Reading
Excerpted by Christopher Lay
Los Angeles Pierce College
Department of History, Philosophy, & Sociology
Excerpts from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, as found here:
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html
Book II, Chapters 5,6,
& 7
Book II, Chapter 5
"Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found
in the soul are of three kinds- passions, faculties, states of character,
virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear,
confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and
in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties
the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g.
of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the
things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the
passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently
or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference
to the other passions."
"Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are
not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the
ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor
blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised,
nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a
certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed."
"Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are
modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are
said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not
to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way."
"For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither
called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling
the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good
or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are
neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states
of character."
"Thus
we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus."
Book II, Chapter 6
"We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of
character, but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that
every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which
it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the
excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the
excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse
makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider
and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every
case, the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man
good and which makes him do his own work well."
"How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain
also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In
everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less,
or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively
to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the
intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the
extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively
to us that which is neither too much nor too little- and this is not one, nor
the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the
intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by
an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But
the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too
much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that
the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the
person who is to take it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much for the
beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus
a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and
chooses this- the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us."
"If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking
to the intermediate and judgling its works by this standard (so that we often
say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add
anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art,
while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their
work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature
also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I
mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions,
and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both
fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and
pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but
to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards
the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both
intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with
regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now
virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of
failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of
success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of
virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at
what is intermediate."
"Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to
the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that
of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason
also one is easy and the other difficult- to miss the mark easy, to hit it
difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic
of vice, and the mean of virtue; For men are good in but one way, but bad in
many."
"Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying
in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational
principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess
and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices
respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and
actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence
in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue
is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme."
"But
not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that
already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of
actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by
their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies
of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must
always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend
on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the
right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally
absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there
should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be
a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of
deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage
because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we
have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they
are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and
deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean."
Book II, Chapter 7
"We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also
apply it to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those
which are general apply more widely, but those which are particular are more
genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must
harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases from our
table. With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of
the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the
states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he
who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to
pleasures and pains- not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains-
the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with
regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons also have
received no name. But let us call them 'insensible'."
"With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality,
the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people
exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls
short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in
spending. (At present we are giving a mere outline or summary, and are
satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactly determined.) With
regard to money there are also other dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for
the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large
sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and
a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to
liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated later. With regard
to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort
of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality
was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so
there is a state similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small
honours while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour
as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his
desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the
intermediate person has no name. The dispositions also are nameless, except
that that of the ambitious man is called ambition. Hence the people who are at
the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we ourselves sometimes call the
intermediate person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise
the ambitious man and sometimes the unambitious. The reason of our doing this
will be stated in what follows; but now let us speak of the remaining states
according to the method which has been indicated."
"With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a
mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we call the
intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean good temper; of the
persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his
vice irascibility, and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of person,
and the deficiency inirascibility."
"There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to
one another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned with
intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with
truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind is
exhibited in giving amusement, the other in all the circumstances of life. We
must therefore speak of these too, that we may the better see that in all
things the mean is praise-worthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor
right, but worthy of blame. Now most of these states also have no names, but we
must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be
clear and easy to follow. With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a
truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the
pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a
boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person
characterized by it mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in the giving of
amusement the intermediate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready
wit, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon,
while the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness.
With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in
life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the
mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he
has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the
man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and
surly sort of person."
"There
are also means in the passions and concerned with the passions; since shame is
not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the modest man. For even in these
matters one man is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed, as for
instance the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who falls short
or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person
is modest. Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these
states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes
of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is
pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained
at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained
that he even rejoices. But these states there will be an opportunity of
describing elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has not one simple
meaning, we shall, after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds
and say how each of them is a mean; and similarly we shall treat also of the
rational virtues."