Reading Notes by Christopher Lay

Los Angeles Pierce College

Department of History, Philosophy & Sociology

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapters 5,6, & 7

Aristotle	Nicomachean Ethics	Aristotle (1984), Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson, published by Princeton University Press.
Book II	Chapter 5
Soul Parts	In the human soul there are three kinds of things: passions, faculties, and states.
Passions	Passions: "appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain.
Faculties	Faculties: "the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling passions.
States	States: "the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions."
States / E.G.	States e.g.: "with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately."
Not Praised or Blamed	"[W]e are neither praised or blamed for our passions."
Praise and Blame	"[F]or our excellences and our vices we are praised and blamed."
Choice	"[W]e feel anger and fear without choice, but the excellences are choices or involve choice."
Not Blamed for Feelings	"[F]or our excellences and our vices we are praised and blamed." "[W]e feel anger and fear without choice, but the excellences are choices or involve choice." "[W]e are neither called good nor bad, nor praised or blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions."
Elimination	"[T]he excellences are neither passions nor faculties [so] all that remains is that they should be states."
Excellence in the Soul	Aristotle tells us that virtues are not to be found in the passions since virtues are "choices or involve choice" (1106^a3-4). Virtues are not faculties, for you can't be faulted for being able to feel things. So, by a process of elimination, we can conclude that virtues are states of the soul. "[T]he excellences are neither passions nor faculties [so] all that remains is that they should be states."

Aristotle	Nicomachean Ethics	Aristotle (1984), Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson, published by Princeton University Press.
Book II	Chapter 6
But What Is Virtue or Excellence?	Here's Aristotle's initial characterization: "every excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is an excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well" (1106^a15-7). "The excellence of man also will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well" (1106^a21-3).
Intermediate / Mean	"[T]he intermediate [relative] to us [is] that which is neither too much nor too little."
Masters of Art	"[A] master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate."
Art Analogy	Art analogy: "it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the man preserves it."
Negative Definitions	Sometimes to get a good understanding of what something is (the positive definition of something), it is useful to understand what that thing is not (the negative definition of that same thing). (We saw Aristotle provide negative definitions when we attempted to understand what virtues are with respect to the soul. By saying the virtues were not passions or faculties, he was thereby able to say what they were, states of the soul.) Now we turn to a negative definition of virtue.
Vice	A virtue is not a vice. But there are two kinds of vices, there is the vice of excess and there is the vice of deficiency. Virtues are neither vices of excess nor vices of deficiency.
The Mean	Here's how he puts the positive and the negative definitions of virtue together: "[Virtue], then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess, and that which depends on defect" (1107^a1).
Passions Management	"it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while excellence both finds and chooses that which is intermediate" (1107^a3-5). So, understand that virtuous states are those that manage passions and actions in the appropriate way.
Virtues and Vices	Together: "Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while excellence both finds and chooses that which is intermediate."
Actions for Which there are no Means	But there are some actions which do not admit of a mean, like theft or murder. And so it is not possible to be "right with regard to them."

Aristotle	Nicomachean Ethics	Aristotle (1984), Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson, published by Princeton University Press.
Book II	Chapter 7
Examples	There are a number of examples to consider: Art, Courage, Temperance, "Giving and Taking Money," Pride, Truth, Humor, Friendliness, and Modesty. Each in turn.
Art	Aristotle looks to the aesthetic world for a general example: "every art does its work well–by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of the art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work)" (1106^b8-14).
Courage	Here is a more rigorous example: "With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward" (1107^a32-^b4). So: "With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean." "[H]e who exceeds in fearlessness has no name." He "who exceeds in confidence is rash." "[H]e who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward."
Temperance	Self-indulgent: excess with regards to pleasures self-indulgent Temperance: mean with regards to pain and pleasure "'[I]nsensible'": deficiency with regards to pleasures
Giving and Taking Money	"With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. They exceed and fall short in contrary ways to one another: the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending" (1107^a9-14). So: Prodigality: excess with regards to giving money and deficiency of getting money Liberality: mean with regards to giving and getting money Meanness: deficiency with regards to giving and excess with regards to getting money
Pride	Empty Vanity: excess with regards to honor and dishonor Pride: mean with regards to honor and dishonor Undue humility: deficiency with regards to honor and dishonor
Temper	Irascible excess with regards to anger Good tempered: mean with regards to anger Inirascible: deficiency with regards to anger
Truth	"The intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretense which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it mock-modest" (1108^a18-23). Examples: Boastfulness in civil defense, and Mock-Modesty in the classroom.
Humor	"With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the intermediate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness" (1108^a23-7). So: Buffoon: excess Ready-witted: mean Boor: deficiency
Friendliness	Obsequious flatterer: excess Friendly: mean Quarrelsome and surly: deficiency
Modesty	Bashful: excess shame Modest: mean Shameless: deficiency of shame