely complacent. Whichever, it does bring out the important point that we do not confront two simple and mutually exclusive possibilities here: pure reduction versus pure elimination. Rather, these are the end points of a smooth spectrum of possible outcomes, between which there are mixed cases of partial elimination and partial reduction. Only empirical research (see chapter 7 [of Matter and Consciousness]) can tell us where on that spectrum our own case will fall. Perhaps we should speak here, more liberally, of "revisionary materialism", instead of concentrating on the more radical possibility of an across-the-board elimination. Perhaps we should. But it has been my aim in this section to make it at least intelligible to you that our collective conceptual destiny lies substantially toward the revolutionary end of the spectrum."